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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
ESSAYS ON INCOME VOLATILITY AND INDIVIDUAL WELL-BEING 
 
My dissertation consists of three essays in which I document trends in earnings 
and income volatility, estimate potential causal mechanisms for changing volatility, and 
examine the long-term consequences of parental income volatility for children.  In essay 
2 I document trends in earnings and income volatility of individuals and families using 
matched data in the March Current Population survey from 1973 to 2009. Essay 3 
advances the literature on volatility, using matched data from the CPS to identify 
demographic and labor market correlates of earnings volatility within education-birth 
year cohorts.  This study collapses the cross-sectional CPS into a pseudo-panel and then 
estimates the association between earnings volatility and race, local economic activity, 
and industry, accounting for endogeneity and sample selection bias.  In essay 4 I use data 
linked across generations in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to estimate the 
relationship between exposure to volatile income during childhood and a set of 
socioeconomic outcomes in adulthood. The empirical framework is an augmented 
intergenerational income mobility model that includes controls for income volatility.  
 I find that family income volatility rose by 38 percent over the past four decades, 
likely driven both by rising volatility of earnings and non means-tested non-labor income. 
Rising family income volatility occurs across race, education, and family structure. From 
essay 3, I find that individuals with lower mean earnings have higher earnings volatility.  
Earnings volatility is also weakly related to race, decreases when young and then rises 
while workers are still within prime working years.  Industry and local economic 
conditions are significantly related to the occurrence of earnings volatility after 
accounting for education, though these links differ between men and women.  Finally, 
when examining the intergenerational consequences of volatility, a weak negative 
association occurs between family income instability during childhood and adult 
educational outcomes in essay 4.   
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 1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 Several economic studies have documented a rise in earnings and income 
volatility throughout the United States over the past 40 years.  This phenomenon may or 
may not warrant concern in an economy with functioning credit markets and individuals 
consuming on permanent income.  When volatility derives from uncharacteristically low 
earnings relative to the previous year, this implies consumption on accumulated savings 
or accessing loanable funds.  Such volatility could have far reaching consequences for 
well-being among individuals and families unable to absorb these changes through 
traditional consumption smoothing channels.  If volatility has negative consequences and 
occurs unequally across demographic groups, this introduces additional concerns 
regarding inequality and economic mobility.  Because some volatility derives from 
income changes that are involuntary, such as the loss of employment, unanticipated 
health problems, or other events resulting in transitions into and out of the labor force, the 
occurrence of such unanticipated volatility is a concern for policymakers. The social 
safety net is designed to insure against such events by intervening for individuals and 
families with limited access to the consumption smoothing benefits of savings and credit 
markets.  In other instances, volatility can result from voluntary decisions or positive 
growth in earnings and income over time, neither of which connote the same individual 
or family welfare concerns as unexpected volatility.   
 With these important implications for individual well-being and the social safety 
net in mind, this dissertation consists of three essays in which I document trends in 
earnings and income volatility, estimate potential causal mechanisms for changing 
volatility, and examine the long-term consequences of parental income volatility for 
 2 
children.  The first essay of the dissertation, essay 2, examines historical trends in 
earnings and income volatility among families.  These historical trends focus on family 
volatility trends occurring across race, education, and family structure type.   Essay 2 
provides documentation of volatility trends across a variety of demographic 
characteristics and also shows how trends are sensitive to labor force transitions.  Essay 3 
then examines correlates of exposure to earnings volatility.  Here, explanatory variables 
include race, earnings level, education, local economic performance, and industry 
classification.  This essay estimates individual and local economic variables, along with 
industrial correlates of earnings volatility, adding to knowledge from essay 2 to 
understand where volatility is likely to occur within the population.  Finally, essay 4 
estimates an augmented intergenerational mobility model to examine the relationship 
between income volatility during childhood and adult outcomes.     
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2 FAMILY EARNINGS AND INCOME VOLATILITY IN AMERICA 
2.1 Introduction 
There is ongoing debate in economics on whether and to what extent the volatility 
of earnings and incomes have increased in the United States in recent decades 
(Gottschalk and Moffitt 1994, 2009; Dynarski and Gruber 1997; Haider 2001; Kniesner 
and Ziliak 2002a,b; Gundersen and Ziliak 2003; Dahl, DeLeire, and Schwabish 2008; 
Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel 2008; Hacker and Jacobs 2008; Jensen and Shore 2008; 
Keys 2008; Shin and Solon 2008; Winship 2009).  Documenting trends in volatility 
facilitates a better understanding of the rise in income inequality since the mid 1970s 
(Katz and Autor 1999; Piketty and Saez 2003; Lemieux 2006; Autor, Kearney, and Katz 
2008). Higher inequality could be due to a rise in overall earnings and income instability, 
a shift in permanent incomes, or both (Gottschalk and Moffitt 1994; Haider 2001). 
However, if there is little evidence of a rise in instability then widening inequality is the 
likely outcome of lifetime changes in the distribution of earnings and income, which 
could have negative consequences for long-term economic mobility (Gottschalk and 
Moffitt 2009).  The evidence on earnings and income volatility comes almost exclusively 
from longitudinal data in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (Gittleman and Joyce 
1996; Cameron and Tracy 1998; Dahl, et al. 2008).   
 In this essay I offer new evidence on earnings and income volatility using data 
from matched Current Population Survey (CPS) files spanning 1973-2009, which makes 
the results more informative to the CPS-based inequality research.1 The rotating structure 
                                                 
1 Gittleman and Joyce (1996) use matched CPS data to estimate earnings mobility and inequality from 
1968-1992, focusing on shifts in permanent income differences rather than volatility. Cameron and Tracy 
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of the CPS permits one to match approximately 50 percent of sample respondents in one 
March survey to the March survey the subsequent year.  I then calculate volatility by 
extending the summary measure used in Dynan, et al. (2008) and Dahl, et al. (2008), 
described in the literature section, so it is robust not only to those workers transitioning in 
and out of the labor market but also to negative earnings commonly found among the 
self-employed.  This captures the trend growth in the fraction of the labor force that is 
self employed, as well as growth in the fraction of men out of the labor force and women 
into the labor force.  The results can be generalized to the U.S. population because the 
larger sample sizes of the CPS allow me to estimate volatility trends with precision for 
detailed subgroups by race, and family structure. 
Essay 2 calls attention to income and earnings volatility at the family level.  By 
doing so, I establish a better understanding of the total earnings and incomes available to 
individuals; this is a helpful step towards determining if and how volatility affects the 
economic well-being of adults and dependent children within the family unit.  Family 
earnings and income volatility trends account for labor market earnings but also include 
non-labor income and government transfers.  By emphasizing both earnings and income, 
I obtain a more complete representation of the family’s total resource volatility.  Because 
a family’s economic volatility can occur from a range of voluntary and involuntary 
events that may not be directly related to labor market or non-labor income instability, 
this essay cannot lend predictions of welfare consequences from volatile earnings or 
incomes.  Instead, this essay identifies heterogeneity in family earnings and income 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1998) use matched CPS data to examine earnings instability of working men, focusing on the 
permanent/transitory distinctions found in Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994). 
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volatility trends across race, family structure, education, gender, and by income source 
that motivates additional inquiry into volatility’s causes and consequences.   
I find that family income volatility rose by 38 percent over the past four decades, 
driven both by rising volatility of earnings and non means-tested non-labor income. 
Rising family income volatility occurs across race, education, family structure, and the 
life cycle. Overall family income volatility peaked in 1999, with the 2000s characterized 
by greater short-term volatility rather than a continued secular increase.  Most of the 20 
percent increase in family earnings volatility occurred prior to the 1990s, which coincides 
with the trend volatility of male earnings. The earnings volatility of women fell 
dramatically between 1973 and 1983, with the continued secular decline converging 
toward the levels of men. The variance decomposition of earnings volatility suggests that 
trends are driven by increases in the conditional variance of earnings of continuous 
workers and the variance of the conditional mean of those workers exiting the labor 
force.  
2.2 Literature  
 The use of the PSID for estimates of volatility owes in part to the literature’s early 
emphasis on decomposing volatility into its permanent and transitory components 
(Gottschalk and Moffitt 1994).  The original motivation in this decomposition was to gain 
a deeper understanding of the observed increase in earnings variability throughout the 
1970s and 1980s and to gain a better understanding of what factors drove this dispersion.  
The variance decompositions are illustrative because they permit identification of 
temporary deviations of earnings from long-term trends, as well as identification of 
structural changes in long-term trends.  This characterization of earnings variance helps 
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to fit a range of labor market events as possible causes of short term instability, including 
job loss, which might drive the transitory component and larger shifts in the economy 
that would show up as permanent volatility.  To connect these and other measures 
employed throughout the dissertation, I describe the major volatility definitions from the 
literature.  First, income 𝑦𝑖𝑡 can be decomposed into a permanent component 𝜇𝑖 and a 
transitory component 𝑣𝑖𝑡: 
(1) 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡.  
Like total income or earnings, total volatility can be decomposed into its permanent and 
transitory components (Gottschalk and Moffitt 1994): 
 (2) 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡𝜇𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
where 𝜇𝑖 is permanent earnings, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is transitory earnings, and 𝛼𝑡 and 𝜑𝑡 are time-varying 
factor loadings on the permanent and transitory components, respectively.  Assuming that 
the factor loadings are equal to 1 in all periods, and that the permanent and transitory 
components are independent, then the variance of log earnings in (2) is simply  
(3) 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡) = 𝜎𝜇2 + 𝜎𝜀2. 
This decomposition in (3) prevails in discussions of how the cross-sectional 
distribution of earnings has been affected by permanent and transitory volatility in recent 
decades.  One reason for the dominance of this approach is the intuition by which 
permanent and transitory volatility might occur among individuals and within the 
population.  Transitory volatility, deviations from some individual-specific mean, could 
represent temporary increases in economic hardship or risk, but could equally result from 
positive events including bonus or incentive pay.  Permanent volatility, measured as the 
variance of earnings (or incomes) between individuals, could be more indicative of larger 
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shifts throughout society and the economy.  Changes in permanent volatility could 
indicate larger shifts in the degree of mobility within and across generations, a topic 
taken up in more detail within essay 4.  A leading, though somewhat controversial 
explanation for permanent volatility is skill biased technological change (Autor, Kearney, 
and Katz 2008), whereby changes in the functioning of the economy put a higher 
premium on skilled labor, with this premium being reflected by greater income and 
earnings inequality throughout society (Gottschalk and Moffitt 2009).  Dynan et al. 
(2008) posit that part of volatility originates from involuntary job loss and wage cuts, as 
well as a voluntary component.  Forecasting the risks related to earnings instability 
requires determining if the observed instability was voluntary or involuntary, anticipated 
or unanticipated, and whether or not individuals have access to public or private 
insurance mechanisms to absorb such instability (Shin and Solon 2010).    
 Historical trends in volatility suggest many adults in the PSID experienced high 
levels of family income volatility as a child.  Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) find that 
transitory earnings volatility was approximately 1/3rd of the overall volatility observed, 
and that this trend increased throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s.   Additional evidence 
generally confirms the rise in volatility that Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) describe 
during the 1970’s and 1980’s, with a flattening out in the 2000’s.  Alternatives to 
Gottschalk and Moffitt’s (1994) log earnings decompositions are proposed for the 
measurement of volatility. 
 Dahl et al. (2008) analyze prime-age earnings using Social Security 
administrative earnings records matched to longitudinal data in the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation.  Looking at year to year changes in earnings and income, using 
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the percent change to measure volatility, they conclude earnings volatility is cyclical, 
though the trend is flat since the mid 1980’s.  Dynan et al. (2008) use a similar approach 
to Dahl et al. (2008), and are a bridge between Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) and Dahl et 
al. (2008).  Their relatively transparent measure of total volatility - the standard deviation 
of the arc percent change, admits person-years with zero earnings and/or incomes:  
(4) 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = �𝑉𝑎𝑟 �100 ∗ 𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑦𝑖𝑡−2
Yaverage �, 
where Yaverage = (Yt+Yt-2)/2. 
Like Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994), they examine a PSID sample.  From 1967-
2004, they estimate that household earnings and transfer payments are more volatile and 
conclude income volatility rose 40 percent.  This rise in volatility is concentrated at the 
lower end of the household income distribution.  A key advantage of this approach is that 
it is relatively transparent when compared to the volatility decomposition described in 
equations (1) – (3).  While a shortcoming of this approach is that persistent changes in 
overall volatility are not estimated, the total volatility measure relies on fewer 
distributional assumptions, particularly that the components are both additive and 
independent.  This assumption is especially rigid, and it is plausible to envision transitory 
and permanent volatility components being related.  As a result, by capturing both 
components, the total measure is relatively transparent and flexible when compared to 
Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994).     
 Another approach, one closer to the total measure I adopt, is to take first 
differences over equation (2) and then compute variances so that 
(5) 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡−1) = (𝛼𝑡 − 𝛼𝑡−1)2𝜎𝜇2 + 𝜑𝑡2𝜎𝜀2(𝑡) + 𝜑𝑡−12 𝜎𝜀2(𝑡 − 1), 
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a measure of total or summary volatility adopted by Shin and Solon (2010).  The time-
difference in log earnings in the left hand side of (5) is approximately the percent change 
in earnings levels, an approach similar to the summary volatility measure introduced in 
equation (4).  The important distinction is that in (4) the arc percent change is computed, 
while in (5) Shin and Solon (2010) measure the point percent change.  If the denominator 
in (4) is not too different from the initial earnings level (𝑦𝑖𝑡−1), then the expressions in (4) 
and (5) are roughly equal. This demonstrates the summary nature of (4), which captures 
changes to permanent variances via changes in the permanent factor loadings as well as 
changes in transitory variances from either transitory factor loadings or shocks (Shin and 
Solon 2010).   
 Most papers in the volatility literature are based on samples of prime-age white 
men, and Keys (2008) verifies that findings of rising volatility over the past 30 years 
generalize across race, gender, education, and family structure.  He finds that the least 
skilled, the young, and racial and ethnic minorities have relatively high transitory 
volatility.  The PSID-based papers on family income tend to find a strong increase in 
volatility in the 30 years from the early 1970s to the early 2000s, though there is 
considerable disagreement on the magnitude.   Regarding the components of volatility, a 
common result was that transitory earnings instability rose by over 40 percent through the 
mid 1980s, and then more or less stabilized thereafter, while lifetime inequality rose 
primarily in the 1980s (Gottschalk and Moffitt 1994; Haider 2001).  The estimates on 
increases in volatility range from a doubling (Hacker and Jacobs 2008) to a low of 10 
percent (Winship 2009). Part of the divergence in results emanates from treatment of the 
PSID redesign in 1992 and 1993, and part from the treatment of families reporting zero 
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earnings. Because much of the literature reports the variance of log earnings, person-
years with zero earnings are dropped, which can understate measured volatility because 
labor-force dropouts are ignored. 
2.3 Data  
 The data derive from the 1973–2009 waves (1972–2008 calendar years) of the 
March Annual Social and Economic Study of the Current Population Survey (CPS).  The 
unit of observation is an individual between the ages of 16 and 60.  The rotating design of 
the CPS makes it possible to match approximately one-half of the sample from one 
March interview to the next.  There was a major survey redesign both in the mid 1980s 
and mid 1990s so it is not possible to match across the 1985-1986 waves and the 1995-
1996 waves.  In addition, the line number, which is intended to uniquely identify a person 
in the household, was not recorded for the 1976-1978 survey years.  I therefore do not 
match across the 1975-1976 survey years, and it is not possible to match across the 1976-
1977 years because of changes in the format of matching variables.  Thus, I produce an 
interrupted time series across 36 years with gaps in calendar years 1974-1975, 1975-
1976, 1984-1985, and 1994-1995. In total there are 640,412 matches, or roughly 20,000 
observations in an average year when a match is possible.  Table 2.3 lists the number of 
correct matches across survey years.    
 The primary variables of interest are total family labor-market earnings and 
before-tax family income.  I test the robustness of the volatility trends to after-tax income 
in figure 2.1.  Family earnings is defined as the sum of wage and salary income, non-farm 
self-employment, and farm self-employment among family householders.  Before-tax 
income is the same as that used in official Census estimates of poverty and inequality and 
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includes earnings, social insurance payments, means-tested transfers, and other forms of 
non-transfer non-labor income of all members within the family household.   Because the 
CPS surveys home addresses and does not follow families as in the PSID, adults are 
counted as family members if they are related and living within the same household.   
2.3.1 Matching Procedure 
 The process of using matched CPS is adopted by at least two other studies 
(Cameron and Tracy 1998; Celik, Juhn, McCue, and Thompson 2009).  The basic ideas is 
as follows: The CPS surveys respondents within U.S. household locations, and the 
rotating design of the survey creates a schedule whereby respondents are in the sample 
for four months, out for eight months, and then they re-enter the sample for four months.  
This results in a large share of respondents, almost one-half, being observed in two 
consecutive March CPS surveys.  To ensure I observe the same individuals over time, I 
utilize a matching procedure recommended by the Census Bureau that matches 
individuals along five variables.  These are month in sample (months 1-4 for year 1, 
months 5-8 for year 2); gender; line number (unique person id); household identifier; and 
household number.  I also restrict the sample by dropping individuals if their self-
identified race or age changes by more than two years, or if state of residence changes.   
Prior to matching the CPS cross sections, I address two issues with the data. First, 
if a respondent is missing information on earnings or nonlabor income, then the Census 
Bureau uses a “hotdeck” imputation method that allocates income to those with such 
missing data. Bollinger and Hirsch (2006) show that an attenuation bias oftentimes 
occurs when allocated CPS data is used, which can then lead to a related attenuation bias 
on estimated regression coefficients based on this imputed data.  Per the recommendation 
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of Bollinger and Hirsch (2006), I drop observations with allocated earnings or income 
prior to matching.  A second issue concerns inconsistent topcoding procedures from the 
Census (Burkhauser, et al. 2004; 2007; Larrimore, et al. 2008), which have raised 
concerns about the accuracy of reported trends in income inequality due to changes over 
time in the methods the Census uses to top-code income data for public release. Prior to 
1995 the Census assigned top-coded data a common value (though this value varied 
across income sources, and at times, years), but starting in 1995 they assigned top-coded 
data the mean values of actual income based on broad demographic groupings (age, race, 
gender, education).  A fix to this inconsistency comes from Larrimore, et al. (2008), who 
back-cast the post-1995 procedure using demographic means from internal CPS data to 
1976 and thus provide a consistent method of top-coding from 1976 onwards. I 
incorporate this series of consistent topcodes into the data prior to matching across years.  
There was a major survey redesign both in the mid 1980s and mid 1990s so it is not 
possible to match across the 1985-1986 waves and the 1995-1996 waves. In addition, the 
line number, which is intended to uniquely identify a person in the household, was not 
recorded for the 1976-1978 survey years, and in 1977 there were changes in the format of 
matching variables. This yields an interrupted time series across 36 years with gaps in 
calendar years 1974-1975, 1975-1976, 1984-1985, and 1994-1995.  As indicated in table 
2.3, the resulting data set contains roughly 20,000 observations in an average year when a 
match is possible.  It also summarizes the number and rate of matches for each year, 
indicating I am able to match approximately 52 percent across survey years on average.  
The declining match rate after the mid 1990s reflects in part a rise in allocation within the 
CPS after adoption of CATI-CAPI computer-assisted interviewing techniques.  
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Comparing summary statistics before (table 2.2) and after (table 2.1) the match 
procedure, the final data set appears to suffer from some attrition.  Prior to matching, the 
sample respondents have lower earnings and income.  Smaller differences emerge when 
comparing demographic characteristics before and after the procedure.  The respondents 
are slightly younger, less educated, more likely to be female, more racially and ethnically 
diverse, and less likely to be married prior to matching.  The observed impact of 
matching CPS observations on earnings, income, and demographic characteristics may 
also be borne out in the final volatility levels and trends. 
2.4 Model  
I follow Dynan, et al. (2008) and measure volatility as the standard deviation of 
the arc percent change, defined as 
(6) 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = �𝑉𝑎𝑟 �100 ∗ 𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑦𝑖𝑡−1
𝑦𝚤�
�, 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is earnings or income for person i in time t.  Dynan, et al. (2008) define the 
denominator as 𝑦𝚤� = 𝑦𝑖𝑡+𝑦𝑖𝑡−12 , which is the person-specific time mean across the matched 
pair of years.  The key advantage of this measure over the variance of log earnings used 
in most of the prior literature is that it is defined even if earnings (or income) is zero in 
one of the two years, and that it is symmetric and bounded below by -200 percent and 
above by +200 percent.  However, the symmetry property is violated if earnings are 
negative one year, say due to a business loss, and positive the next.  I modify the 
arithmetic mean in the denominator as 𝑦𝚤� = 𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑦𝑖𝑡)+𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑦𝑖𝑡−1)2 , where abs(.) refers to the 
absolute value. This modified measure at once permits negative earnings and retains the 
symmetry property of -200 percent and +200 percent.  In addition, there is a rising share 
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of the male population out of the labor force two years in a row, and after declining 
through the mid 1990s it has been rising among women as well.  By definition earnings 
volatility of these individuals is zero, but because I am interested in a population measure 
of volatility I retain these individuals and set earnings volatility to zero in the baseline 
series.  This is a measure of total volatility, in contrast to the variance decomposition of 
total volatility into its transitory and permanent components put forth by Gottschalk and 
Moffitt (1994; 2009).  Similar measures are adopted when the primary goal is to measure 
volatility trends, as I do in this essay (Dynan et al. 2008; Dahl et al. 2008).   
2.5 Results - Earnings and Income Volatility Levels and Trends 
 Figure 2.1 depicts trends in year-to-year family earnings and income volatility. 
The first panel of the figure shows that earnings volatility increased sharply through the 
1970s and into the mid 1980s, rising 20 percent, which corroborates findings from the 
PSID.  The 1986 redesign of the CPS reset the sample to coincide with the 1980 
Decennial Census, which initially resulted in a sharp decrease in the level of volatility but 
not the trend. By the 1996 redesign, which reset the CPS sample to coincide with the 
1990 Census, much of the overall increase in family earnings volatility over the 36-year 
period was realized. However, the lower line in the first panel also shows that family 
income volatility continued to increase to the end of the century, suggesting that although 
nonlabor income clearly reduced the level of economic volatility facing the family, it did 
not reduce the trend.  From 1973-2008 family income volatility rose 38 percent.  
The series in the first panel of Figure 2.1 does not adjust for possible changes in 
family size and composition from one period to the next, whether owing to changes in 
marital status, children in the family, or other relational changes. To account for changing 
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needs in the family in the second panel I report the volatility of family earnings to needs 
and income to needs. In this case needs are determined by the family-size specific 
poverty threshold, which makes an adjustment for economies to scale in family 
consumption and changes each year according to the Consumer Price Index. Because the 
threshold is adjusted annually by the CPI, I construct the series as the ratio of nominal 
earnings (or nominal income) to needs. As the second panel indicates, adjusting for 
changing family needs has no discernable impact on volatility trends. 
Many of the studies in the volatility literature exclude persons with zero or 
negative earnings, although there have been substantial changes in labor force 
participation of men and women in the past four decades.  In the third panel of Figure 2.1 
I reproduce the base-case results excluding families reporting negative or no earnings (or 
income) in any year to examine the influence of zeros and negative values.  It is readily 
apparent that including non-positive values shifts up the level of volatility in any given 
year by about 10 percentage points, but the basic trends in the first panel hold, at least 
with respect to earnings. Earnings volatility increases 21 percent in panel three as 
opposed to 20 percent in panel one, most of which is realized by the early 1990s, but 
family income volatility increases a more modest 28 percent with the non-positive 
earnings/income values omitted.  
Recent research highlights the consumption-smoothing role of the Federal tax and 
transfer system; that is, the fact that for any given change in before-tax and transfer 
income, after-tax and transfer income changes by less (Gruber 1997; Auerbach and 
Feenberg 2000; Kniesner and Ziliak 2002a,b; Gundersen and Ziliak 2003; Blundell, 
Pistaferri, and Preston 2008).  The series already contains the income from major social 
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insurance programs such as Unemployment Insurance, Social Security, as well as means-
tested cash transfers. However it does not include in-kind transfers such as food stamps 
or public housing, or income tax payments and credits such as the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC). To examine the potential stabilizing role of the tax system and fungible 
in-kind transfers I subtract tax payments from gross income and add in the cash value of 
food stamps, school lunch and breakfast programs, and public housing/Section 8.  In 
panel 4 I assume that the family bears only the employee share of the payroll tax rate. 
The fourth panel of Figure 2.1 shows that in any given year the tax system reduces the 
level of volatility by about 10 percent, but does not alter the trend growth. Indeed the 
trend growth in after-tax income volatility is actually higher at 48 percent than before-tax 
income volatility. When restricting attention to the 1980-2009 survey years when all tax 
and transfer data are available, after-tax volatility increased 43 percent compared to 32 
percent for before-tax income.  These results are consistent with Kniesner and Ziliak 
(2002a) who found that the tax reforms of the 1980s, which reduced the number and 
magnitude of marginal tax rates, reduced the automatic stabilizer capacity of the tax 
system. 
2.6 Volatility across Race, Family Structure, and Education 
 In this section I examine trends in family earnings and income volatility across 
families based on race, family structure, and education of the family head. Figure 2.2 
depicts trends in volatility for families headed by a white or a black person. The level and 
pattern of earnings volatility is strikingly different; although the level of earnings 
volatility is nearly one-third higher among black families, the trend increase in overall 
family earnings volatility in Figure 2.1 was driven entirely by the 24 percent increase in 
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volatility among white families. There was a strong increase in earnings volatility among 
black families through the mid 1980s, but starting in the early 1990s black family 
earnings volatility fell and the level in 2008 is the same as in 1973. At the same time, 
black family income volatility actually rose more than white family income volatility (48 
versus 36 percent), although it is clear that overall income volatility was widely 
distributed across race. 
 With the secular rise of divorce and out of wedlock births, as well as cohabitation, 
it is possible that this has translated into marked differences in volatility across family 
structure. In Figure 2.3 I present earnings and income volatility for intact families; that is, 
for families with continuous marital status from one year to the next separately for 
married families (panel one), unmarried families (widowed, divorced, separated, never 
married in panel two), and single female-headed families (panel three). Figure 2.3 reveals 
that earnings and income volatility is lowest for married families as opposed to unmarried 
heads, or single female headed families, but the rise in family earnings volatility occurred 
primarily among married families. Earnings volatility was essentially constant across the 
36 years among unmarried families, while it actually fell 15 percent among female heads. 
The trend rise in family income volatility was experienced across all family types, 
although the trend rise was least pronounced among single female heads of household.  
This may seem surprising given the dramatic reforms to the U.S. welfare system in the 
1990s, but as noted in Bollinger and Ziliak (2008) there were substantial changes in the 
composition of single mothers toward a much higher educated population, dampening the 
effects of volatility. In the last panel of Figure 2.3 I compare family to household income 
volatility. Cohabitors and other non-family members dampen the level of household 
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volatility compared to family volatility, as well as the short-term swings in family 
volatility in the 2000s, but the overall trend is unchanged. 
 The increase in wage inequality was most pronounced in the 1980s and was likely 
due to a combination of skill-biased technical change favoring skilled workers, falling 
unionization, and a declining real wage (Katz and Autor 1999; Lemieux 2008), while the 
inequality growth of the 1990s was most pronounced in the upper tail of the distribution 
(Piketty and Saez 2003; Autor, et al. 2008).  This suggests the growth in earnings and 
income volatility should differ across education group, and be most pronounced among 
the least skilled in the first half of the series and most pronounced among the high skilled 
in the second half. Figure 2.4 depicts trends in family earnings and income volatility for 
family heads with less than a high school education, those with a high school diploma but 
not college, and those with some college. The rise in family earnings inequality cuts 
across education level fairly uniformly, increasing by 30 percent for dropouts, 30 percent 
for high school graduates, and 35 percent for those with at least some college. However, 
earnings volatility rose faster among the less skilled compared to high skilled from 1973-
1984 (33 versus 12 percent), and then reversed from 1986-2008 (11 versus 31 percent). 
Likewise, total income volatility increased considerably more among high school 
dropouts (70 percent) compared to those with some college (41 percent).   
2.7 Earnings and Income Volatility by Source  
 The analysis to this point has focused on the family as an aggregate unit, and thus 
in this section I want to look within families to examine the volatility of earnings, as well 
as the volatility of income by component source. I first document trends in earnings 
volatility overall for men and women in the first two panels of Figure 2.5.  From 1973 to 
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2008 earnings volatility of men increased about 14 percent overall. In unpublished 
results, men’s earnings volatility included a 16 percent increase for white men and no 
increase for black men, with much of the increase occurring in the 1970s and early 1980s.  
For women, volatility has fallen about 15 percent overall in the last four decades.  Most 
of the decline occurred by the mid 1980s and has continued into the 2000s.  If the 
volatility trends of men and women continue the levels are likely to converge in the 
current decade, and this convergence has already taken place between black men and 
women (not depicted here).  
 In the last two panels of Figure 2.5 I document earnings volatility for husbands 
and wives.  Viewed with the decline in female-headed earnings volatility and constant 
volatility for unmarried family heads in general (Figure 2.3), panels three and four 
suggest that the overall increase in family earnings volatility is being driven primarily by 
volatility of husbands earnings.  In support of this, the covariance between earnings 
volatility of husbands and wives over the sample period is -22.73.  The volatility trends 
of husbands and wives in the last four decades mimics the trends of men and women in 
general.  
 I return to total income volatility in Figure 2.6 to examine the rise in volatility by 
income source. Because of the secular growth in self-employment in the U.S. in recent 
decades, I examine the role of self-employment in earnings volatility in the first panel of 
Figure 2.6.  Although self-employment earnings are volatile from the individual 
perspective, from the family volatility perspective this source actually has the effect of 
dampening the level of volatility. The panel makes clear that self-employment earnings 
affect the level but not the trends.  The second panel depicts trends in income volatility 
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for means-tested transfers and credits (cash welfare, food stamps, housing assistance, 
SSI, and EITC). As discussed in surveys such as Blank (2002), Hotz and Scholz (2003), 
and Ziliak (2008) there have been dramatic changes in the safety net in the U.S. since the 
1980s, with huge expansions in cash welfare and food stamps in the early 1990s, 
followed by even larger declines in the late 1990s but with a concomitant increase in the 
EITC and SSI.  However, these changes have had little effect on overall trend inequality 
for the American family, though in figure 2.7 means-tested income volatility did increase 
by 15 percent for single mother families. On the other hand, as panels three and four of 
figure 2.6 demonstrate, there is a strong upward trend in non-welfare non-labor income 
since the mid 1980s, which is being driven by higher volatility of income from rent 
payments, interest, and dividends.   
2.8 Decomposing the Volatility of Earnings 
The increase in family earnings volatility may be due to a compositional change 
of the workforce, or it may simply reflect increased earnings dispersion of workers 
(Lemieux 2006).  That is, the volatility of earnings depends on the relative role of 
changes in the extensive margin of entry and exit into employment and the intensive 
margin of earnings conditional on being a worker.  Because I define volatility as the 
variance of the percent change from one period to the next, there are four possible states 
of labor-force participation: (0,0), (0,1), (1,0), and (1,1), where 0 means out of the labor 
force and 1 means participation. In Figure 2.8 I depict trends in employment rates for 
men and women, and husbands and wives, for each of the four states, and where 
employment refers to earnings at any point in time during the past year. The figure 
reveals that among men there is a secular trend increase in the (0,0) state, and trend 
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decrease in the (1,1) case, but relatively constant and symmetric transition employment 
rates.  These trends hold for husbands as well, though they are less distinct. For women, 
on the other hand, the trend increase in the (1,1) state, and concomitant decrease in (0,0), 
plateaued in the mid 1990s and actually reversed slightly in the 2000s.  This was true for 
wives as well.   
2.9 Understanding the Importance of Labor Force Transitions 
To see the possible interaction between the extensive and intensive margins on the 
unconditional volatility of earnings note the variance can be written as  
(7) 𝑉(𝑞) =  𝐸{𝑉(𝑞|𝑃)} + 𝑉(𝐸{𝑞|𝑃}), 
where q is the arc percent change in earnings, P  is an indicator variable equal to one if 
an individual participates in the labor force, and E is the expectations operator.  Equation 
(7), which expresses volatility as the unconditional variance of the percent change of 
earnings instead of the standard deviation, is the sum of the expected conditional variance 
of the percent change and the variance of the conditional mean of the percent change.  
With four possible states of labor-force participation, this implies that the first 
term on the right hand side of equation (7) can be expressed as 
(8) 𝐸{𝑉(𝑞|𝑃)} = 𝑉(𝑞|𝑃 = 0,0) ∗ Pr(𝑃 = 0,0) + 𝑉(𝑞|𝑃 = 0,1) ∗ Pr(𝑃 = 0,1) +
𝑉(𝑞|𝑃 = 1,0) ∗ Pr(𝑃 = 1,0) + 𝑉(𝑞|𝑃 = 1,1) ∗ Pr (𝑃 = 1,1). 
However, the volatility of nonworkers is zero, and thus the first term of (8) is zero.  Also, 
because the arc percent change from equation (6) equals 200 for all workers in the (0,1) 
state, and equals -200 for all workers in the (1,0) state, this means the variance of these 
two subsamples are also zero since the percent change is a constant.  Consequently, the 
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only term remaining in (8) is the fourth term, which is the volatility of two-period 
workers weighted by the probability of working both periods.  
 Likewise, the variance of the conditional mean in equation (7) can be expressed as 
follows: 
(9)  𝑉(𝐸{𝑞|𝑃}) = (𝐸{𝑞|𝑃 = 0,0} − 𝐸{𝑞})2 ∗ Pr(𝑃 = 0,0) +  (𝐸{𝑞|𝑃 = 0,1} −
𝐸{𝑞})2 ∗ Pr(𝑃 = 0,1) +  (𝐸{𝑞|𝑃 = 1,0} − 𝐸{𝑞})2 ∗ Pr(𝑃 = 1,0) +  (𝐸{𝑞|𝑃 = 1,1} −
𝐸{𝑞})2 ∗ Pr(𝑃 = 1,1),  
where 𝐸{𝑞|𝑃 = 0,0} = 0, i.e. the conditional mean of two-period non-workers is zero.  
This implies that the unconditional variance in (7) is a function of five terms—the 
weighted conditional variance in equation (8) plus the four weighted variances of the 
conditional mean in two-period non-workers, the two transition states, and two-period 
workers from (9).   
In Figures 2.9-2.15 I show the time series of each of the five components in the 
volatility variance decomposition for family earnings, husbands, wives, white men, black 
men, white women, and black women, respectively.  The top panel of each figure depicts 
the conditional variance of two-period workers from equation (8) on the right axis and the 
left axis presents the variance of the conditional mean for the two transition states (0,1) 
and (1,0).  Because the scales are markedly different the trends for the conditional mean 
variances for the two period work (1,1) and non-work (0,0) states are in the bottom panel.  
Across all samples the contribution of the variances of the conditional means from the 
continuous work and non-work states to overall volatility is negligible, and thus I restrict 
attention to the top panels.  At the family level in Figure 2.9 most volatility comes from 
the conditional variance, though after the mid 1990s the contribution of the conditional 
 23 
mean variance of families transitioning from work to non-work (1,0) increases.  Thus 
even though the probability of such a transition is small, and stable over the period, the 
contribution to volatility is not.  The trends affecting the family track strongly those of 
husbands in Figure 2.10.  In Figure 2.11 for wives, however, in the early part of the 
sample volatility is dominated by labor-force transitions, both (0,1) and (1,0), but as 
volatility of wives earnings declined over time the three variance terms in the top panel 
were roughly equal in magnitude.  At the individual level, among white men in Figure 
2.12, the conditional variance dominates the variance of the conditional mean in any 
given year, though clearly in the past decade the conditional mean variance of exiters 
increases as the conditional variance of continuous workers declines.  For black men in 
Figure 2.13, and white and black women in Figures 2.14 and 2.15, respectively, the last 
four decades are characterized by a declining contribution of the variance of the 
conditional mean of labor-force transitions such that by the 2000s the three terms were 
roughly each in magnitude. 
2.10  Conclusion and Future Work 
I find strong evidence from matched data from the CPS that income volatility 
increased substantially from the 1970s through the 1990s, and that this increase was 
distributed widely across the American family in terms of race, education, and family 
structure. The primary source of rising income volatility was an increase in earnings 
volatility of husbands and an increase in non-transfer nonlabor income volatility, 
especially income from rent, interest, and dividends. Although much of the rise in 
earnings volatility stems from higher conditional variance of earnings among continuous 
workers, an increasing fraction comes from higher variance of the conditional mean 
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among workers exiting the labor force from one period to the next. With the aging of the 
labor force these trends are likely to continue to exert upward pressure on volatility 
overall.   Given the attrition initially observed between tables 2.1 and 2.2, volatility trends 
and levels based on matched CPS data may suffer from a slight downward bias as well.   
My results broadly corroborate those from studies based on the PSID, namely that 
most of the increase in earnings volatility occurred prior to the 1990s but that income 
volatility continued to rise through the 1990s.  With the change to every other year survey 
design after 1997, Gottschalk and Moffitt (2009) urge caution in interpreting volatility 
trends from the PSID in the 2000s.  This makes data from matched CPS a potentially 
more appealing source for future research on this topic.  
Future research should examine in more detail life cycle patterns of volatility, 
which I do in essay 3.  Another important extension involves a full variance 
decomposition of family income, to gain an even better understanding of what drives the 
overall income volatility rise.  With broad trends now established across several major 
survey and administrative data sets new research is needed on underlying causal factors 
such as whether the labor force transitions leading to higher volatility are voluntary or 
involuntary, as well as research on the effects of volatility on family and child well-being.  
To that end, essay 3 also identifies demographic, economic, and industry correlates of 
earnings volatility, while essay 4 is an inquiry into family volatility during childhood and 
its relationship to adult outcomes.    
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Table 2.1 Summary Statistics by 2nd Year Adjusted for Inflation (2008 Dollars) 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation 
 
Earnings and Income 
 
   Family Earnings ($) 
   % Change in Family Earnings 
   Family Income ($) 
   % Change in Family Income 
   Disposable Income ($) 
   Self Employment Income ($) 
 
Demographics 
 
   Age 
   % Female 
   No. of Persons in Family 
   % Less Than High School  
   % High School 
   % More Than High School 
   % White 
   % Black 
   % Other 
   % Married 
 
 
 
 
62,709.95 
0.65 
69,280.60 
1.82 
52,561.31 
3,489.32 
 
 
 
37.63 
53.53 
3.28 
20.37 
35.55 
44.08 
86.07 
9.50 
4.42 
62.70 
 
 
 
53,678.91 
107.19 
55,925.64 
190.83 
35,583.78 
18,142.65 
 
 
 
12.21 
49.87 
1.49 
39.82 
47.60 
48.73 
34.52 
29.32 
19.96 
48.20 
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Table 2.2 Summary Statistics Prior to Merging CPS Cross Sections (2008 Dollars) 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation 
 
Earnings and Income 
 
   Family Earnings ($) 
   Family Income ($) 
   Disposable Income ($) 
   Self Employment Income ($) 
 
Demographics 
 
   Age 
   % Female 
   No. of Persons in Family 
   % Less Than High School  
   % High School 
   % More Than High School 
   % White 
   % Black 
   % Other 
   % Married 
 
 
 
 
   57,417.33  
   63,473.16  
   48,674.96  
   3,276.26  
 
 
 
35.48 
52.73 
3.25 
24.86 
34.66 
40.47 
84.82 
10.30 
4.88 
58.44 
 
 
 
 
    51,899.71  
    54,293.74  
    34,814.52  
    17,282.31  
 
 
 
12.41 
49.92 
1.55 
42.87 
47.38 
48.30 
35.68 
30.36 
20.81 
49.13 
 
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 27 
Table 2.3 Number and Rate of Merges Per Year by 2nd Year of CPS Panel. CY 
1973-2008. 
Year 
# Merged CPS 
Observations 
Total # CPS 
Observations 
Merge 
Rate 
1973 10,116 20,863 48.5% 
1974 14,618 19,612 74.5% 
1975 - - - 
1976 - - - 
1977 26,063 36,299 71.8% 
1978 23,661 33,707 70.2% 
1979 21,800 38,320 56.9% 
1980 23,421 38,970 60.1% 
1981 21,404 36,635 58.4% 
1982 23,379 37,547 62.3% 
1983 23,303 36,942 63.1% 
1984 21,313 36,232 58.8% 
1985 - - - 
1986 19,129 35,778 53.5% 
1987 21,114 41,573 50.8% 
1988 22,436 38,616 58.1% 
1989 22,810 41,776 54.6% 
1990 24,330 42,342 57.5% 
1991 24,131 41,784 57.8% 
1992 23,792 40,847 58.2% 
1993 22,580 41,316 54.7% 
1994 19,883 37,931 52.4% 
1995 - - - 
1996 18,462 32,466 56.9% 
1997 18,140 31,812 57.0% 
1998 16,976 30,761 55.2% 
1999 16,223 34,942 46.4% 
2000 15,449 49,155 31.4% 
2001 18,538 49,586 37.4% 
2002 18,161 49,650 36.6% 
2003 19,085 49,243 38.8% 
2004 16,260 48,466 33.5% 
2005 17,470 48,572 36.0% 
2006 18,431 48,611 37.9% 
2007 18,873 48,640 38.8% 
2008 19,061 49,679 38.4% 
Average Number of 
Matches 20,013 Average % Matched 52.1% 
 
  
 28 
FIGURE 2.1 
 
  
30
40
50
60
70
S
td
. D
ev
ia
tio
n 
of
 P
er
ce
nt
 C
ha
ng
e
1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Year
Earnings Before-Tax Income
Includes Non Positive Earnings and Income
30
40
50
60
70
 
1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Year
Earnings-to-Needs Before-Tax Income-to-Needs
Needs Ratios
30
40
50
60
70
S
td
. D
ev
ia
tio
n 
of
 P
er
ce
nt
 C
ha
ng
e
1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Year
Earnings Before-Tax Income
Excluding Non-Positive Earnings and Income
30
40
50
60
70
 
1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Year
Before-Tax Income After-Tax Income
Before and After-Tax Income
Family Earnings and Income Volatility
 29 
FIGURE 2.2 
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FIGURE 2.3 
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FIGURE 2.4 
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FIGURE 2.5 
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3 A COHORT ANALYSIS OF EARNINGS VOLATILITY 
3.1 Introduction 
Consumption smoothing among individuals and families may not occur optimally 
if information asymmetries or other imperfections in credit markets exist in a labor 
market with high levels of aggregate earnings volatility (Loury 1981; Becker and Tomes 
1986; Mazumder 2005).  This is troubling for policymakers if individuals experience 
earnings volatility coinciding with market imperfections, such as the imperfect loanable 
funds market for human capital.  Inequality may be worsened if such phenomena occur 
unevenly across groups.  From essay 2, demographic heterogeneity in the trend and level 
of volatility provides new evidence that volatility occurs differentially by race, gender, 
education, and marital status.  For example, families where the household head is female, 
less educated, or Black report higher levels of earnings and income volatility.  Yet, these 
trends are incomplete for policymakers because they are unconditional and may be driven 
in part by differences in earnings levels, labor market skills, or local economic 
conditions.  Labor market skills may not insulate individuals from volatility, as earnings 
volatility rises among male household heads both with and without college. This is also 
true for prime age individuals in their mid 40’s, when workers have acquired formal and 
on-the-job training thought to combine for more income and earnings stability (essay 3).  
The varying levels and trends in earnings volatility call for a deeper understanding of its 
occurrence, but few studies up to this point attempt to identify economic or demographic 
relationships with volatility.   
This essay investigates the demographic, labor market, and industry 
characteristics associated with exposure to volatile earnings by merging elements of 
human capital theory and lifecycle earnings models.  The resulting empirical 
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specification corrects for heterogeneous human capital and lifecycle earnings profiles by 
grouping individuals into education birth-year cohorts following the approach of Deaton 
(1985) and Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir (1998).  The possibility of a lifecycle earnings 
profile driving volatility can be seen from the rise in earnings and income volatility 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s (essay 2), suggesting a specific group or cohort of 
workers may drive the trends; it is also documented in the literature on lifecycle earnings 
profiles (Polachek 2007).  Outside of these lifecycle effects, it would be helpful to 
understand if rising earnings volatility has more or less to do with workers' education, 
gender, race, local economic growth, or industry of employment.   
Since at least Mincer (1958) and human capital theory, earnings models account 
for such differences, describing how different human capital investments and resulting 
skill sets along with observable traits relate to earnings growth over the lifecycle.  Along 
with the documented U-shape in earnings volatility, this literature finds that the returns to 
education vary by age, race, gender (Smith and Welch 1979), and location (Black, 
Kolesnikova, and Taylor 2009; Bollinger, Ziliak, and Troske 2009).   This essay applies 
insights from human capital theory to understand earnings volatility over the lifecycle by 
raising similar questions.  To do so, my approach tests the importance of demographic, 
industry, and local economic variables for explaining earnings volatility after accounting 
for education-birth-year cohort and non-random selection (Heckman 1979) into and out 
of the labor force.   
Using the matched Current Population Survey (CPS), I find that earnings 
volatility among men and women begins at a relatively high level within the initial years 
of entering the labor force and falls over time.  After this initial decline, earnings 
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volatility of workers with education beyond high school rises and forms a U shape as 
men reach their mid-40s and women approach 50.  After controlling for education and 
year-of-birth cohort, I then find earnings levels, race, industry, and local labor market 
conditions predict exposure to earnings volatility.  These predictions differ in importance 
and are sensitive to gender and the econometric specification employed.  Because the 
U.S. economy may have some credit market imperfections, an improved understanding of 
earnings volatility may have important policy implications.  By extending human capital 
theory to explain the occurrence of volatility, society can more optimally provide 
temporary public assistance to smooth consumption.  This, in turn, may aid in correcting 
capital market imperfections. 
3.2 Background 
The literature on volatility has placed an important emphasis on methodological 
differences in measuring volatility, including the construction of permanent, transitory, 
and total volatility trends over roughly 40 years (Gottschalk and Moffitt 1994, 2009; 
Dahl, DeLeire, and Schwabish 2008; Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel 2008; essay 2).  
Because of this focus on the permanent and transitory components of volatility, the 
discussion within the literature has emphasized structural causes of volatility and how 
these then influence the observed rise in the variability of wages since the 1970s.  Essay 2 
provides a background discussion of total, transitory and permanent volatility 
measurement and trends.   
Several studies find volatility rising among men and falling among women (Shin 
and Solon 2010; Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel 2008; essay 2) since the 1970s.  Some 
studies show, depending on the measure used, volatility negatively related to economic 
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growth (Dahl et al. 2008), while others find that job changers actually have lower 
volatility due to their continuous employment, so that high volatility may occur during 
high growth periods when people are more willing to change jobs (Celik, Juhn, McCue, 
and Thompson 2009).  The possible culprits of volatility extend beyond job loss and 
economic risk to include voluntary labor force exits such as childcare, along with 
permanent changes including earnings volatility induced by incentive-pay structures 
(Celik et al. 2009) and  skill-biased technological change (Gottschalk and Moffitt 2009; 
Hacker and Jacobs 2008; Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2008).  Technological change may 
render transitions into new industries and occupations costlier in terms of skill acquisition 
for a new job.  A consequence of this may be higher transitory volatility from higher 
transition costs and skill gaps between occupations (Violante 2002).  There is limited 
evidence from the PSID that parents may pass on volatile earnings to their children.  
Shore (2010) estimates an intergenerational model in which parents’ income volatility is 
ultimately found to predict risk taking, for which volatility of incomes among their adult 
offspring serve as a proxy.   
A few papers estimate economic models related to predicting volatility 
determinants.  Cameron and Tracy (1998) use matched CPS data to document trends and 
possible volatility determinants.  They focus on the role of education, industry 
heterogeneity, and job stability in explaining volatility, where volatility is measured as 
the residual earnings variance.  They find Government and Manufacturing to be among 
the least volatile trades with respect to earnings, and that education is also associated with 
lower volatility of earnings.  They restrict their data sample to individuals remaining 
within the same industry across both years of the two-year panel and estimate regressions 
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of volatility on a set of industry and education indicators, controlling for lifecycle growth 
profiles.  Gittleman and Joyce (1996) use matched-CPS data to examine earnings 
instability in America throughout the 1970s and 1980s.  In line with essay 2, they find 
that lesser educated persons and minorities exhibit higher levels of earnings volatility. 
3.3 Cohort Regression Model of Earnings Volatility  
 This essay extends the literature on human capital theory and earnings volatility 
by estimating earnings volatility functions.   I identify demographic, economic, and 
industry correlates of earnings volatility exposure by extending Cameron and Tracey’s 
(1998) empirical model using matched-CPS to account for education and birth-year 
cohort membership.  I do so by using a pseudo panel approach for cross-section data that 
replaces individual observations with cohort means (Deaton 1985; Blundell, Duncan, and 
Meghir 1998).  Blundell et al. (1998) relate how the individual’s labor supply equation is 
similar to a labor supply equation where the individuals are organized by groups or 
cohorts.  I apply this to the estimation of earnings volatility as the dependent variable.  
Beginning with (1), the individual-level regression model for earnings volatility is 
(1) Vict = αic + mct + URictγ + INDictδ + β′xict + uict 
Here, Vict represents individual i’s earnings volatility in a defined cohort c at time t, αic 
denotes some individual fixed effect, mt is a time fixed effect, xict are demographic 
controls for race, and INDict is the individual’s industry in cohort c at time t, measured 
with error uict.  Cohorts are determined by membership in one of three education groups 
and year of birth at five year intervals. Thus, every individual i belongs to one cohort.  
The next step requires grouping the individual data by cohort and constructing a data set 
of yearly, cohort means from the micro-level cross-sectional data.  With this, the 
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empirical strategy pools the set of individual observations within cohorts into a data set of 
cohort mean observations.  Cohorts can then be followed throughout cross-sectional data 
over time in a manner analogous to individuals observed within a longitudinal panel.  
This similarity to individual panel data relies on the random sampling assumption 
appropriate for cross sectional data sets such as the CPS, so that cohorts followed across 
years are representative and the same groups are observed continuously (Baltagi 2008).   
The procedure of grouping by education-birth year cohort enables me to estimate 
the measure of total volatility employed in essay 2 as the dependent variable, the standard 
deviation of the arc percent change in earnings.  I construct a pseudo panel of individuals 
as described above by allocating each individual to one of 45 five-year birth-education 
cohorts, comprised of 15 birth cohorts and three education groups (less than high school, 
high school graduate, and more than high school).  After collapsing the data into 
education birth-year cohort means, this method makes it is possible to look across and 
within cohorts to identify life cycle profiles of volatility, shown in figures 3.1 and 3.2.  
Assuming linearity in parameters, the resulting cohort regression on this collapsed data 
will estimate equation (2)  at the cohort level using OLS with cohort and time fixed 
effects.  The result is a panel data regression model where the cohorts are akin to 
individual observations within a panel for the earnings volatility equation:  
(2) Vct���� = Zct���� + uct���� = αc��� + mt���� + URct������γ + INDct�������δ + β′xct���� + S11���� + S10���� + S01���� + uct����. 
Subscripts c and t refer to the education-age cohort and year, respectively.  Vct���� and  xct���� 
represent cohort specific earnings volatility and demographic controls for race, 
respectively - means that vary over time and across cohorts.  As a result, explanatory 
variables are measured as proportions or rates within specific cohorts.  αc��� and mt���� 
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represent the cohort fixed effects and time effects.  These fixed effect terms are meant to 
control for time-invariant, unobserved cohort effects that would otherwise remain in the 
error term uct.  They are derived from the initial cohort and time fixed effects in equation 
1, which are then collapsed into the cohort-mean data design.  uct otherwise contains 
these cohort fixed effects in the absence of controls for αc��� + mt����.   
 In equation (2) I estimate mean cohort selection parameters S11����, S10����, and S01����, to 
account for the non-random decision to engage in continuous work (1,1), exit the labor 
market (1,0), or enter the labor market (0,1) between periods (Wooldridge 2002).  Mincer 
(1974), Ben-Porath (1967) and other adaptations of the seminal human capital model 
(Polachek 2007) acknowledge that continuous workers’ earnings profiles differ from 
those of discontinuous workers, and the decision to enter or leave work is driven by 
childbearing and various other preferences that are difficult to observe.  Transitions into 
and out of work can represent the largest volatility swings in the data, and the 
endogenous choice that workers face potentially imposes a bias on the results.  By 
addressing this form of omitted variables bias, I mitigate an inherent sample selection 
issue introduced by Gronau (1974) and Heckman (1979) in the area of labor supply.  
 The selection equation is generated using a first stage probit of continuous work, 
labor force entry or exit on race, non-labor income, state unemployment rates, earned 
income tax credit (EITC) maximum benefits, cash welfare (Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC)/Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)), food 
stamp maximum benefit levels, and state minimum wages on the individual-level data.  
Similar to the procedure that leads to equation (2), after estimating the individual-level 
inverse mills ratios S11, S10, and S01, I then create a set of cohort-level mean selection 
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correction terms for each year constructed from individual inverse mills ratios observed 
within each cohort.  These are denoted S11����, S10����, and S01���� in equation (2) to distinguish 
mean cohort-level selection parameters from individual-level selection parameters.  It is 
permissible for the explanatory variables between the main empirical model and the first-
stage selection probits to overlap, but many of the included policy regressors in the probit 
represent exclusion restrictions omitted from the main volatility regressions.  These 
policy regressors are chosen because they are believed to impact the individual’s decision 
to enter, exit, or maintain continuous work.  Since the 1980s, there has been variation in 
benefit levels for the EITC, making it among the largest means-tested benefit program in 
terms of outlays.  Over the same time period the direct-cash assistance AFDC/TANF 
programs also saw dramatic reform throughout the 1980’s and especially in 1996 
(Haskins 2001).  States have discretion to set minimum wages above the nationally 
mandated level, so that there is also variation across states on this dimension as well.  All 
of these factors and the resulting inverse mills ratio constructed from the first-stage probit 
attempt to account for the individual’s work behavior between periods.  
 Three identifying assumptions are needed under this pseudo-panel framework.  
First, as just described  
(3) E(uct����| w, c, t) =  αc��� +  mt���� + δλct����, 
where  λct���� represents the included selection controls described in (2).  (3) assumes 
unobserved differences in volatility across cohorts are captured additively by a 
combination of time-invariant cohort effects and time fixed effects, along with controls 
for selection into the labor force.  A second identifying assumption requires between-
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cohort variation in demographics, local economic controls, and industries after netting 
out fixed cohort effects, time effects, and selection.  This then implies that 
(4) E(Vct����| w, c, t) =  bE(xct����| w, c, t) + αc��� + mt���� + δλct����, 
The explanatory variables xct���� are uncorrelated with deviations of αc��� from its own average  αc��� over the duration of the panel, with the analogous assumption required for time 
effects mt���� (Wooldridge 2002).  Thus, the fixed effects can and may be correlated with the 
explanatory variables, which is acceptable so long as deviations are uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables.  As is the case in survey data analysis, concerns arise regarding 
measurement error.  The risk is that OLS estimates are, at the very least, consistent and 
biased, and at worse, inconsistent and biased (Davidson and MacKinnon 2004).  For the 
main estimation as shown in (2), a third assumption for consistency via OLS is that 
cohort sample sizes in the CPS provide large sample sizes so that the mean fixed effects 
αc��� estimated for each cohort can sufficiently capture the cohort-specific unobserved 
effects αct����, which are not fixed over time.  Table 3.1 presents summary statistics that 
provide a snapshot of the cohort data, including mean cohort size, which is approximately 
12,000.  There is substantial deviation in sample sizes between cohorts, as shown in table 
3.2.  
3.3.1 Defining Volatility 
Volatility is defined as a total measure. Mathematically, it is the standard 
deviation of the arc percent change, defined as 
(5) 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = �𝑉𝑎𝑟 �100 ∗ 𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑦𝑖𝑡−1
𝑦𝚤�
�, 
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where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is earnings for person i in time t.  𝑦𝚤� = 𝑦𝑖𝑡+𝑦𝑖𝑡−12 .  I adopt a variant of this 
method, used in essay 2, allowing for the analysis of negative earnings.  This measure 
picks up both transitory and permanent volatility, and it also allows for negative earnings 
to enter into the definition – a feature that is not possible in definitions using log 
earnings.  When combined with the matched-CPS data described below, the definition 
offers a novel approach to measuring earnings volatility.  A longer discussion of the 
summary volatility measure occurs in essay 2.   
3.4 Data 
The data in essay 3 are generated using the 1981–2009 waves (1980–2008 
calendar years) of the March Annual Social and Economic Study of the CPS.  A detailed 
description of the match process is contained in essay 2.   The large sample size in the 
CPS enables me to estimate associations within subgroups while maintaining statistical 
power, an important feature enabling me to identify associations to volatility within 
education cohorts.  The unit of observation at the cohort level is an individual between 
the ages of 16 and 60.  The rotating design of the CPS makes it possible to match 
approximately one-half of the sample from one March interview to the next, with the end 
goal of creating a series of 2-year longitudinal panels.  The final file is an interrupted 
time series across 28 years with gaps in calendar years 1984-1985 and 1994-1995 due to 
data sample redesign.  In total there are roughly 20,000 observations in an average year 
when a match is possible.  As described above, I follow Deaton (1985) and Blundell, 
Duncan, and Meghir (1998), collapsing the matched data set, by cohort and birth year, 
into 1 of 45 cohorts differentiated across education groups for less than high school, high 
school, or post high school education, and the individual’s membership in a 5 year year-
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of-birth cohort band.  An example of a unique cohort observation is an individual born 
between 1980 and 1985 with education beyond high school.  Importantly, following 
Cameron and Tracey (1998) I require that observations included in the collapsed data 
maintain the same education, race, gender, and industry across the two-year panel.  This 
excludes individuals moving across education groups or industries between years.  After 
accounting for non-random selection into work, the final data set contains only 
continuous workers. 
Earnings are adjusted for inflation using the personal consumption expenditures 
deflator, in 2008 dollars.  Data on EITC maximum benefits, welfare cash maximum 
benefits, and state minimum wage levels used in estimating the selection equations (table 
3.3) were obtained from a master data set maintained by the University of Kentucky 
Center for Poverty Research (www.ukcpr.org).       
3.5 Summary Statistics  
Table 3.1 gives a detailed look at summary statistics across the cohort.  It presents 
sample means over the cohort-level data.  For example, mean earnings are around 
$38,000, average cohort unemployment is below 6 percent, and services industry work is 
dominant.  There are approximately 12,000 observations per cohort on average, though 
this ranges from cohort 27 and a high of 38,438 to a low of 255 in cohort 45 (table 3.2).  
To assist in understanding who falls within these cohorts, table 3.2 shows, for example, 
that individuals in cohort 27 are born between 1947 and 1951 with education beyond high 
school.  Those in cohort 45 are born in or prior to 1921 with education beyond high 
school.  The cohort sample sizes show rising educational attainment throughout America 
over the twentieth century, especially among baby-boomers.   
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3.6 Lifecycle Profile of Volatility 
 Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 depict cohort level trends in volatility focused on the 
timing of volatility over the life cycle for all individuals, men, and women, respectively, 
which has potentially important welfare implications related to mobility.  If volatility is 
largely concentrated early in the life cycle when job change and geographic is more 
frequent, then the welfare consequences are likely attenuated relative to a situation where 
it is increasing with age.  Two key implications of human capital theory are that earnings 
levels increase at a decreasing rate and that variation in earnings levels falls with age 
before rising again (Polachek 2007).  This finding is confirmed in figures 3.1-3.3, where 
each panel contains the time series for 15 birth cohorts, with each panel representing one 
of three education groups.  Figure 3.1 shows that, across education groups, volatility 
declines rapidly until about age 40, but among those with education at or beyond high 
school volatility actually begins to increase at age 45 and thus is U-shaped across the life 
cycle. For individuals with a less than high school education volatility levels off from its 
decline after age 40.   Figure 3.2 presents the parallel graph of individual earnings 
volatility across the life cycle for men only.  As with earnings volatility across all 
individuals, volatility stabilizes by the late 30s among men and then follows a similar 
upward trajectory around age 45 for those with high school education or more than high 
school, though the trend is actually more pronounced.  For women, figure 3.3 shows a 
consistent decline in earnings volatility over the lifecycle, though the rate of decline falls 
around age 40.  Around their mid 40s, the volatility trends for women with high school 
education or beyond rise much like that observed for more educated men.  A reason for 
this observed U-shape in earnings volatility might be labor force entry when young and 
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labor-force exit when old.  However, the observed rise in volatility among men and 
women occurs before the early 60s, when workers can begin collecting social security 
benefits to support their labor force exit.  Instead, this rise in volatility occurs earlier in 
the lifecycle than is predicted in lifecycle models of earnings variation (Polachek 2007), 
where retirement is a primary culprit.  This initial finding shown in figures 3.1-3.3 
suggests earnings volatility could be driven by events and characteristics beyond lifecycle 
trends.  Some of these characteristics will be identified in the main results, described 
below.        
3.7 Cohort Regression Results 
 The results of first-stage probit models controlling for selection into work, out of 
work, and continuous work are shown in table 3.3.  The unobserved characteristics of 
individuals who transition into and out of the labor force are important, as these decisions 
ultimately impact observed volatility.  In my selection equations, I account for race, 
gender, state unemployment, non-labor income (transformed by dividing non-labor 
income by 10,000), and government transfers that may all be correlated with individual 
decisions to work and the reservation wage.  Blacks and females are less likely to work 
continuously, and a weaker labor market as exhibited by unemployment lowers the 
likelihood of continuous work.  Access to more generous government transfer programs 
and non-labor income are associated with lower continuous work.  A higher minimum 
wage is positively correlated with continuous work, and it lowers the chance of labor 
force transitions.  Racial and ethnic minorities along with females are more likely to 
transition into and out of the labor market.   Government transfer programs are generally 
linked to a greater chance of exiting or entering the labor force.  The selection equations 
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are estimated on the full sample of individual observations, prior to collapsing the data 
into cohort-level means.   
 The regression results in tables 3.4-3.7 are shown separately for men and women 
with and without controls for selection.  Education is accounted for via education birth-
year cohort effects.  Moving left to right, baseline models estimate the role of race and 
average state labor market characteristics in explaining observed volatility, without and 
with average earnings.  Columns 3-6 then control for cohort fixed effects and year 
effects, adding in average earnings and industry shares.   
 I find cohorts with a larger share of racial and ethnic minorities are associated 
with higher earnings volatility in base model regressions without cohort or time effects 
(tables 3.4-3.5).  After controlling for average earnings the coefficient on Black is 
negative among men and women and is statistically significant for women.  Other racial 
and ethnic male minorities maintain a reduced but significant positive association to 
volatility and their female counterparts maintain a negative association upon controlling 
for cohort and time effects in columns 3-6.  For men and women higher earnings are 
related to lower earnings volatility.  I transform average earnings, dividing by 100.  
Unemployment has opposite relationships between men and women.  As it rises, state 
unemployment is linked with lower earnings volatility among men and higher volatility 
among women.  Government, Construction, and Manufacturing are the least volatile 
industries for men.  Upon conditioning for mean cohort earnings, men in the Construction 
and Manufacturing display lower earnings volatility.  Women in Government, Trade, 
Manufacturing, and Transportation/Utilities exhibit lower volatility.  These results are 
sensitive to model specification, as Trade becomes a significantly low-volatility industry 
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and government becomes higher-volatility for women upon controlling for average 
earnings.   
3.7.1 Accounting for Selection Into and Out of the Labor Market 
 As discussed earlier, it is important to consider the impact of selection into and 
out of the labor market.  Individuals transitioning into work or out of work by definition 
experience high volatility.  Repeating the exercise shown in tables 3.4-3.5, I show results 
for men and women accounting for selection into these transition states (tables 3.6 and 
3.7).  Black women have consistently lower volatility than their white counterparts after 
controlling for selection.  For both men and women, the relationship between Other racial 
and ethnic minorities, average earnings, and earnings volatility described in tables 3.4 
and 3.5 is maintained after selection controls are included.   The positive unemployment-
volatility relationship is fades upon introducing selection controls for women but the 
negative link remains among men.  The industry-volatility association is generally the 
same, with the exception that trade is relatively less volatile among men after controlling 
for selection 
 Overall, a link between race and higher volatility appears for women at the cohort 
level, though this does not hold up or is noticeably reduced once cohort and time effects 
are accounted for.  Other race and ethnicity males also show a strong, positive link to 
volatility that is larger in absolute terms among the baseline specifications, between 
37.735 and 77.357 with cohort and selection controls and between 41.084 and 204.178 in 
the baseline models (tables 3.4 and 3.6).  Unemployment is procyclical among women 
and counter-cyclical for men, from 2.897 to 6.362 standard deviation points for women 
and -10.937 to -13.413 points for men.  Across all models, average earnings are small in 
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magnitude but have a statistically significant, negative association to volatility between    
-0.082 to -0.195 (multiplied by 100) so that higher earners are linked to lower earnings 
volatility.  Across gender Government industry workers show the least volatility for men 
and very low volatility for women.  For men, Manufacturing is another industry with 
relatively lower earnings volatility across the econometric specifications.  Among 
women, Transportation/Utilities is the industry category with the lowest earnings 
volatility, all else equal.   
3.8 Conclusion and Future Work   
 For men, the link between race and volatility exists among Other racial and ethnic 
minorities.  The relationship between volatility and Black women is maintained in the 
fixed effects models with selection.  In the baseline models, unemployment rate has a 
positive association with volatility among women and it appears weakly positive in one 
model accounting for cohort fixed effects.  Meanwhile, men display a negative 
unemployment-volatility relationship.  Per Celik et al. (2008), this may suggest a labor 
market strategy where, within a household, men maintain stable employment during 
relatively weaker economic times, whereas women may be responding to economic 
instability either voluntarily or involuntarily.  One of the strongest, consistent findings is 
the negative link between earnings levels and volatility, so that higher earners could 
expect, on average, lower earnings volatility.  Volatility elasticities evaluated at the 
sample means for volatility and earnings are approximately -0.5, so that a 1 percent 
increase in individual earnings leads to a -0.5 percent decline in earnings volatility.  
Industry covariates suggest that workers within the Government, Manufacturing, and 
Transportation/Utilities industries exhibit some of the lowest volatility levels across men 
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and women.  These results are sensitive to the inclusion of average earnings between 
columns 5 and 6 throughout tables 3.4-3.7. 
Given the nature of this exercise, it is difficult to fully evaluate the causal 
mechanisms of exposure to earnings volatility.  Still, the cohort design of the study 
allows me to uncover important implications.  Compared with essay 2, where I find 
differences in family income and earnings volatility levels across education levels, and 
that the least educated bear the highest levels of earnings and income volatility, I look 
within cohorts separated by education level and 5-year birth intervals.  In so doing, I find 
that significant differences in the predicted level of volatility emerge within these skill 
groups.  Being non-White and having lower earnings are associated with higher earnings 
volatility, and local unemployment seems to matter differently for men and women once 
cohort fixed effects are considered.  Also, the public sector industries are consistently 
linked to lower volatility for men and women.   
A takeaway from this essay is the existence of differences in total volatility within 
education groups.  Local economic conditions may matter, and minorities, persons 
working outside stable government industries, and lower earners may find themselves 
more likely to face earnings volatility.  These differences in volatility exposure may then 
raise new questions about volatility’s consequences, and suggest the possibility of 
inequality in its occurrence across the earnings distribution, race, industry, and local 
economic conditions.  In Essay 4, I investigate what, if any, consequences result from 
exposure to income volatility during childhood.  
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics by Education-Birth Year Cohort (2008 Dollars) 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation 
 
Individual Earnings ($) 
% Change in Individual Earnings 
SD(% Change in Individual Earnings) 
 
Unemployment Rate  
    
Demographics Within Cohort 
 
   % Female 
   % Less Than High School  
   % High School 
   % More Than High School 
   % White 
   % Black 
   % Other 
 
Industry Shares Within Cohort 
 
   Manufacturing 
   Construction 
   Services 
   Trade 
   Transportation/Utilities 
   Mining 
   Government 
   Agriculture (Omitted Category) 
   Miscellaneous Industry 
 
   Mean Observations Per Cohort 
 
 
37,801.59 
2.55 
71.67 
 
5.72 
        
 
 
48.60 
13.40 
35.33 
51.28 
87.78 
7.97 
4.24 
 
 
 
16.78 
6.72 
40.74 
14.15 
6.89 
0.78 
5.52 
2.25 
8.34 
 
11,787.02 
 
11,870.20 
7.10 
29.33 
 
.47 
    
 
 
4.15 
34.06 
47.80 
49.98 
2.45 
2.23 
1.28 
 
 
 
5.69 
3.15 
12.67 
4.22 
2.22 
0.39 
2.51 
1.15 
7.73 
 
6,861.59 
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Table 3.2 Matched-CPS Sample Size by Education Birth-Year Cohort, 1980-2008 
Cohort Birth Year Interval Education Sample Size 
1  Less High School 5,203 
2 1987 – 1992 High School 1,188 
3  Post High School 1,489 
4  Less High School 6,355 
5 1982 – 1986 High School 3,202 
6  Post High School 5,259 
7  Less High School 6,046 
8 1977 – 1981 High School 5,577 
9  Post High School 9,560 
10  Less High School 7,999 
11 1972 – 1976 High School 7,812 
12  Post High School 14,375 
13  Less High School 9,024 
14 1967 – 1971 High School 13,949 
15  Post High School 22,463 
16  Less High School 12,068 
17 1962 – 1966 High School 22,282 
18  Post High School 28,971 
19  Less High School 8,789 
20 1957 – 1961 High School 29,250 
21  Post High School 36,388 
22  Less High School 8,488 
23 1952 - 1956 High School 29,551 
24  Post High School 40,287 
25  Less High School 8,331 
26 1947 - 1951 High School 25,172 
27  Post High School 38,438 
28  Less High School 7,839 
29 1942 - 1956 High School 19,579 
30  Post High School 23,993 
31  Less High School 7,177 
32 1937 - 1941 High School 13,826 
33  Post High School 12,636 
34  Less High School 6,575 
35 1932 - 1936 High School 10,496 
36  Post High School 7,679 
37  Less High School 5,556 
38 1927 - 1931 High School 6,779 
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Table 3.2 (Continued) 
    
39  Post High School 4,489 
40  Less High School 3,352 
41 1922 - 1926 High School 3,492 
42  Post High School 2,024 
43  Less High School 443 
44 Before 1921 High School 448 
45  Post High School 255 
Cohort sample size counts represent the total number of individual observations within 1 
of 45 education birth-year cohorts over the period 1980-2008.  Individuals must meet the 
criteria of education (less than high school, high school diploma, or post-high school) and 
5 year year-of-birth interval to be assigned to 1 of 45 cohorts.   
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Table 3.3 Probit Labor Force Participation Selection Equation 
LABOR FORCE DECISION P(1,1) P(1,0) P(0,1) 
 Continuous Workers Labor Force Exit Labor Force Entry 
    
Black -0.451*** 0.213*** 0.171*** 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) 
Other -0.310*** 0.115*** 0.111*** 
 (0.011) (0.017) (0.016) 
Female -0.667*** 0.364*** 0.290*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) 
Unemployment Rate -0.014*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Non Labor Income -0.041*** 0.014*** 0.026*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
AFDC-Food Stamp Benefit -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EITC Max Benefit -0.000*** -0.000* 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
State Min Wage 0.020*** -0.021*** -0.053*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) 
    
Constant 1.373*** -2.057*** -1.949*** 
 (0.017) (0.026) (0.025) 
    
Observations 301,276 301,276 301,276 
Columns 1-3 represent first-stage probit regressions estimating the likelihood of continuous work (denoted P(1,1)), labor force exit 
(denoted P(1,0)), and labor force entry (denoted P(0,1)).  As described in the essay, covariates are chosen that relate to the individual’s 
reservation wage and theoretically predict their labor force entry, exit, or continuous work history. 
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Table 3.4 Determinants of Men's Cohort Earnings Volatility (w/o Selection), 1980-2008 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SD(Arc Pct. Change) Base Model Base Model Cohort/Year 
Effects 
Cohort/Year 
Effects 
Cohort/Year 
Effects 
Cohort/Year 
Effects 
       
Black 96.762*** -20.075 14.973 12.843 -12.535 -7.117 
 (22.195) (17.308) (17.663) (21.482) (15.777) (15.165) 
Other 204.178*** 107.660*** 58.572** 77.357*** 55.210** 47.644** 
 (32.427) (24.543) (23.398) (28.427) (21.632) (20.795) 
Average Earnings  -0.104*** -0.150***   -0.075*** 
  (0.005) (0.009)   (0.010) 
Unemployment Rate 0.950 -0.609 -11.821*** -13.413*** -13.029*** -12.244*** 
 (0.914) (0.685) (3.485) (4.237) (3.027) (2.908) 
Manufacturing     -24.712* -37.981*** 
     (12.823) (12.449) 
Construction     -21.315 -33.053** 
     (16.268) (15.703) 
Service     -0.372 -15.806 
     (17.220) (16.671) 
Trade     10.557 -14.852 
     (17.823) (17.474) 
Transportation/Utilities     -4.217 -2.516 
     (25.092) (24.090) 
Mining     -50.668 -55.350 
     (52.538) (50.443) 
Government     -80.746** 7.094 
     (34.748) (35.539) 
Miscellaneous Trade     130.992*** 89.352*** 
     (14.349) (14.950) 
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Table 3.4 (Continued) 
 
      
Constant 49.815*** 111.753*** 193.859*** 119.382*** 106.454*** 160.359*** 
 (5.641) (4.988) (20.402) (23.889) (21.890) (22.320) 
       
Observations 672 672 672 672 672 672 
R-squared 0.0775 0.4877 0.6758 0.5197 0.7603 0.7795 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Selection equations estimate a first stage probit on a set of 
demographic and policy.  Average earnings is transformed, multiplied by 100.   
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Table 3.5 Determinants of Women's Cohort Earnings Volatility (w/o Selection), 1980-2008 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SD(Arc Pct. Change) Base Model Base Model Cohort/Year 
Effects 
Cohort/Year 
Effects 
Cohort/Year 
Effects 
Cohort/Year 
Effects 
       
Black 58.552*** -18.664* -7.531 -16.928 -15.276 -12.941 
 (16.426) (11.093) (10.646) (11.159) (10.111) (10.070) 
Other 11.144 0.936 -57.705*** -66.448*** -62.738*** -59.673*** 
 (27.428) (18.016) (17.181) (18.076) (16.118) (16.037) 
Average Earnings  -0.195*** -0.110***   -0.047*** 
  (0.007) (0.013)   (0.015) 
Unemployment Rate 5.751*** 0.365 5.938** 6.362** 3.230 3.502 
 (0.847) (0.585) (2.398) (2.527) (2.260) (2.246) 
Manufacturing     -100.769*** -113.198*** 
     (37.955) (37.909) 
Construction     -2.654 -6.529 
     (36.672) (36.439) 
Service     -91.249** -103.873*** 
     (37.568) (37.534) 
Trade     -56.665 -75.222** 
     (37.581) (37.807) 
Transportation/Utilities     -121.080*** -130.673*** 
     (45.298) (45.092) 
Mining     -213.532 -259.783 
     (203.531) (202.679) 
Government     -91.877* -70.933 
     (48.149) (48.299) 
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Table 3.5 (Continued) 
 
Miscellaneous Trade 
 
 
-17.597 
 
 
-39.658 
     (37.325) (37.756) 
       
Constant 53.218*** 132.918*** 98.900*** 83.641*** 136.019*** 159.303*** 
 (5.323) (4.398) (24.553) (24.912) (45.188) (45.512) 
       
Observations 679 679 679 679 679 679 
R-squared 0.0903 0.6083 0.7867 0.7626 0.8164 0.8192 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Selection equations estimate a first stage probit on a set of 
demographic and policy variables. Average earnings is transformed, multiplied by 100.   
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Table 3.6 Determinants of Men's Cohort Earnings Volatility, 1980-2008 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SD(Arc Pct. Change) Base Model Base Model Cohort/Year 
Effects 
Cohort/Year 
Effects 
Cohort/Year 
Effects 
Cohort/Year 
Effects 
       
Black 87.482*** -8.852 -12.541 -19.139 -19.244 -16.996 
 (20.923) (17.711) (19.722) (22.720) (18.481) (17.724) 
Other 91.824*** 41.084* 34.351 19.742 41.171* 37.735* 
 (27.622) (22.532) (22.798) (26.243) (22.314) (21.403) 
Average Earnings  -0.082*** -0.126***   -0.077*** 
  (0.004) (0.009)   (0.011) 
Unemployment Rate 1.956 0.569 -11.973*** -10.937*** -11.956*** -11.848*** 
 (1.395) (1.132) (3.465) (3.992) (3.186) (3.055) 
Manufacturing     -28.288** -45.636*** 
     (12.651) (12.366) 
Construction     -25.221 -38.759** 
     (15.941) (15.400) 
Service     -0.763 -17.759 
     (16.969) (16.440) 
Trade     -3.907 -29.905* 
     (17.648) (17.300) 
Transportation/Utilities     -10.448 -13.002 
     (24.569) (23.562) 
Mining     -52.125 -55.495 
     (51.471) (49.359) 
Government     -83.025** -8.731 
     (34.878) (34.986) 
Miscellaneous Trade     111.364*** 63.793*** 
     (14.999) (15.813) 
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Table 3.6 (Continued)       
       
Selection (1,1) 339.146*** 307.164*** 109.132* 389.467*** 110.829** 45.713 
 (48.345) (39.185) (59.735) (64.854) (55.089) (53.586) 
Selection (1,0) 273.558** 112.126 -31.735 65.109 -13.093 -28.956 
 (121.097) (98.439) (126.883) (145.995) (117.477) (112.672) 
Selection (0,1) -151.737*** -0.180 -40.524 41.304 28.236 -15.431 
 (55.085) (45.338) (53.153) (60.878) (49.442) (47.793) 
       
Constant -328.814* -237.595 334.044 -138.256 60.797 228.600 
 (192.796) (156.194) (221.578) (249.050) (202.290) (194.629) 
       
Observations 669 669 669 669 669 669 
R-squared 0.3965 0.6049 0.7198 0.6273 0.7673 0.7864 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Selection equations estimate a first stage probit on a set of 
demographic and policy variables including non labor income and the maximum EITC benefit for adult workers with one dependent 
child.  Average earnings is transformed, multiplied by 100.  For men, the results are restricted to household heads.  
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Table 3.7 Determinants of Women's Cohort Earnings Volatility, 1980-2008 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SD(Arc Pct. Change) Base Model Base Model Cohort/Year 
Effects 
Cohort/Year 
Effects 
Cohort/Year 
Effects 
Cohort/Year 
Effects 
       
Black 75.625*** -11.029 -33.094*** -53.891*** -30.225** -24.267** 
 (19.999) (13.450) (12.713) (13.242) (12.252) (12.061) 
Other -20.447 -31.675* -66.944*** -86.331*** -61.656*** -54.903*** 
 (27.033) (17.753) (16.394) (17.224) (15.669) (15.410) 
Average Earnings  -0.194*** -0.117***   -0.074*** 
  (0.007) (0.013)   (0.015) 
Unemployment Rate 5.987*** 2.897*** 1.957 2.590 -0.462 -0.311 
 (1.440) (0.951) (2.271) (2.407) (2.177) (2.134) 
Manufacturing     -91.416** -110.807*** 
     (35.605) (35.094) 
Construction     -8.503 -12.594 
     (34.443) (33.756) 
Service     -85.034** -103.660*** 
     (35.379) (34.858) 
Trade     -50.176 -78.221** 
     (35.398) (35.120) 
Transportation/Utilities     -116.134*** -134.327*** 
     (42.629) (41.921) 
Mining     -285.566 -362.194* 
     (190.134) (186.903) 
Government     -100.678** -71.022 
     (45.062) (44.537) 
Miscellaneous Trade     -9.991 -41.543 
     (35.335) (35.175) 
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Table 3.7 (Continued)       
       
Selection (1,1) 45.877 143.614*** 35.008 139.190*** -54.492 -78.819* 
 (43.550) (28.782) (42.714) (43.488) (42.663) (42.075) 
Selection (1,0) 230.044* 281.157*** -102.930 -65.954 -148.707 -156.205 
 (134.309) (88.200) (103.515) (109.678) (100.175) (98.162) 
Selection (0,1) -187.893*** -80.698** 85.970** 148.550*** 47.008 28.880 
 (57.378) (37.845) (37.070) (38.566) (35.898) (35.354) 
       
Constant -59.564 -358.456*** 165.035 -194.556 381.017** 529.200*** 
 (196.697) (129.536) (176.707) (187.193) (176.223) (170.617) 
       
Observations 677 677 677 677 677 677 
R-squared 0.1990 0.6552 0.8205 0.7978 0.8403 0.8469 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Selection equations estimate a first stage probit on a set of 
demographic and policy variables including non labor income and the maximum EITC benefit for adult workers with one dependent 
child. Average earnings is transformed, multiplied by 100.  For women, the regressions are not restricted to household heads.  
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FIGURE 3.1  
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FIGURE 3.2  
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FIGURE 3.3  
 
 
 
 
 
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
20 30 40 50 60
20 30 40 50 60
Less Than High School High School
More Than High School
S
td
. D
ev
ia
tio
n 
of
 P
er
ce
nt
 C
ha
ng
e
Age
 
Individual Women's Earnings Volatility Across the Lifecycle
  
75 
 
4 CHILDHOOD INCOME VOLATILITY AND ADULT OUTCOMES 
4.1 Introduction 
Income volatility in the United States has been on the rise since the 1970’s, 
increasing by at least one-third (Gottschalk and Moffitt 1994; Keys 2008; Dynan et al. 
2008; essay 2).  Driven largely by earnings, it exhibits cyclical behavior (Dahl, 
Schwabish, and DeLeire 2008) and is attributed to both short-term economic shocks and 
permanent structural change throughout the economy (Gottschalk and Moffitt 2009).  
Several studies focus on specific examples of volatility, finding that health shocks, 
workplace injury, divorce, plant closings, and job loss can have long term effects on 
adults (Currie et al. 2010; Woock 2009; Eliason and Storrie 2007; Charles and Stephens 
2002; Huff Stevens 1997).   For children, it is unclear whether membership in families 
with volatile incomes has any long term effect.  While the literature does confirm that 
growing up in poverty is associated with lower education, earnings, and cognitive ability 
(Duncan and Brooks-Gunn 2000; Duncan et al. 2008; Dahl and Lochner 2005), we do not 
know if growing up in households with unstable incomes per se warrants concern. 
Research examining the long term effects of volatility is lacking.  Most volatility 
research has, up to this point, focused on trends, statistical measurement, and the 
implications such measures have when interpreting changes in income inequality in the 
United States.   Although the literature relating income to long term outcomes and 
mobility mainly focuses on measured levels, not volatility, these studies help explain 
income’s socioeconomic correlates.  Studies identify a connection between early 
childhood poverty, and both lowered earnings and receipt of public assistance as an adult 
(Duncan, Kalil, and Ziol-Guest 2008).  One channel enabling such relationships across 
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generations may be human capital (Becker and Tomes 1979; Lillard and Willis 1994; 
Blau 1999; Ludwig and Miller 2007).  This essay draws motivation from a model of 
mobility where parental income determines human capital for children in the household, 
which then largely determines the children’s adult earnings, income, and well-being 
(Becker and Tomes 1979).  Work on early human capital formation describes how initial 
skills are necessary to acquire additional skills in the future (Cuhna, Heckman, Lochner, 
and Masterov 2005), and modest, positive associations exist between income and 
educational attainment (Duncan et al. 2008), and performance on math and reading 
assessments (Dahl and Lochner 2005).  Such skill deficits may drive findings in studies 
estimating intergenerational relationships.  
In this essay I examine the long-term consequences of income volatility during 
childhood on subsequent adult outcomes.  There has been extensive evidence on 
intergenerational economic mobility in earnings, income, education, and wealth (Becker 
and Tomes 1979; Mazumder 2005; Solon 1992; Zimmerman 1992; Meghir and Palme 
2005; Black et al. 2005; Charles and Hurst 2003).  The mobility model adopted here 
augments the standard intergenerational income elasticity (IGE) model to include income 
volatility.  One mechanism that gives rise to the intergenerational transmission of 
volatility in the standard Becker and Tomes (1979) framework is imperfect capital 
markets (Loury 1981; Mazumder 2005).  In this context imperfect capital markets imply 
that income shocks can persist.  By accounting for the long term effect of shocks to 
income during childhood, this paper addresses a missing component in the literature on 
the transmission of mobility.    
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  To empirically implement the model I link families in the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) across generations.  Income volatility during childhood is defined as 
the volatility of family income from labor market earnings, total taxable non-labor 
income, and government transfers between ages 0 and 16.  For each person, volatility is 
calculated by decomposing total volatility into its permanent and transitory components 
(Gottschalk and Moffitt 1994; 2009).  Volatility enters the model both separately and 
interacted with income level.   
The adult outcomes I examine include income level, educational attainment, and 
health for children growing up in households with higher income volatility.  Adult 
income is measured at age 25 and beyond, educational attainment is measured as whether 
the person completes post high school education, and health status is measured by 
whether adult participants consider themselves to be in poor health.  To capture the 
experiences of adults near the age thresholds of 25, 30, and 40, linear dependent variable 
models examine outcomes at age groups 24-26, 29-31, and 39-41 respectively.  The OLS 
classical errors-in-variables assumption is violated in the income IGE models, as families 
with higher lifetime mean income typically experience relatively higher rates of income 
growth over the lifecycle.  This leads to intergenerational estimates that are too low if 
second generation income is recorded while primary earners are in early adulthood and 
too high as workers approach older age.  To address this, the income IGE models account 
for lifecycle earnings growth and adopt specifications found to minimize left-side 
measurement error in second generation incomes (Haider and Solon 2006; Lee and Solon 
2007). 
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I find that on average higher income volatility exposure during childhood is 
associated with lower adult income and lower educational attainment.  For education, the 
magnitudes of these associations are generally small.  The sample families predominantly 
experience positive income change between years, and I control for lifecycle growth in 
family incomes to address this concern.  I then test the relationship of several volatility 
measures to adult outcomes.  Finally, I instrument for potentially endogenous family 
income volatility exposure during childhood.    
4.2 Literature  
4.2.1 Intergenerational transmission and mobility  
While relatively little work exists on the intergenerational aspects of volatility, the 
inheritability of economic status is well documented in the literature on intergenerational 
transmission (Solon 1992; Zimmermann 1992; Charles and Hurst 2003).  In these 
models, IGE’s are summary measures of the relationship between income, earnings, or 
wealth across generations and, by design, known causal factors are omitted in the 
regressions.  An IGE of 1 denotes no mobility across generations and a value of 0 denotes 
perfect mobility.  Becker and Tomes (1986) find an intergenerational elasticity of 0.2 for 
the United States using single year measures of fathers’ income and earnings, providing 
initial evidence of a highly mobile society.  Recent work estimating IGE’s has generally 
overturned this finding by accounting for lifecycle effects and measurement error using 
longer measures of permanent earnings or incomes, with IGE estimates ranging between 
0.4 and 0.6 (Solon 1992; Zimmerman 1992; Mazumder 2005; Gouskova et al. 2010).   
Shore (2010) presents rare evidence that volatility is passed across generations. 
He models the intergenerational transmission of risk, using income volatility as a proxy 
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for riskiness.  Children of parents with higher income volatility will experience higher 
permanent income volatility as adults, and channels for transmitting volatility include 
education and self employment of parents.  Income volatility is found to reduce 
inequality and promote mobility, weakening the relationship between parental and child 
income.  I replicate this finding in baseline estimates of volatility, which pool instability 
from both positive and negative income changes.   
Prior to Shore (2010) income shocks have typically been described as a 
measurement problem to overcome in explaining permanent income (Duncan 1988; Blau 
1999) or assumed to be mean zero over time (Becker and Tomes 1979).  Thus the 
introduction of volatility as an explanatory variable in mobility models is rare up to this 
point.  The volatility literature has documented trends in instability, or volatility, over the 
past 40 years with a focus on the United States.   Gottschalk and Moffitt’s (1994) work in 
the area established the method of applying permanent income decompositions to 
volatility studies.    In their seminal piece, they introduce permanent and transitory 
earnings volatility as underlying explanations for observed wage gaps of the 1970’s and 
1980’s.  They find that transitory volatility explains between one-third and one-half of the 
increase in overall earnings variability over this time period, underscoring the importance 
of accounting for economic risk in the discourse on rising income and earnings 
inequality. Many recent analyses documenting historical trends conclude that income and 
earnings volatility rose over the past 30 to 40 years (Dynan, Elmendorf, Sichel 2008; 
essay 2).  This increasing trend occurs across race and education groups since the 1970’s, 
though groups with fewer skills and lower earnings exhibit higher levels (Gottschalk and 
Moffitt 1994; Keys 2008; essay 3).  If family income volatility during childhood has an 
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intergenerational effect, the adult outcomes of children from the 1970’s and 1980’s, who 
faced relatively high volatility during childhood, would reflect this (Gottschalk and 
Moffitt 2009).   
4.2.2 Instability 
Like intergenerational elasticities, volatility is a summary measure.   It captures 
events that add and take away income.  Parents may maximize utility to the benefit of 
their children, but downward economic instability may threaten this effort.  A variety of 
event studies have documented specific examples of volatility or instability.  This work 
attempts to explain the role of job loss and income shocks in predicting earnings 
(Oreopolous, Page, and Huff Stevens 2005), health (Ruhm 2003; Eliason and Storrie 
2007), marriage, and divorce (Mayer 1997; Eliason 2004; Charles and Stephens 2002; 
Conger et al. 1990; Hankins and Hoekstra 2010).  The conclusions from these studies are 
mixed, due in part to methodological differences in modeling exogenous relationships 
(Mayer 1997).   
When considering how volatility and labor market instability are related, the 
differences between permanent and transitory income volatility should be highlighted.  
Permanent income volatility is likely the result of differences in skills and the return for 
skills within the economy, and transitory income volatility is associated with risk and 
shocks (Gottschalk and Moffitt 2009).  This risk may be voluntary or involuntary, and it 
can reflect a variety of decisions and events within the household, such as bonuses for 
performance or household employment risk within the labor market (Gottschalk and 
Moffitt 2009).  Recent evidence estimates a link between transitory income volatility and 
divorce (Nunley and Seals 2010).  Facing income volatility from a variety of underlying 
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sources, investment in children’s human capital may change and preferences between 
consumption and investment may also change (Attanasio and Meyer 2010).   If volatility 
causes parents to reduce human capital investment, it can harm children.  However, it is 
equally possible that volatility reflects income growth, so that the variation of income 
within a family represents a wider set of investment possibilities for children.   
4.3 A Model of Mobility with Volatility 
The basic framework of the intergenerational mobility model is a log-linear 
regression of adult offspring income on the income level of the working-age parent(s): 
(1) yitchild =  α + βyi,t−1parent + 𝜀, 
where yitchild  represents adult offspring income in period t and yi,t−1parent is the income of 
the working-age parent(s) in period t-1.  Thus, β denotes the intergenerational income 
elasticity and is a summary measure of the relationship between incomes across 
generations, measured with mean zero error 𝜀 (Solon 1992; Zimmerman 1992).  Causal 
parameters are not directly recovered in this framework, but the theory of human capital 
investment and mobility, described below and in the appendix on intergenerational 
mobility, underscores the potential influence of parental income and investment in 
offspring human capital towards determining β (Becker and Tomes 1979; Solon 1999, 
2004).  The resulting empirical studies provide a straightforward description of the 
degree to which American families move up or down the continuum of economic status 
over time.  
The theory of intergenerational mobility assumes that transitory income volatility 
has no role in predicting income mobility.  This is supported largely by the permanent 
income hypothesis, which predicts households borrow against transitory negative income 
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shocks by accessing perfectly functioning capital markets while saving positive income 
shocks.  There are, however, reasons to expect that transitory volatility does transmit 
across generations.  Constant relative risk aversion utility models of family consumption 
and saving accounting for prudence (i.e. precautionary savings) by decision makers 
underscore the role of income variances in determining optimal choices.  In these models, 
rising variability of income affects consumption, human capital investment, and utility 
(Attanasio and Weber 2010).  Thus, previous intergenerational models relying on the 
permanent income hypothesis to justify omitting higher income moments exclude an 
important component of the family’s utility maximization process.  Statistically, 
transitory shocks persist over several years (Hyslop 2001), and both permanent and 
transitory shocks contribute substantially to measured inequality (Gottschalk and Moffitt 
1994).  As mentioned previously, the timing of these shocks, possibly during early human 
capital formation, means that some children will be exposed to shocks at stages of child 
development where the acquisition of basic skills occurs (Cuhna et al. 2005).  These 
skills allow for the acquisition of more complex skills later in childhood and into 
adulthood, which may largely determine labor market income and earnings.   
Imperfections in capital markets (Loury 1981; Becker and Tomes 1986; 
Mazumder 2005) may constrain access to loanable funds and constitute a final reason 
motivating the inclusion of transitory income shocks in an intergenerational model.  Such 
loans would insure against unanticipated shocks that threaten human capital investment 
in children.  Imperfections of several kinds may arise in this market, as future ability or 
income of the child investment is noisy to predict, but necessary to justify investment.  If 
collateralized through a child borrower, a loan for human capital investment amounts to 
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indentured servitude and cannot legally or realistically occur (Becker and Tomes 1986; 
Kane and Ellwood 2000).  In a study on permanent income and the Black-White test 
score gap, Rothstein and Wozny (2010) also describe human capital investment decisions 
of parents as a function of permanent income, explicitly assuming the absence of credit 
constraints or any uncertainty.  They note, as do I, that violations of this assumption 
would impact these human capital investment decisions.     
 I adapt the theoretical model of mobility to include a decomposed definition of 
total income 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1, so that transitory and permanent shocks from volatility eventually 
enter and influence the family’s utility maximization problem.    
(2) 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝜇𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1,  
𝜇𝑖,𝑡−1 represents permanent income and 𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 represents transitory income.  The family 
maximizes utility over current consumption and investment in future generations.  
Permanent income 𝜇𝑖,𝑡−1 and transitory income vi,t−1 enter the family budget constraint, 
where income is spent on consumption Ci,t−1 and investment in child human capital Ii,t−1.  
This is shown by substituting the decomposition in (2) for income in the intergenerational 
model (Solon 2004):    
(3) 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝜇𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 = Ci,t−1 + Ii,t−1. 
Solving for permanent income, 𝜇𝑖,𝑡−1: 
(4) 𝜇𝑖,𝑡−1 = Ci,t−1 + Ii,t−1 − 𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1. 
The productivity of parental investment in human capital is determined as follows: 
(5) hi,t−1 = θlog�Ii,t−1 + Gi,t−1� + αeit + αut. 
This production function hi,t−1 for human capital accumulation includes parental 
investments and government investment.  θ denotes positive marginal productivity of 
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human capital investment. As described in the Appendix, the determinants of lifetime 
income include a set of innate and environmental factors et beyond human capital 
investment that are fixed and endogenous in estimates of the IGE.  Human capital 
production, determined largely by parental investments, has consequences for 
determining income of children in adulthood, yit: 
(6) 𝑙𝑜𝑔yit = δi + ρhi,t−1. 
ρ reflects the income return on human capital.  Introducing a basic Cobb-Douglass utility 
function with preferences 𝛼, family decision makers 
(7) max𝐶𝑡−1, 𝑦𝑡 𝑈 = (1 − 𝛼)𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑡−1 +  𝛼𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑡, 
and, substituting for current period consumption t-1 and adult income of the next 
generation t, family utility takes the following form: 
(8) 𝑈𝑖 = (1 − 𝛼) log  �𝜇𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1� + 𝛼δi + 𝛼𝜃𝜌 log� 𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1� + 𝛼𝜌𝑒𝑖𝑡. 
This is, again, an adaptation of Solon (2004) with a decomposed definition of income.  
Economic shocks to family income may equally reflect a variety of events, including 
raises, bonuses, changes in family structure, or job loss.  Accordingly, the implications 
for family utility are not straightforward.  Maximizing utility, families invest in children 
during period t-1: 
(9) 𝜕𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 = −(1 − 𝛼)/[𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1] + 𝛼𝜃𝜌/[𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1] = 0. 
In some instances, families may choose to invest zero resources, finding instead that the 
level of public investment in children 𝐺 is sufficient.  (9) reflects an interior solution, 
where public resources do not satisfy parents.  Solving for the optimal amount of 
investment 𝐼∗: 
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(10) I∗ = ( 1(1−α)+αθρ)[µi,t−1αθρ − 𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1(1 − 𝛼) + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1αθρ]. 
The variance of investments, I*, reflects how different degrees of transitory income 
volatility var(𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1), permanent volatility var�𝜇𝑖,𝑡−1�, and total volatility var(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) 
relate to variation of human capital investment in future generations.  This model 
demonstrates that the investment choices of parents can vary according to the variation in 
both permanent and transitory income:        
(11)      var(I∗) = � 1(1−α)+αθρ�2 ��(αθρ)2var�µi,t−1� + (1 − 𝛼)2var( 𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1� +(αθρ)2var(𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1)] +  2(αθρ)(1 − 𝛼)cov(µi,t−1, Gi,t−1) − 2(αθρ)(1 − 𝛼)cov(vi,t−1, Gi,t−1) + 2(αθρ)2cov(µi,t−1, vi,t−1)�  
I approximate the magnitude of shocks to income using a measure of transitory income 
volatility, 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1), introduced by Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994).   Like total income 
or earnings, I decompose income volatility into its permanent and transitory components 
(Gottschalk and Moffitt 1994): 
(12) var(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) = var�𝜇𝑖,𝑡−1� + var�𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1�.   
The permanent and transitory components are assumed to be additive and independent.  
Transitory income volatility is then measured as the sum of squared deviations around a 
family specific mean of log income, shown in equation (13) below:   
(13)  var�𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1� = 𝜎𝑣𝑖2 = ( 1𝑇𝑖−1)∑ (𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦�𝑖)2𝑇𝑖𝑡=1 ,  
where 𝑦�𝑖 is the person-specific mean income over a specified time period 𝑇𝑖 during 
childhood.   Permanent volatility is defined as between-person income variation 
(14) var�𝜇𝑖,𝑡−1� = 𝜎𝜇2 = � 1𝑁−1�∑ (𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦�)2 −𝑇𝑖𝑡=1 (𝜎𝑣2𝑇� ). 
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Finally, from the left-hand side of equation (12), I re-introduce a measure of total income 
volatility, var(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1), from essays 2 and 3.  This measure combines transitory and 
permanent volatility components in (13) and (14) and has the properties and advantages 
described in greater detail in the first two essays.  To restate from essays 2 and 3, total 
volatility is defined as 
(15) �𝑉𝑎𝑟 �100 ∗ 𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑦𝑖𝑡−1
𝑦𝚤�
�, 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is income for person or family i in time t.     
 The solution in equation (11) yields several predictions.   From the independence 
assumption stated in (12), the last term on the right hand side of (11) is canceled out.  
Consistent with Attanasio and Weber (2010), a higher variance of permanent income or 
transitory income, all else equal, is associated with higher variances of investment in 
child human capital.  A high variance of government spending on human capital raises 
the variance of family investment in human capital.   Highly altruistic families’ 
contributions to human capital are more volatile given levels of permanent volatility, var�µi,t−1�, or transitory volatility, var(𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1).  Higher levels of θρ, the overall market 
return to human capital, are positively associated with the magnitude of permanent and 
transitory income shocks.   Because 𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 shocks to income can be positive or negative, 
the implications for human capital and adult well-being are ambiguous, but the model 
confirms that transitory and permanent volatility could both have a non-zero 
intergenerational impact through human capital investment and formation.  By definition, 
these implications carry over to total volatility, the sum of permanent and transitory 
volatility. 
(16) cov(µi,t−1, Gi,t−1) ≠ cov(vi,t−1, Gi,t−1) ≠ cov(µi,t−1, vi,t−1) ≠ 0. 
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(16) acknowledges many of the public human capital investments Gi,t−1 received by 
children are means-tested benefits based on the permanent µi,t−1 and transitory vi,t−1 
income levels of the family (examples include subsidized food programs, Head Start, and 
targeted interventions for children deemed to be at-risk for low achievement).  Also, 
transitory income may be related to the level of permanent income.  For now, it is 
established that such effects are theoretically non-zero.   When evaluating the potential 
welfare consequences of volatility, it is important to note the existence of public safety 
net programs acting as an insurance mechanism.   These programs potentially impact 
individual decision-making and consumption habits and therefore complicate 
identification of a true exogenous volatility effect. 
The optimizing decisions of parents with respect to their own consumption and 
human capital investment into offspring represent structural parameters underlying the 
reduced-form empirical mobility model specification as described in (1).  The preceding 
framework shows that these parameters include a decomposed definition of family 
income that recognizes the role of transitory income fluctuations in determining adult 
outcomes.  The reduced-form intergenerational mobility model in equation (1) is 
therefore augmented to include income volatility from the structural representation, Vi,t−1parent : 
(17) yitchild =  α + βyi,t−1parent + γVi,t−1parent + 𝜀. 
Moving forward, equation (17) is the basic augmented intergenerational elasticity model 
estimated throughout the paper.  The addition of income volatility to the intergenerational 
mobility model shows that volatility has an intergenerational relationship to income and 
well-being.  Thus, γ is assumed to be non-zero.  Through the mechanism of human 
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capital investment, volatility is theoretically associated with higher overall volatility of 
human capital investment, which supports the inclusion of higher income moments 
empirically.   
 Estimating the intergenerational role of transitory income volatility amounts to 
testing, indirectly, how volatile or unstable incomes correlate with human capital 
investment, and the subsequent relationship to observable adult outcomes.  As stated in 
Becker and Tomes (1979), substituting measures of offspring quality or welfare for adult 
income in the utility function yields similar theoretical results for income distributions 
and inequality.  This lends support to the inclusion of education and health outcomes in 
the analysis – lifetime quality measures which, along with income, parents plausibly seek 
to maximize in their children. 
4.4 Empirical Model: Testing the Association between Volatility and Adult 
Outcomes 
 In my empirical model, holding the level of family income during childhood 
constant, I estimate the relationship between family income volatility during childhood Vi 
and a set of adult outcomes Oiy.  For each adult individual i, I estimate regressions to 
determine if shocks are transmitted across generations:   
(18)    Oiy =  α +  βI0−16�������i + γV0−16i +  𝐗δ + εi. 
When outcome Oiy is adult offspring income, equation (18) yields the income IGE for 
offspring aged 25 and older.  It is the canonical intergenerational elasticity model (Solon 
1992; Lee and Solon 2007; Grawe 2006; Mazumder 2005; Gouskova, Chiteji, and 
Stafford 2010) estimated via OLS with controls for income volatility during childhood 
years 0-16.  Non-income outcomes Oiy for high school dropout, post high school 
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educational attainment, health status, and non-marital child bearing are tested in (18) 
using an OLS binary linear probability model.  I also present results tabulated in 
appendix regression tables using an alternative specification substituting parental 
education for permanent family income during childhood.  During childhood years 0-16, 
mean family income I0−16�������i is an approximation for permanent income.  Family income is 
defined as the income, earnings, and transfers received in person i’s household.  To 
account for potential non linearities in mean income and income volatility, I use a 
logarithmic transformation of family income.  Non-income outcomes are estimated over 
three age groups y: 24-26, 29-31, and 39-41 year olds.  These groups are selected to 
approximate smoothed results for 25, 30, and 40 year old adults.   
The separability of income and volatility is tested via interactions of the two 
variables.  A vector of demographic X’s includes age Ai and race of parent, gender of 
offspring, education of parents, and the number of offspring.  Education is a 0/1 variable 
equal to one if either parent attends college for four or more years.  Age of the household 
head, Ai, most often the father, is averaged over the observed childhood years of the 
offspring.  Properly accounting for life-cycle earnings profiles is important, as both 
earnings and income are known to follow a concave growth profile over prime age 
working years (Weiss 1986).   In the volatility literature, life-cycle effects are often 
accounted for by replacing income with residuals from a regression of income on an age 
quartic (Gundersen and Ziliak 2008).  For intergenerational studies, such effects are 
modeled with an age quartic within the set of explanatory variables.  For estimates of 
permanent and transitory volatility, I combine both approaches, using an age quartic of 
household head’s average age Ai in the set of demographic variables while estimating 
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volatility using residuals purging lifecycle effects.  For total volatility, I elect to follow 
the intergenerational literature and rely on the age quartic controls to pick up lifecycle 
effects.   In a series of robustness checks using the Current Population Survey, I find that 
the total volatility measure is not sensitive to lifecycle controls.  Income IGE models also 
include an age quartic for offspring age interacted with mean family income during 
childhood.  Intergenerational estimates are tabulated when all child volatility years Vi are 
available, requiring at least one observation across three defined child volatility 
developmental stages: ages 0-5, 6-10, and 11-16.  
 The estimation of intergenerational models, where the same individuals are 
followed over time, produces positive autocorrelation of the individual specific error 
terms over the panel.  At the same time, the errors likely have unequal variances, 
violating the OLS assumption of identical, independently distributed errors. This implies 
the OLS standard errors are no longer consistent.  To address this, the estimates are 
corrected for heteroscedasticity using Huber-White corrected standard errors, and they 
are clustered on a unique identifier for each child observation to account for 
autocorrelation.   
4.5 Measurement and Data 
 The PSID is a longitudinal survey that began in 1968 and has continued to be 
administered at the University of Michigan.  It consists of two independent samples, the 
Survey Research Center (SRC) sample and the Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) 
sample.  Due to challenges in the SEO survey design, this essay uses the SRC sample of 
the PSID (Shin and Solon 2009).  The PSID collects detailed economic, social, and 
demographic information on 1968 participant families and their descendants.  Over time, 
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offspring of the families are followed as they age and begin their own families.  The 
PSID spans multiple generations between 1968 and 2007.  It started with 4,800 families 
and is estimated to have reached over 7,000 families by 2001.  As of 2003, the PSID 
collected information on over 65,000 individuals spanning as much as 36 years (Institute 
for Social Research 2006).  Major changes in the collection of the PSID throughout the 
1990’s include a switch to biennial interviews in 1997 and a doubling in the length of 
interviews between 1995 and 1999 (Gouskova, Andreski, and Schoeni 2010).   
 To construct the intergenerational sample, I use the Family Identification and 
Mapping System from the PSID, which links parents and offspring.  Unique individual 
identifiers and yearly family interview numbers, along with demographic variables for 
age and marital status, indicate when offspring leave their childhood family units.  The 
main income measure, family money income, can be tracked for offspring over the 
lifecycle.  Individuals are observed as dependent children within families, though most of 
the information collected applies to adults.  As subjects enter adulthood they participate 
in the PSID survey.  The resulting panel is unbalanced since, depending on the age of the 
subject, there are a range of data on adult income and earnings.   
 The data file I construct is a sample of 2,186 unique offspring.  The final file size 
ranges between approximately 1,200 and 1,400 unique adult offspring observations for 
24-26 year olds and under 1,000 adult offspring observations for 29-31 and 39-41 year 
olds.  This depends on cell sizes for dependent and independent variables.  Sample sizes 
for each intergenerational outcome are reported in the regression tables.  For regressions 
on the likelihood of adult poor health status, there are insufficient degrees of freedom to 
estimate results for 40 year olds.  Several factors contribute to this limitation.  First, in 
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this sample, the average adult child above 25 is 33 years old.  Next, self-reported health 
status is collected in 1986 and 1988 onward, leaving fewer observations compared to data 
starting from the 1970’s.  In results for the likelihood of non marital child bearing, the 
tabulation of female-only regressions reduces the sample by one-half, resulting in 
insufficient power to estimate these results for 39-41 year olds as well. 
 Family money income, the main income measure used, is a summary measure of 
earnings and income for all members of the family.  As described earlier, it is the 
summation of total taxable income, non-taxable transfer income, and social security 
income for the head (husband), wife, and other members of the family.  Families, as 
defined by the PSID, include cohabitating adults and single individuals living alone in a 
distinct household.  When the mother and father are both present, fathers are 
automatically assigned head status.  The PSID assigns a family income value for all 
persons in a family based on the family interview number.  As such, I have family 
income for mothers, fathers, heads of household, and offspring.  Topcoding rules for 
family income change throughout the survey.  Before 1979, the topcode value of income 
was $99,999, by 1980 it is $999,999, and in 1981 it increases to $9,999,999.  During 
1968-1993, family income was bottom coded at $1, but after 1994 the definition allows 
for negative family income of -$999,999 from business or farm losses.  As with previous 
work on income volatility and dynamics, I address changes in the collection of PSID 
income and earnings data by imposing a consistent topcoding and bottomcoding strategy.  
The top 1 percent of family income (Shin and Solon 2009) is excluded, and I assign a 
value of $1 to family incomes of zero and below (Dynan et al. 2008).    
  
93 
 
 For income elasticity models in (18) the offspring’s age equals year minus birth 
year minus 40, y-b-40.  It is then normalized so that offspring age equals zero at age 40.  
This has the useful feature of simplifying the interpretation of intergenerational 
elasticities at age 40, where several recent studies recommend evaluating the IGE to 
minimize bias in estimates of permanent income (Haider and Solon 2006; Lee and Solon 
2007).   
4.6 Summary Statistics and Volatility Trends 
 Table 4.1 provides summary statistics for the intergenerational data sample.  
Average parental family income (in 2006 dollars) is approximately $67,000.  Summary 
statistics for volatility, education, gender, age, and race are also included in Table 4.1.  
Upon comparing my sample volatility statistics to those of from other studies, I observe a 
24 to 30 percent rise in volatility between 1972 and 2007 (Figure 4.1), similar to the 
nearly 25 percent increase in Dynan et al. (2008) and 38 percent increase in essay 2 over 
a similar time frame.  The trend increase for offspring volatility (Figure 4.1, panel 1) is 
lower than that for heads (Figure 4.1, panel 2), though the level of volatility is the 
highest.  Mean sample volatility, 0.75, is higher than previous studies.  Those studies, 
however, do not typically pool volatility over 40 years and tend to focus on prime-age 
white males (Keys 2008).    
4.7 Results 
 The regression results are reported in tables 4.2-4.19, with alternative 
specifications in appendix tables 4.1-4.8 summarized separately.  Baseline results for 
volatility are shown along with interaction models allowing for the estimation of the 
average treatment effect of volatility on outcomes Oi (Wooldridge 2002).  The 
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interactions test the separability of demeaned average log family income and log 
volatility during childhood, but primarily are meant to transform γ, shown in equation 
(2), into the average treatment effect at the mean level of permanent family income 
within the population.  The 24-26, 29-31, and 39-41 age groups in non-income regression 
models are hereafter referred to as 25, 30, and 40, respectively.  The results presented are 
divided into sections based on the outcome being tested – income, education, or health 
and behavior.  These sections summarize results from empirical models testing the 
association of outcomes to transitory volatility and total volatility, respectively, as 
defined in section 4.3.   Next, the results from instrumental variables models are shown.  
Finally, I describe appendix regressions that utilize an alternative specification.   In many 
instances, small sample sizes either significantly constrain or prohibit confident 
interpretation of the results for 40 year olds.  They are, however, noted where the results 
for 40 year olds are available and seem relevant for the discussion. 
4.7.1 Income 
 Earnings and income mobility are studied extensively using the PSID, and I 
estimate the relationship between parents’ income (income during childhood), volatility 
between ages 0 and 16, and offspring adult income.   In log points, baseline childhood 
transitory volatility exposure during childhood predicts lower levels of income in 
adulthood between 0.019 and 0.021 (table 4.2); in models testing the separability of 
income and income volatility, transitory volatility has no statistically significant 
association to permanent income during childhood.  These and all interaction models are 
evaluated at the mean level of income during childhood, $67,000, and the mean level of 
volatility (see table 4.1).  Family economic background, as proxied by income during 
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childhood between birth and age 16, exhibits a statistically significant income IGE 
between 0.406 and 0.460 for 40 year olds.   
 The income IGE for total volatility ranges from 0.439 to 0.600 (table 4.2, lower 
panel).  Being Black and having additional siblings also predicts lower income in 
adulthood.  Total volatility is associated with a statistically significant higher adult 
income in the Base model (table 4.2, column 1) without covariates.   In models where 
total volatility is interacted with demeaned family income during childhood, total 
volatility is negatively associated with adult income.  This coefficient is insignificant by 
itself but significant when combined with the interaction of family income and total 
volatility.  These mixed results suggest that volatility’s impact may be sensitive to the 
level of income.  The combination of elasticities generated from transitory and total 
intergenerational mobility models are comparable to an elasticity of around 0.4 from 
Solon (1992) and 0.4 to 0.6 from Mazumder (2005) and Gouskova et al. (2010).  The 
intergenerational income elasticities generated in the process of estimating volatility’s 
relationship provide a useful reference point to gauge the reliability of the estimates.   
4.7.2 Education 
 To examine the impact of family income volatility on parental investments in 
child human capital, I test the role of volatility on the likelihood of high school dropout 
(tables 4.3-4.4) and post high school educational attainment (table 4.5-4.6).  Baseline 
transitory volatility is associated with a higher likelihood of dropout, but the association 
is statistically insignificant.  Among 25 year olds, permanent income during childhood is 
related to a lower chance of dropout, as are Black race and Female.  Individuals with 
additional siblings are more likely to drop out of high school, all else equal.   
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 In table 4.4, the association between drop out and total childhood income 
volatility exposure is tested.   Total volatility is insignificant for 25 year olds but predicts 
a small, significant increase in the drop out chance for 30 year olds by 0.001.  25 and 30 
year old Blacks and females are less likely, holding other variables constant, to drop out 
of high school and having more siblings is associated with a greater risk of drop out 
among 25 year olds.      
 Transitory volatility exposure is associated with a lower, statistically insignificant 
chance of post high school attainment (table 4.4) between -0.024 and -0.025 for 25 year 
olds.  The association remains insignificant but changes signs moving to 30 and 40 year 
olds.  The results are statistically zero, for all ages, when demeaned volatility is interacted 
with the demeaned level of income during childhood.  Family income level, measured in 
log points, is the strongest positive correlate of post high school education.  Females are 
generally predicted to have higher education attainment likelihood, and individuals with 
more siblings are less likely to pursue additional training beyond high school.   
Examination of the partial effect on post high school education of income during 
childhood, the relationship to family income is between 0.179 and 0.184 for 25 year olds, 
and 0.131 and 0.145 for 30 year olds.   
 The joint significance of total volatility and permanent income during childhood 
suggests post high school educational attainment may be less likely given exposure to 
total volatility (table 4.6, columns 2 and 4).  As is the case in the previous estimates of 
adult education and volatility exposure, family permanent income, gender, and the 
number of siblings are the strongest predictors of educational attainment.   
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4.7.3 Health and Behavior 
 Another measure of quality that parents may seek to maximize in their children is 
health.  Transitory volatility exposure during childhood has a small, positive, 
insignificant association to poor adult health for 25 year olds and a small, statistically 
significant negative association to poor health among 30 year olds between -0.008 and     
-0.009 (Table 4.7).  Income level does not appear to play an important role, though it 
does have the expected (negative) sign with respect to the likelihood of poor health.  
These mixed results for transitory volatility and health fit with some parts of the literature 
on economic risk and health – rest while on layoff may improve the health of 
unemployed workers (Ruhm 2003).  On the other hand, the stress associated with job loss 
may induce stress and threaten health (Eliason and Storrie 2007).  Like models for 
transitory volatility exposure, Poor health status in total volatility specifications (table 
4.8) is less likely among Other race individuals, 25 year olds, Black 30 year olds, as well 
as those from homes with higher permanent income.  There are no significant impacts for 
health from exposure to total volatility during childhood.   
 Non marital child bearing is examined in table 4.9.  I find no statistically 
important relationship between transitory volatility and non-marital child bearing, though 
the signs are consistently negative.   Higher permanent income during childhood is linked 
to a lower likelihood of non-marital childbearing, whereas Black race is related to a 
higher likelihood of non-marital child bearing as an adult, at all ages.  Similar to the 
transitory volatility model specifications, total volatility exposure has no important 
relationship to the occurrence of non-marital child bearing, but non marital child bearing 
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is associated with permanent childhood family income among 30 year olds and Black 
race among 25 and 30 year olds (table 4.10).   
4.7.4 Volatility and Negative Asymmetry  
Thus far, it appears that volatility might be associated with lower educational attainment 
through a joint relationship with family income, but the economic significance is weak.  
To test the dependence of this conclusion on asymmetries within the volatility measure, 
the final set of specifications control for negative volatility.  Overall summary measures 
of volatility contain a range of individual family income trends.  In this sample, the 
volatility being recorded in the overall definition Vi is potentially driven by positive 
income growth.  Negative volatility in childhood is defined as before, with the added 
condition that family income is in decline 50 or more percent of the time.  I estimate 
regressions with negative volatility covariates alongside overall volatility, identical 
otherwise to equation (18).   
(19) Oiy =  α +  βI0−16�������i + γVi + θVi,d + 𝐗δ + εi. 
For income, the specification adds volatility terms Vi,d separately and interacted with 
income I0−16�������i, where d denotes volatility in families experiencing income decline 50 or 
more percent of the time between the child’s birth and age 16.   
(19) is referred to as the asymmetric model, denoting the specification of overall 
volatility with negative volatility simultaneously.   
 To evaluate the importance of these asymmetries, I note changes in the sign, 
magnitude, and statistical significance of the volatility estimates relative to the overall 
baseline results.  Regression tables 4.11-4.19 account for negative volatility.  Negative 
transitory volatility has a statistically significant negative association with adult income 
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(top panel Table 4.11) – raising the possibility that negative volatility may be associated 
with lower adult income.  This negative volatility term is a dummy variable; the net effect 
is to potentially reduce the overall positive association between volatility and adult 
income.  The coefficients on baseline negative volatility range from -0.4 to -0.51.  It is 
plausible that volatility from downward income shifts has different impacts from overall 
volatility.  The interaction of negative volatility and income has a negative association 
with adult income.  The bottom panel of table 4.11 summarizes results for exposure to 
negative total volatility.  Consistent with negative transitory volatility, the relationship to 
adult income is again negative, although the coefficients are smaller and range between  
-0.005 and -0.007.   
 A relationship consistent with the Becker and Tomes (1979) theory of investment 
emerges between post high school education and negative volatility (Tables 4.14-4.15) 
among 25 year olds.  The baseline coefficient on negative transitory volatility (table 4.14) 
is -0.195; the overall net effect of volatility combines to lower the chance of post high 
school education attainment for 25 year olds by -0.218.  Other signs in this empirical 
specification are consistent with the main results described in sections 4.7.1-4.7.3, 
including income, race, gender, and number of siblings.  This is then confirmed in the 
empirical specification for negative total volatility (table 4.15).  Here, individuals are  
-0.003 points less likely to attain post high school education.  Thus, while a statistical 
association occurs with education, the estimated impacts across all models are usually 
small. 
 For 30 year olds, negative volatility predicts a lower chance of non marital child 
bearing by -0.047 (Table 4.18).  Understanding the behavioral mechanisms that might 
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yield a negative link between downward income mobility and childbearing will require 
more attention.  Overall baseline volatility may mask different intergenerational 
implications based on the degree to which asymmetric effects from extended income 
growth or decline dominate.  However, the results here suggest that the estimates on 
negative volatility’s relationship are small, with the exception of those for adult income 
and for post high school attainment.   
4.7.5  Discussion of Main Results 
 Across the main empirical models in tables 4.2-4.19, some consistent 
relationships appear between family income, race, gender, number of siblings, and adult 
outcomes.  For volatility, the strongest relationship is with education and health.  The 
strongest statistical volatility-education link occurs within the asymmetric model of 
transitory volatility and with models of volatility as a total definition.  The results suggest 
collectively that volatility exposure and income level may be jointly related to lower 
educational attainment, but the magnitudes are small.  The signs on some the coefficients 
for post high school attainment in the transitory volatility models (table 4.4) suggest that 
efficiency issues may potentially mask additional negative relationships.  Transitory 
volatility is related to better health as a 30 year old.  Given that some theories suggest 
economic risk could help or harm health, it is plausible that this association is somehow 
related to job loss (Ruhm 2003).   
 In some cases, the results are not consistent across age, implying the determinants 
of education differ by age.  Another plausible explanation for age-specific results here 
and throughout the study is sample attrition bias (Wooldridge 2002), whereby different 
types of persons respond as ages increase over time.  Some study participants do leave 
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the sample, and PSID attritors are less educated, have lower earnings, and are less likely 
to be married (Fitzgerald et al. 1998).  Consistent with documented trends, child bearing 
outside of marriage is less likely for mothers from higher income backgrounds and more 
likely if the adult is Black, all else equal (Moynihan 1965; Cancian and Reed 2001).   
4.7.6 Instrumental Variables Strategy for Volatility and Intergenerational Outcomes 
 Instability within families from income growth or decline could result in more 
time at work and less time investing in children directly during developmental years.  If 
time and money are not perfectly substitutable, this would lower child human capital 
investment and, by consequence, adult income.  The results described up to this point 
may contain unobserved heterogeneity modeled in equation (10) as well as appendix 
equations (6), (7), and (8).  Because of this, income volatility may be endogenous.   As a 
solution, I attempt to separate the impact of exogenous economic shocks from individual 
decisions, preferences, and inherited behavior with county level data.  I instrument for 
transitory income volatility using the mean county unemployment statistics from the 
Local Area Unemployment Statistics program of the U.S. Department of Labor, matched 
to individuals using restricted-access Geocoded data provided to me by the PSID.   For 
persons within the PSID, I link data from their county of residence so that I can compute 
the mean unemployment rate during childhood, as an instrument for transitory volatility.  
Shocks from business cycle fluctuations within the local labor market are theoretically 
taken exogenously by families and their children, reducing omitted variables bias in the 
OLS estimates.   
 Referring back to notation defining volatility, 𝜎𝑣𝑖
2 , and unobserved traits eit in 
section 4.2, the conditions for county economic indicators as valid instruments are that 
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(19) 𝑐𝑜𝑣�𝑈𝑅,𝜎𝑣𝑖2 � ≠ 0  
and  
(20) 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑈𝑅, eit) = 0.    
The error term eit is inclusive of unobserved preferences and inherited behavior.  
Exogenous income volatility resulting from events within the local economy can 
theoretically reduce endogeneity in reduced form estimates.  
 The overall instrumental variables (IV) strategy is ineffective.  To summarize the 
results, weak instruments limit my ability to effectively estimate volatility’s potential 
intergenerational relationship.  The first stage results, regressing average county 
unemployment on the full set of included explanatory variables including the endogenous 
volatility parameter, uniformly fail tests of significance individually and jointly.  Thus, 
there is no apparent link between local unemployment and volatility, and unemployment 
appears to be an invalid instrument.  As a consequence, the theoretical relationship in 
(19) fails to materialize in the data.  The results of the instrumental variables estimation 
are shown in tables 4.20-4.28.  There are several potential extensions for identifying a 
valid instrument of income volatility.  These include the variance of unemployment, as 
well as county-level data on crime and population change.   
 Throughout the IV models, many of the demographic associations established in 
tables 4.2-4.19 remain intact.  For example, in IV models for transitory volatility family 
income during childhood is associated with a lower likelihood of having a child outside 
of marriage and higher income as an adult.  The model predicts Blacks to be more likely 
to have a child outside of marriage.  Within the total volatility IV models the chance of 
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non marital child bearing is higher among Black women, an association which appears 
through all of the intergenerational models.   
4.7.7 Appendix Results on Volatility and Intergenerational Outcomes 
 In appendix tables 1-9, I estimate intergenerational models for transitory volatility 
and total volatility by substituting parents’ education for family income during childhood.  
Appendix table 1 shows the strong relationship between income and education, and the 
purpose in this section is to test whether volatility’s intergenerational impacts are 
sensitive to the use of family income as a measure of family background characteristics.   
 The total volatility empirical models find, all else equal, that volatility exposure is 
related to a higher likelihood of high school dropout and a lower likelihood of education 
beyond high school (Appendix tables 3 and 5).  In absolute terms, the effects are around 
0.001 for 25 year olds.  Parents’ education in the appendix regressions performs similarly 
to family income during childhood in the main empirical results, suggesting it to be 
decent proxy variable for family income.  Across main empirical and appendix models, 
females exhibit higher educational attainment relative to men, and the presence of 
additional siblings during childhood lowers the chance of additional education.  Blacks 
are less likely to drop out of high school, minorities are less likely to report poor health as 
an adult, and Blacks are more likely to have a child outside of marriage.  
4.8 Conclusion and Future Work 
 To estimate an intergenerational model with transitory family income volatility, I 
link parents and offspring in the PSID between 1970 and 2007.  The purpose of this is to 
identify what, if any, consequences occur for adult outcomes from growing up with 
volatile family income as a child.  For health and non-marital child bearing, more work is 
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needed to consider the mechanisms that affect behavioral outcomes, looking beyond 
standard economic models to include insights from the vast psychology literature on child 
outcomes.  This work could inform the interdisciplinary literature concerned with 
understanding the intersection of income and child outcomes.  Research on income 
dynamics and volatility should push further on the importance of volatility at the tails of 
the childhood age distribution, focusing more on early childhood and teenage years.  To 
do so, this study can ultimately extend beyond academic outcomes to consider behavioral 
outcomes that might have an even clearer link to volatile family income.  A second 
recommended extension is to consider how volatility differs based on the voluntary 
versus involuntary nature of the definition, and the implications of these differences when 
interpreting the results.  Anticipated volatility implies that individuals can blunt the 
potential downside effects by insuring against the event.  While the instrumental 
variables strategy introduced here takes a first, though unsuccessful, step towards doing 
this, another approach involves codifying volatility associated with major events, 
including illnesses and job losses.  Several studies cited in this essay focus on such 
events.  Doing so might help to separate instability of incomes that is anticipated and 
related to traits such as risk taking, versus that which occurs suddenly and requires 
immediate, drastic shifts in the family’s consumption bundle.     
 The economic theory of intergenerational mobility and empirical evidence shown 
in this essay imply that exposure to volatility during childhood may be linked to slightly 
lower educational attainment in young adulthood.  In general, the strongest results are for 
25 and 30 year olds in the main and asymmetric models.  Unfortunately, intergenerational 
estimates for 40 year olds contain very small cell sizes, such that confident estimation at 
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this age will likely require more time for PSID participants to proceed through the life 
course and continue survey participation.  Along with small effects related to volatility 
exposure, the even stronger link between permanent income and education outcomes 
leave open the possibility of imperfections within credit markets for human capital 
(Loury 81; Kane and Ellwood 2000; Mazumder 2005).   That the results emerge strongest 
for education attainment suggest that the application of the Becker and Tomes (1979) 
intergenerational model fits best with outcomes possessing a clearly definable human 
capital objective, such as post high school attainment.  In the U.S., where education is 
fully subsidized through the tax system from kindergarten through grade twelve, 
additional parental investments in human and financial capital must occur in order for 
offspring to successfully matriculate into 2 and 4 year college programs.    
 If adult educational outcomes are compromised by downside volatility as the 
asymmetric model suggests, efforts to help families reach their optimal private human 
capital investment level could improve the well-being of adult children (Mazumder 
2005).  A modest policy prescription to address the findings regarding educational 
attainment would promote precautionary savings among families to facilitate smooth 
child human capital investment profiles.  A benefit of such a policy is that, whether 
volatility derives from income growth or decline, additional savings raises utility for 
prudent families by providing insurance against unanticipated events (Attanasio and 
Weber 2010).  This may be appropriate given the negligible size of the volatility-
education link in most of the models presented.   
 A secondary set of findings also emerge from this essay that may concern 
policymakers.   These indicate a strong consistent connection of higher permanent family 
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income during childhood to educational attainment, higher income, and overall well-
being as an adult.  They also suggest a strong positive link between Black women and 
parenting outside of a marital relationship, which may be a channel through which Black 
poverty operates across generations, since one parent households have fewer resources on 
average compared with two parent households (Moynihan 1965).  Consistent with Hauser 
et al. (2000) and Guryan (2004), Blacks are likelier to graduate high school conditional 
on family income. Finally, it appears that the need to divide resources across siblings may 
harm individuals.   Those with more siblings are predicted to have lower adult income 
and are less likely to graduate high school or go on to pursue any post high school 
training.  These findings do merit attention.    
 Beyond promoting precautionary savings, additional public investments in child 
human capital may help close the gap between the educational investments advantaged 
and disadvantaged families make, raising incomes and improving adult well-being for 
descendants of lower-income families. The current safety net uses food, housing, and 
cash assistance programs to intercede for low and moderate income families, yielding 
real-time benefits.  By comparison, a policy directing additional resources to childhood 
and young adult education will not provide immediate relief from hardship for recipient 
children.  Yet, recent policy debates over state and federal based education grants for 
low-income students make these results timely.  If policymakers’ objectives include 
immediate needs as well as longer-term economic mobility, grants for education and 
training beyond high school might be made more available, not less.  Over time, such a 
strategy could lower the apparently large consequences of low permanent income during 
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childhood and loosen the link between low family incomes as a child and reduced human 
capital and income in adulthood.  
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Table 4.1 Summary Statistics Adjusted for Inflation (2006 Dollars) 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation 
 
Earnings and Income 
   Offspring Family Income in Adulthood ($) 
   Head’s Family Income in Childhood ($) 
   Average Childhood Transitory Volatility (Ln) 
   Average Childhood Total Volatility (Std. Dev) 
 
   Average County Unemployment Rate 
   
   Age of Offspring (if offspring over 25) 
   Age of Father (if offspring over 25)    
   Age of Mother (if offspring over 25) 
 
  Education 
   % Less Than High School - Offspring 
   % High School - Offspring 
   % Some College - Offspring 
   % College - Offspring 
    
 
   % Less Than High School - Father 
   % High School - Offspring - Father 
   % Some College - Offspring - Father 
   % College – Offspring – Father 
 
 
   % Less Than High School - Mother 
   % High School - Offspring - Mother 
   % Some College - Offspring - Mother 
   % College - Offspring - Mother 
 
  Race & Gender 
   % White - Head of Household 
   % Black - Head of Household 
   % Other - Head of Household 
   % Female 
 
Sample – Observations with Child Income 0-16 
   Number of offspring matched to parents 
   Sample size (person-years) 
 
 
$67,873.04 
67,161.04 
0.75 
28.32 
 
6.61 
 
33.14 
61.87 
59.16 
 
 
5.79% 
31.74% 
27.57% 
34.91% 
 
 
25.76% 
36.56% 
15.22% 
22.47% 
 
                    
20.65% 
48.87% 
17.03% 
13.46% 
 
 
91.62% 
5.78% 
2.59% 
48.37% 
 
 
2,186 
57,395 
 
 
46,445.62 
43,757.99 
4.32 
21.87 
 
2.22 
 
6.81 
8.51 
10.03 
 
 
23.34% 
46.54% 
44.68% 
47.67% 
 
 
43.73% 
48.16% 
35.92% 
41.74% 
 
 
40.48% 
48.16% 
37.59% 
34.13% 
 
 
27.71% 
23.33% 
15.90% 
49.97% 
Note:  Summary statistics are topcoded at 1% and bottomcoded at $1.   
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Table 4.2 Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and Adult Income  
ADULT INCOME Baseline Full Baseline Full 
     
Income0-16 0.460*** 0.408*** 0.462*** 0.406*** 
 (0.119) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) 
Transitory Volatility0-16 -0.019 -0.021 -0.019 -0.021 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) 
Income0-16 * Transitory Vol0-16   0.008 -0.007 
   (0.079) (0.076) 
Demographics No Yes No Yes 
Observations 1,365 1,365 1,365 1,365 
R-squared 0.0998 0.1167 0.0998 0.1167 
Joint F Test   0.125 0.165 
ADULT INCOME  Baseline Full Baseline Full 
Income0-16 0.494*** 0.439*** 0.600*** 0.558*** 
 (0.118) (0.117) (0.101) (0.101) 
Total Volatility0-16 0.002* 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Income0-16 * Total Vol0-16   -0.007*** -0.006*** 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
Demographics No Yes No Yes 
Observations 1,366 1,366 1,366 1,366 
R-squared 0.1010 0.1173 0.1238 0.1359 
Joint F Test   18.00 14.94 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for parents' education, race, gender, number of 
siblings, and age in Full models not shown.  F-statistics tests joint significance of Volatility0-16 and Income0-16 * Vol0-16. 
Intergenerational income elasticities include order 4 polynomial of offspring age normalized to age 40, as well as normalized offspring  
age interacted with income during childhood (parents’ income), also not shown.  
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Table 4.3 Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and High School Dropout (Transitory Definition) 
DROPOUT 24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 39-41 39-41 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Income0-16 -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.031 -0.044** -0.032 -0.032 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.025) (0.024) 
Transitory Volatility0-16 0.007 0.007 0.013 0.011 0.002 0.002 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.007) (0.006) 
Income0-16 * Transitory Vol0-16  -0.006  -0.057  0.001 
  (0.030)  (0.037)  (0.024) 
Black -0.052** -0.052** -0.053*** -0.052*** -0.036 -0.036 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.012) (0.012) (0.024) (0.025) 
Other -0.029 -0.029 -0.008 -0.004 -0.012 -0.012 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.030) (0.030) (0.012) (0.012) 
Female -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.031 -0.031 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) 
No. of Siblings 0.010* 0.010* 0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
       
Constant -4.204 -4.163 -6.506* -5.982 -4.265 -4.264 
 (3.411) (3.411) (3.912) (4.008) (7.653) (7.675) 
       
Observations 1,329 1,329 873 873 158 158 
R-squared 0.0475 0.0475 0.0291 0.0330 0.0367 0.0367 
Joint F Test  0.156  1.460  0.0893 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for education and age not shown.  F-statistics 
tests joint significance of Transitory Volatility0-16 and Income0-16 * Transitory Vol0-16. 
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Table 4.4 Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and High School Dropout (Total Volatility Definition) 
DROPOUT 24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 39-41 39-41 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Income0-16 -0.049** -0.059** -0.022 -0.030 -0.039 -0.051 
 (0.023) (0.026) (0.023) (0.026) (0.031) (0.035) 
Total Volatility0-16 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001* -0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Income0-16 * Total Vol0-16  0.001  0.000  0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Black -0.052** -0.054** -0.055*** -0.056*** -0.038 -0.041 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.012) (0.012) (0.023) (0.025) 
Other -0.028 -0.026 0.000 0.002 -0.013 -0.015 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.032) (0.032) (0.015) (0.015) 
Female -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.032** -0.032** -0.032 -0.031 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.023) (0.023) 
No. of Siblings 0.010* 0.010* 0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
       
Constant -4.438 -4.444 -7.886** -7.723** -4.470 -4.956 
 (3.417) (3.419) (3.973) (3.913) (8.014) (8.102) 
       
Observations 1,401 1,401 872 872 158 158 
R-squared 0.0490 0.0508 0.0374 0.0389 0.0375 0.0430 
Joint F Test  1.162  1.454  1.083 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for education and age not shown.  F-statistics 
tests joint significance of Total Volatility0-16 and Income0-16 * Total Vol0-16. 
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Table 4.5 Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and Post Secondary Education (Transitory Definition) 
POST SECONDARY 24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 39-41 39-41 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Income0-16 0.179*** 0.184*** 0.131** 0.145*** 0.126 0.141 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.051) (0.051) (0.109) (0.102) 
Transitory Volatility0-16 -0.024 -0.025 0.011 0.013 0.005 0.007 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.031) (0.032) (0.067) (0.067) 
Income0-16 * Transitory Vol0-16  0.031  0.064  0.086 
  (0.053)  (0.076)  (0.153) 
Black -0.001 -0.001 -0.043 -0.044 -0.258 -0.266 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.077) (0.077) (0.233) (0.229) 
Other 0.043 0.044 0.090 0.085 -0.130 -0.136 
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.088) (0.089) (0.154) (0.156) 
Female 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.104*** 0.104*** -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.033) (0.033) (0.072) (0.072) 
No. of Siblings -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.046 -0.045 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.028) (0.029) 
       
Constant 6.661 6.436 7.745 7.158 47.321 47.392 
 (8.143) (8.137) (12.037) (12.167) (37.043) (37.214) 
       
Observations 1,329 1,329 873 873 158 158 
R-squared 0.1674 0.1677 0.1329 0.1337 0.1629 0.1648 
Joint F Test  0.599  0.443  0.175 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for education and age not shown.  F-statistics 
tests joint significance of Transitory Volatility0-16 and Income0-16 * Transitory Vol0-16. 
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Table 4.6 Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and Post High School Education (Total Volatility Definition) 
POST SECONDARY 24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 39-41 39-41 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Income0-16 0.199*** 0.251*** 0.152*** 0.227*** 0.148 0.214** 
 (0.040) (0.037) (0.056) (0.050) (0.115) (0.096) 
Total Volatility0-16 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Income0-16 * Total Vol0-16  -0.003***  -0.004***  -0.004 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Black 0.001 0.008 -0.044 -0.033 -0.253 -0.235 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.077) (0.075) (0.232) (0.235) 
Other 0.042 0.034 0.090 0.073 -0.126 -0.118 
 (0.063) (0.064) (0.088) (0.089) (0.155) (0.153) 
Female 0.095*** 0.096*** 0.101*** 0.103*** -0.001 -0.009 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.033) (0.033) (0.073) (0.072) 
No. of Siblings -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.047* -0.051* 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.028) (0.029) 
       
Constant 6.062 6.091 8.398 7.002 48.023 50.574 
 (8.140) (8.064) (12.052) (11.690) (36.617) (36.256) 
       
Observations 1,401 1,401 872 872 158 158 
R-squared 0.1686 0.1793 0.1366 0.1547 0.1640 0.1778 
Joint F Test  6.558  11.56  1.355 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for education and age not shown.  F-statistics 
tests joint significance of Total Volatility0-16 and Income0-16 * Total Vol0-16. 
 
  
 
114 
Table 4.7 Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and Self Reported Poor Health (Transitory Definition) 
POOR HEALTH 24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Income0-16 -0.006 -0.004 -0.008* -0.009* 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Transitory Volatility0-16 0.009 0.008 -0.006* -0.006* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) 
Income0-16 * Transitory Vol0-16  0.011  -0.003 
  (0.017)  (0.004) 
Black 0.010 0.010 -0.005* -0.005* 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.003) (0.003) 
Other -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Female 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
No. of Siblings -0.008 0. 136 0. 437 0. 391 
 (1.654) (1.649) (1.453) (1.474) 
     
Constant 0.615 0.523 -1.473 -1.440 
 (1.324) (1.338) (1.721) (1.697) 
     
Observations 1,250 1,250 803 803 
R-squared 0.0068 0.0079 0.0110 0.0111 
Joint F Test  0.738  1.470 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for education and age not shown.  F-statistics 
tests joint significance of Transitory Volatility0-16 and Income0-16 * Transitory Vol0-16.   Coefficients and standard errors on No. of 
siblings are transformed, dividing by 1000. 
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Table 4.8 Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and Self Reported Poor Health (Total Volatility Definition) 
POOR HEALTH 24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Income0-16 -0.007 -0.008 -0.009** -0.011** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
Total Volatility0-16 -0.006 -0.002 -0.006 -0.002 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Income0-16 * Total Vol0-16  0.009  0.008 
  (0.007)  (0.006) 
Black 0.010 0.010 -0.004* -0.004* 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.003) (0.003) 
Other -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Female 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
No. of Siblings 0.012 0.007 0.032 0.030 
 (0.162) (0.160) (0.147) (0.147) 
     
Constant 0.719 0.707 -1.384 -1.353 
 (1.330) (1.329) (1.692) (1.697) 
     
Observations 1,323 1,323 802 802 
R-squared 0.0044 0.0046 0.0091 0.0095 
Joint F Test  0.755  1.420 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for education and age not shown.  F-statistics 
tests joint significance of Total Volatility0-16 and Income0-16 * Total Vol0-16.  Coefficients and standard errors on Total Volatility0-16  , 
Income0-16 * Total Vol0-16 , and  No. of Siblings are transformed, dividing by 100. 
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Table 4.9 Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and Non Marital Child Bearing (Transitory Definition) 
OWB 24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Income0-16 -0.052** -0.052** -0.026 -0.031 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.017) (0.020) 
Transitory Volatility0-16 -0.004 -0.005 -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) 
Income0-16 * Transitory Vol0-16  0.001  -0.034 
  (0.032)  (0.039) 
Black 0.386*** 0.386*** 0.337*** 0.334*** 
 (0.096) (0.096) (0.117) (0.116) 
Other 0.030 0.030 -0.022 -0.020 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.015) (0.016) 
No. of Siblings 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
     
Constant 0.800 0.789 -1.847 -1.380 
 (4.227) (4.273) (3.157) (3.282) 
     
Observations 638 638 417 417 
R-squared 0.1500 0.1500 0.1389 0.1401 
Joint F Test  0.0554  2.235 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for education and age not shown.  F-statistics 
tests joint significance of Transitory Volatility0-16 and Income0-16 * Transitory Vol0-16. 
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Table 4.10 Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and Non Marital Child Bearing (Total Volatility Definition) 
OWB 24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Income0-16 -0.049** -0.047** -0.016 -0.019 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) 
Total Volatility0-16 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Income0-16 * Total Vol0-16  -0.000  0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Black 0.386*** 0.386*** 0.339*** 0.339*** 
 (0.096) (0.096) (0.116) (0.116) 
Other 0.030 0.030 -0.022 -0.020 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.015) (0.015) 
No. of Siblings 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
     
Constant 0.784 0.922 -1.489 -1.616 
 (4.235) (4.294) (3.160) (3.198) 
     
Observations 671 671 417 417 
R-squared 0.1500 0.1501 0.1387 0.1392 
Joint F Test  0.0674  0.887 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for education and age not shown.  F-statistics 
tests joint significance of Total Volatility0-16 and Income0-16 * Total Vol0-16. 
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Table 4.11 Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and Adult Income  
ADULT INCOME Baseline Full Baseline Full 
     
Income0-16 0.452*** 0.403*** 0.452*** 0.399*** 
 (0.119) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) 
Transitory Volatility0-16 -0.016 -0.019 -0.017 -0.019 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) 
Negative Transitory Volatility0-16 -0.510** -0.421* -0.494** -0.400* 
 (0.245) (0.231) (0.243) (0.230) 
Income0-16 * Transitory Vol0-16   0.012 -0.000 
   (0.080) (0.076) 
Income0-16 * Negative Transitory 
Vol0-16 
  -0.325 -0.417 
   (0.407) (0.391) 
Demographics No Yes No Yes 
Observations 1,365 1,365 1,365 1,365 
R-squared 0.1060 0.1208 0.1062 0.1212 
Joint F Test   2.306 2.159 
ADULT INCOME  Baseline Full Baseline Full 
     
Income0-16 0.498*** 0.443*** 0.599*** 0.557*** 
 (0.118) (0.117) (0.102) (0.102) 
Total Volatility0-16 0.002* 0.002* -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Negative Total Volatility0-16 -0.007** -0.006** -0.005* -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Income0-16 * Total Vol0-16   -0.006*** -0.006*** 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
Income0-16 * Negative Total Vol0-16   0.001 0.002 
   (0.004) (0.004) 
 
Demographics 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
Observations 1,366 1,366 1,366 1,366 
R-squared 0.1057 0.1205 0.1265 0.1377 
Joint F Test   2.129 1.760 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for 
parents' education, race, gender, number of siblings, and age in Full models not shown.  
F-statistics tests joint significance of Negative Volatility0-16 and Income0-16 * Negative 
Vol0-16.  Intergenerational income elasticities include order 4 polynomial of offspring age 
normalized to age 40, as well as normalized offspring age interacted with income during 
childhood (parents’ income), also not shown.   
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Table 4.12 Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and High School Dropout (Negative Transitory Definition) 
DROPOUT 24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 39-41 39-41 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Income0-16 -0.053*** -0.051*** -0.031 -0.038* -0.033 -0.032 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.026) (0.025) 
Transitory Volatility0-16 0.006 0.006 0.012 0.008 0.002 0.002 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) 
Negative Transitory Volatility0-16 0.043 0.031 0.127 0.111 -0.063 -0.064 
 (0.081) (0.076) (0.104) (0.099) (0.056) (0.058) 
Income0-16 * Transitory Vol0-16  -0.009  -0.065*  0.001 
  (0.030)  (0.036)  (0.025) 
Income0-16 * Negative Transitory Vol0-16  0.207  0.681*  0.042 
  (0.313)  (0.366)  (0.082) 
Black -0.053** -0.053** -0.049*** -0.048*** -0.036 -0.036 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.011) (0.011) (0.024) (0.025) 
Other -0.028 -0.028 -0.006 -0.002 -0.009 -0.010 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.030) (0.030) (0.012) (0.012) 
Female -0.045*** -0.044*** -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.031 -0.031 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) 
No. of Siblings 0.010* 0.010* 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
       
Constant -4.005 -4.119 -5.887 -7.142* -4.471 -5.130 
 (3.383) (3.413) (3.809) (3.995) (7.691) (8.394) 
       
Observations 1,329 1,329 873 873 158 158 
R-squared 0.0480 0.0496 0.0349 0.0521 0.0376 0.0377 
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Table 4.12 Continued 
       
Joint F Test  0.276  2.003  0.618 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for education and age not shown.  F-statistics 
tests joint significance of Negative Transitory Volatility0-16 and Income0-16 * Negative Transitory Vol0-16. 
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Table 4.13 Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and High School Dropout (Negative Total Definition) 
DROPOUT 24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 39-41 39-41 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Income0-16 -0.049** -0.060** -0.023 -0.031 -0.039 -0.053 
 (0.023) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.031) (0.036) 
Total Volatility0-16 0. 028 0.054 0. 077 0.010 -0. 028 0. 013 
 (0. 054) (0.052) (0. 062) (0.067) (0. 103) (0. 113) 
Negative Total Volatility0-16 0.016 0.019 0. 186 0. 163 -0. 142 -0.177  
 (0.130) (0.128) (0. 185) (0. 177) (0. 117) (0. 120) 
Income0-16 * Total Vol0-16  0.057  0. 040  0.070 
  (0.054)  (0.046)  (0.050) 
Income0-16 * Negative Total Vol0-16  0.124  -0. 886  -0. 831 
  (0.182)  (0. 192)  (0. 430) 
Black -0.052** -0.054** -0.052*** -0.054*** -0.039 -0.043* 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.012) (0.012) (0.024) (0.026) 
Other -0.028 -0.026 0.001 0.003 -0.009 -0.008 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.032) (0.032) (0.015) (0.013) 
Female -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.034** -0.032** -0.032 -0.030 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.023) (0.023) 
No. of Siblings 0.010* 0.010* 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
       
Constant -4.405 -4.526 -7.497* -7.036* -4.853 -4.743 
 (3.451) (3.464) (3.980) (3.950) (8.108) (8.354) 
       
Observations 1,401 1,401 872 872 158 158 
R-squared 0.0491 0.0511 0.0408 0.0437 0.0389 0.0448 
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Table 4.13 Continued 
       
Joint F Test  0.234  0.588  1.250 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for education and age not shown.  F-statistics 
tests joint significance of Negative Total Volatility0-16 and Income0-16 * Negative Total Vol0-16.  Coefficients and standard errors on 
Total Volatility0-16, Negative Total Volatility0-16, Income0-16 * Total Vol0-16, and Income0-16 * Negative Total Vol0-16 are transformed, 
dividing by 100. 
 
  
  
 
123 
Table 4.14 Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and Post Secondary Education (Negative Transitory Definition) 
POST SECONDARY 24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 39-41 39-41 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Income0-16 0.178*** 0.182*** 0.131** 0.141*** 0.131 0.123 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.051) (0.051) (0.111) (0.103) 
Transitory Volatility0-16 -0.023 -0.023 0.012 0.015 0.006 0.009 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.031) (0.032) (0.067) (0.067) 
Negative Transitory Volatility0-16 -0.195* -0.193 -0.072 -0.062 0.353 0.348 
 (0.117) (0.118) (0.164) (0.164) (0.459) (0.399) 
Income0-16 * Transitory Vol0-16  0.034  0.069  0.097 
  (0.053)  (0.076)  (0.155) 
Income0-16 * Negative Transitory Vol0-16  -0.058  -0.465  -1.447* 
  (0.267)  (0.469)  (0.741) 
Black 0.001 0.001 -0.045 -0.046 -0.253 -0.281 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.077) (0.077) (0.238) (0.218) 
Other 0.039 0.040 0.089 0.084 -0.147 -0.111 
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.089) (0.090) (0.157) (0.152) 
Female 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.105*** 0.106*** -0.010 0.003 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.033) (0.033) (0.072) (0.073) 
No. of Siblings -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.051* -0.049* 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.029) (0.029) 
       
Constant 5.762 5.562 7.394 8.017 48.467 70.985* 
 (8.175) (8.167) (12.036) (12.152) (38.555) (36.661) 
       
Observations 1,329 1,329 873 873 158 158 
R-squared 0.1700 0.1704 0.1332 0.1351 0.1653 0.1785 
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Table 4.14 Continued 
       
Joint F Test  1.456  0.582  2.436 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for education and age not shown.  F-statistics 
tests joint significance of Negative Transitory Volatility0-16 and Income0-16 * Negative Transitory Vol0-16. 
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Table 4.15 Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and Post Secondary Education (Negative Total Definition) 
POST SECONDARY 24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 39-41 39-41 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Income0-16 0.199*** 0.247*** 0.153*** 0.226*** 0.151 0.181* 
 (0.040) (0.038) (0.056) (0.050) (0.115) (0.101) 
Total Volatility0-16 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Negative Total Volatility0-16 -0.003* -0.002 -0.000 0.001 0.005 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) 
Income0-16 * Total Vol0-16  -0.003***  -0.004***  -0.003 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Income0-16 * Negative Total Vol0-16  0.002  0.036**  -0.284** 
  (0.003)  (0.018)  (0.120) 
Black 0.003 0.009 -0.044 -0.031 -0.249 -0.257 
 (0.057) (0.056) (0.077) (0.075) (0.236) (0.222) 
Other 0.038 0.032 0.090 0.072 -0.140 -0.081 
 (0.063) (0.064) (0.088) (0.089) (0.158) (0.153) 
Female 0.095*** 0.096*** 0.101*** 0.096*** -0.003 -0.000 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.033) (0.033) (0.073) (0.072) 
No. of Siblings -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.049* -0.053* 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.028) (0.028) 
       
Constant 5.400 5.413 8.355 5.768 49.345 74.763** 
 (8.160) (8.101) (12.050) (11.725) (38.065) (36.570) 
       
Observations 1,401 1,401 872 872 158 158 
R-squared 0.1710 0.1810 0.1366 0.1597 0.1654 0.1904 
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Table 4.15 Continued 
       
Joint F Test  2.051  2.165  2.907 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for education and age not shown.  F-statistics 
tests joint significance of Negative Total Volatility0-16 and Income0-16 * Negative Total Vol0-16. 
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Table 4.16 Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and Self Reported Poor Health (Negative Transitory Definition) 
POOR HEALTH 24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Income0-16 -0.005 -0.004 -0.008* -0.009* 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Transitory Volatility0-16 0.009 0.008 -0.006* -0.006* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) 
Negative Transitory Volatility0-16 0.008 0.009 -0.006 -0.007 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.005) (0.005) 
Income0-16 * Transitory Vol0-16  0.012  -0.003 
  (0.017)  (0.004) 
Income0-16 * Negative Transitory Vol0-16  -0.033*  0.019 
  (0.020)  (0.028) 
Black 0.010 0.010 -0.005* -0.005* 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.003) (0.003) 
Other -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Female 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
No. of Siblings -0.010 -0.003 0.053 0.053 
 (0.169) (0.170) (0.147) (0.147) 
     
Constant 0.650 0.587 -1.506 -1.525 
 (1.318) (1.335) (1.728) (1.758) 
     
Observations 1,250 1,250 803 803 
R-squared 0.0069 0.0083 0.0112 0.0113 
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Table 4.16 Continued 
     
Joint F Test  2.009  0.872 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for education and age not shown.  F-statistics 
tests joint significance of Negative Transitory Volatility0-16 and Income0-16 * Negative Transitory Vol0-16.  Coefficients and standard 
errors on No. of Siblings are transformed, dividing by 100.  
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Table 4.17 Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and Self Reported Poor Health (Negative Total Definition) 
POOR HEALTH 24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Income0-16 -0.007 -0.008 -0.009* -0.011** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
Total Volatility0-16 -0. 007 -0.003 -0. 005 -0. 001 
 (0. 012) (0.011) (0. 011) (0. 012) 
Negative Total Volatility0-16 0. 013 0.009 -0.013 -0. 014 
 (0. 028) (0.027) (0.009) (0. 009) 
Income0-16 * Total Vol0-16  0.009  0.009 
  (0.007)  (0.006) 
Income0-16 * Negative Total Vol0-16  -0.013  0.061 
  (0.024)  (0.062) 
Black 0.010 0.010 -0.004* -0.005* 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.003) (0.003) 
Other -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Female 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
No. of Siblings 0.004 0.002 0.041 0.041 
 (0.164) (0.162) (0.147) (0.147) 
     
Constant 0.743 0.739 -1.413 -1.413 
 (1.325) (1.324) (1.698) (1.728) 
     
Observations 1,323 1,323 802 802 
R-squared 0.0045 0.0047 0.0093 0.0097 
     
  
 
130 
Table 4.17 Continued 
     
Joint F Test  0.152  1.474 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for education and age not shown.  F-statistics 
tests joint significance of Negative Total Volatility0-16 and Income0-16 * Negative Total Vol0-16.  Coefficients and standard errors on 
Total Volatility0-16, Negative Total Volatility0-16, Income0-16 * Total Vol0-16, Income0-16 * Negative Total Vol0-16, and No. of Siblings are 
transformed, dividing by 100. 
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Table 4.18 Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and Non Marital Child Bearing 
(Negative Transitory Definition) 
OWB 24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Income0-16 -0.053** -0.055** -0.027 -0.033* 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.017) (0.020) 
Transitory Volatility0-16 -0.004 -0.004 -0.015 -0.015 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) 
Negative Transitory Volatility0-16 -0.029 -0.017 -0.047* -0.043 
 (0.049) (0.053) (0.026) (0.027) 
Income0-16 * Transitory Vol0-16  0.003  -0.033 
  (0.033)  (0.040) 
Income0-16 * Negative Transitory 
Vol0-16 
 -0.263  -0.080 
  (0.184)  (0.100) 
Black 0.385*** 0.385*** 0.335*** 0.331*** 
 (0.096) (0.096) (0.117) (0.116) 
Other 0.029 0.029 -0.023 -0.021 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.015) (0.016) 
No. of Siblings 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
     
Constant 0.888 1.320 -1.725 -1.053 
 (4.251) (4.298) (3.172) (3.226) 
     
Observations 638 638 417 417 
R-squared 0.1503 0.1514 0.1400 0.1413 
Joint F Test  3.392  2.722 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for 
education and age not shown.  F-statistics tests joint significance of Negative Transitory 
Volatility0-16 and Income0-16 * Negative Transitory Vol0-16. 
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Table 4.19 Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and Non Marital Child Bearing 
(Negative Total Definition) 
OWB 24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Income0-16 -0.048** -0.043** -0.016 -0.019 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) 
Total Volatility0-16 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Negative Total Volatility0-16 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Income0-16 * Total Vol0-16  -0.000  0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Income0-16 * Negative Total Vol0-16  -0.012  -0.001 
  (0.008)  (0.003) 
Black 0.386*** 0.378*** 0.339*** 0.338*** 
 (0.096) (0.096) (0.116) (0.116) 
Other 0.030 0.029 -0.022 -0.020 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.015) (0.015) 
No. of Siblings 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
     
Constant 0.875 0.589 -1.488 -1.616 
 (4.252) (4.313) (3.145) (3.176) 
     
Observations 671 671 417 417 
R-squared 0.1505 0.1545 0.1387 0.1392 
Joint F Test  3.311  0.0378 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for 
education and age not shown.  F-statistics tests joint significance of Negative Total 
Volatility0-16 and Income0-16 * Negative Total Vol0-16. 
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Table 4.20 IV Estimation of Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and Adult Income  
ADULT INCOME Baseline Full Baseline Full 
     
Income0-16 0.502** 0.489** -19.361 -8.835 
 (0.215) (0.213) (749.493) (167.116) 
Transitory Volatility0-16 1.973 1.962 23.694 9.323 
 (3.494) (3.172) (880.557) (168.772) 
Income0-16 * Transitory Vol0-16   -81.196 -37.248 
   (3068.823) (673.094) 
Demographics No Yes No Yes 
Observations 1,359 1,359 1,359 1,359 
ADULT INCOME Baseline Full Baseline Full 
     
Income0-16 1.945 2.238 1.908 4.597 
 (2.066) (2.544) (2.665) (18.357) 
Total Volatility0-16 0.079 0.096 0.076 0.216 
 (0.109) (0.135) (0.168) (1.011) 
Income0-16 * Total Vol0-16   -0.001 0.006 
   (0.025) (0.083) 
Demographics No Yes No Yes 
Observations 1,359 1,359 1,359 1,359 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for parents' education, race, gender, number of 
siblings, and age in Full models not shown.  Intergenerational income elasticities include order 4 polynomial of offspring age 
normalized to age 40, as well as normalized offspring age interacted with income during childhood (parents’ income), also not shown.  
Instrument for Volatility is average county unemployment rate during childhood.   
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Table 4.21 IV Estimation of Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and High School Dropout (Transitory Definition) 
DROPOUT 24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 39-41 39-41 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Income0-16 -0.020 -0.345 -0.039 -0.174 -0.029 -0.725 
 (0.124) (0.970) (0.025) (0.235) (0.027) (11.097) 
Transitory Volatility0-16 -1.050 0.438 -0.071 -0.279 0.131 2.521 
 (2.841) (3.008) (0.548) (0.684) (0.386) (43.888) 
Income0-16 * Transitory Vol0-16  -1.719  -0.604  -5.554 
  (5.897)  (0.983)  (92.444) 
Black -0.098 -0.024 -0.066 -0.088 0.010 1.295 
 (0.142) (0.164) (0.092) (0.104) (0.118) (22.754) 
Other 0.030 -0.119 0.007 0.087 -0.020 0.370 
 (0.190) (0.300) (0.111) (0.196) (0.025) (6.324) 
Female -0.052 -0.023 -0.039 -0.044 -0.041 -0.207 
 (0.036) (0.080) (0.024) (0.030) (0.030) (3.002) 
No. of Siblings 0.021 -0.017 0.005 0.000 -0.008 -0.214 
 (0.030) (0.087) (0.013) (0.016) (0.024) (3.608) 
       
Constant 9.528 3.769 -8.166 -4.541 -4.256 5.194 
 (41.368) (58.305) (9.015) (11.193) (9.541) (267.312) 
       
Observations 1,394 1,394 868 868 158 158 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for education and age not shown.  Instrument 
for Transitory Volatility is average county unemployment rate during childhood. 
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Table 4.22 IV Estimation of Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and High School Dropout (Total Volatility Definition)   
DROPOUT 24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 39-41 39-41 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Income0-16 -1.501 -2.600 -1.562 -4.366 -4.326 -3.422 
 (2.900) (8.505) (3.472) (32.344) (43.644) (29.970) 
Total Volatility0-16 -0.069 -0.110 -0.074 -0.282 -0.208 -0.182 
 (0.141) (0.377) (0.169) (2.129) (2.117) (1.619) 
Income0-16 * Total Vol0-16  0.005  -0.056  -0.015 
  (0.025)  (0.430)  (0.146) 
Black -0.112 -0.141 -0.083 0.053 -1.491 -1.077 
 (0.175) (0.357) (0.142) (0.925) (14.813) (9.213) 
Other -0.124 -0.159 -0.198 -0.927 -0.702 -0.629 
 (0.265) (0.547) (0.482) (7.035) (7.000) (5.466) 
Female -0.053 -0.071 -0.069 -0.135 -0.745 -0.694 
 (0.068) (0.138) (0.122) (0.824) (7.302) (5.917) 
       
Constant 31.348 46.549 7.437 -8.100 -149.328 -127.276 
 (77.100) (175.035) (40.502) (86.624) (1548.540) (1150.175) 
       
Observations 1,394 1,394 867 867 158 158 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for education and age not shown.  Instrument 
for Total Volatility is average county unemployment rate during childhood. 
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Table 4.23 IV Estimation of Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and Education Beyond High School (Transitory 
Definition) 
POST SECONDARY 24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 39-41 39-41 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Income0-16 0.053 0.853 0.158 0.148 0.297 -1.639 
 (0.534) (1.919) (0.116) (0.486) (0.229) (31.752) 
Transitory Volatility0-16 4.852 -0.420 -2.081 -0.792 1.508 7.957 
 (12.255) (7.387) (3.180) (1.588) (2.078) (125.733) 
Income0-16 * Transitory Vol0-16  4.069  0.217  -14.976 
  (11.573)  (2.063)  (264.437) 
Black 0.204 -0.042 -0.402 -0.176 0.162 3.677 
 (0.614) (0.380) (0.562) (0.261) (0.741) (65.137) 
Other -0.234 0.221 0.450 0.218 -0.119 0.886 
 (0.842) (0.666) (0.634) (0.404) (0.334) (18.081) 
Female 0.131 0.049 0.042 0.080 -0.076 -0.542 
 (0.157) (0.170) (0.134) (0.064) (0.188) (8.594) 
No. of Siblings -0.087 0.026 0.001 -0.014 -0.138 -0.684 
 (0.128) (0.187) (0.082) (0.040) (0.117) (10.329) 
       
Constant -54.341 -19.736 -13.096 -5.000 58.312 78.995 
 (178.192) (122.263) (51.763) (27.398) (75.264) (777.102) 
       
Observations 1,394 1,394 868 868 158 158 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for education and age not shown.  Instrument 
for Transitory Volatility is average county unemployment rate during childhood. 
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Table 4.24 IV Estimation of Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and Education Beyond High School (Total Volatility 
Definition)   
POST SECONDARY 24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 39-41 39-41 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Income0-16 2.228 2.219 2.387 4.816 -0.524 0.517 
 (3.630) (6.395) (4.344) (33.328) (6.313) (5.845) 
Total Volatility0-16 0.095 0.085 0.105 0.300 -0.036 0.020 
 (0.176) (0.282) (0.212) (2.193) (0.307) (0.313) 
Income0-16 * Total Vol0-16  -0.006  0.057  0.001 
  (0.020)  (0.443)  (0.027) 
Black 0.055 0.060 -0.036 -0.166 -0.542 -0.103 
 (0.234) (0.280) (0.207) (0.966) (2.133) (1.818) 
Other 0.176 0.150 0.378 1.079 -0.184 -0.062 
 (0.350) (0.416) (0.628) (7.248) (1.027) (1.064) 
Female 0.116 0.120 0.156 0.213 -0.098 0.069 
 (0.093) (0.109) (0.164) (0.854) (1.052) (1.146) 
       
Constant -35.562 -30.294 -5.020 -7.674 33.385 63.859 
 (97.514) (129.551) (54.181) (146.177) (244.701) (207.456) 
       
Observations 1,394 1,394 867 867 158 158 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for education and age not shown.  Instrument 
for Total Volatility is average county unemployment rate during childhood. 
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Table 4.25 IV Estimation of Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and Self Reported Poor Health (Transitory Definition) 
POOR HEALTH 24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Income0-16 -0.046 0.134 -0.008 -0.106 
 (0.118) (0.235) (0.011) (0.773) 
Transitory Volatility0-16 0.939 0.363 -0.230 -0.241 
 (2.520) (1.931) (0.312) (1.035) 
Income0-16 * Transitory Vol0-16  0.946  -0.384 
  (1.601)  (3.188) 
Black 0.034 0.017 -0.043 -0.034 
 (0.084) (0.054) (0.055) (0.094) 
Other -0.038 0.018 0.039 0.075 
 (0.110) (0.081) (0.071) (0.462) 
Female 0.005 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.030) (0.026) (0.016) (0.051) 
No. of Siblings -0.011 0.006 0.005 0.000 
 (0.030) (0.026) (0.008) (0.023) 
     
Constant -7.981 -10.267 -2.936 0.729 
 (25.922) (24.303) (4.291) (26.875) 
     
Observations 1,317 1,317 799 799 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for education and age not shown.  Instrument 
for Transitory Volatility is average county unemployment rate during childhood. 
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Table 4.26 IV Estimation of Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and Self Reported Poor Health (Total Volatility Definition)   
POOR HEALTH 24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Income0-16 0.166 0.975 0.077 0.069 
 (0.565) (18.472) (0.087) (0.099) 
Total Volatility0-16 0.008 0.045 0.004 0.004 
 (0.028) (0.846) (0.004) (0.006) 
Income0-16 * Total Vol0-16  -0.000  0.000 
  (0.010)  (0.001) 
Black 0.017 0.037 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.031) (0.506) (0.008) (0.007) 
Other 0.001 0.031 0.005 0.005 
 (0.034) (0.742) (0.014) (0.018) 
Female 0.000 0.003 0.007 0.007 
 (0.010) (0.053) (0.008) (0.008) 
     
Constant -4.043 -21.080 -2.536 -2.547 
 (16.604) (410.913) (2.768) (2.682) 
     
Observations 1,318 1,318 798 798 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for education and age not shown.  Instrument 
for Total Volatility is average county unemployment rate during childhood. 
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Table 4.27 IV Estimation of Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and Non Marital Child Bearing (Transitory Definition) 
OWB 24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Income0-16 -0.046 -0.132 -0.035** -0.067 
 (0.033) (0.458) (0.016) (0.067) 
Transitory Volatility0-16 -0.078 -0.152 0.032 0.009 
 (0.281) (0.527) (0.125) (0.126) 
Income0-16 * Transitory Vol0-16  -0.930  -0.250 
  (4.966)  (0.365) 
Black 0.385*** 0.290 0.345*** 0.313*** 
 (0.099) (0.518) (0.113) (0.117) 
Other 0.030 0.016 -0.024 -0.010 
 (0.065) (0.112) (0.015) (0.027) 
No. of Siblings 0.004 -0.008 0.003 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.066) (0.008) (0.008) 
     
Constant 0.881 8.522 -1.807 1.896 
 (3.947) (42.204) (3.570) (7.323) 
     
Observations 667 667 415 415 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for education and age not shown.  Instrument 
for Transitory Volatility is average county unemployment rate during childhood. 
  
  
 
141 
Table 4.28 IV Estimation of Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and Non Marital Child Bearing (Total Volatility 
Definition)   
OWB 24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Income0-16 3.159 -1.412 -0.297 -0.154 
 (54.399) (9.019) (1.388) (0.319) 
Total Volatility0-16 0.160 -0.072 -0.014 -0.016 
 (2.715) (0.477) (0.076) (0.054) 
Income0-16 * Total Vol0-16  -0.007  -0.010 
  (0.057)  (0.045) 
Black 0.439 0.386* 0.328** 0.335*** 
 (0.905) (0.198) (0.149) (0.123) 
Other 0.391 -0.126 -0.063 -0.101 
 (6.180) (1.043) (0.217) (0.292) 
     
Constant -40.599 18.451 -6.294 -1.026 
 (698.916) (122.866) (20.714) (8.959) 
     
Observations 668 668 415 415 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for education and age not shown.  Instrument 
for Total Volatility is average county unemployment rate during childhood. 
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FIGURE 4.1 
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5 CONCLUSION 
 The three essays of this dissertation yield a set of results that could inform 
policymakers concerned with the occurrence of economic volatility in America.  First, the 
results from essay 2 suggest that income volatility is on the rise throughout many 
American households.  This is a broad finding occurring across race, education, and 
family structure.  While those who are continuously employed contribute substantially to 
this rising volatility, labor force transitions explain an increasing proportion of earnings 
volatility among males.  From essay 3, individuals with low average earnings and 
members of racial and ethnic minority groups are more likely to report higher earnings 
volatility.  Between essays 2 and 3, I find that volatility increases occur largely 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s and are disproportionately borne by those less skilled, 
with lower earnings, and both racial and ethnic minorities.  Finally, volatility exposure 
during childhood may be related to lower educational attainment as an adult in essay 4.  
However, when compared to the mobility consequences of permanent family income, 
race, and family size, the intergenerational volatility impact appears to be small.        
 Earnings and income volatility may threaten family and child well-being in 
instances where consumption smoothing is not possible or even imperfect.  This 
dissertation identifies differences in volatility levels, trends, and correlates across 
different races, education groups, and family structures.  It then estimates how volatility 
exposure during childhood relates to adult outcomes.  These results, which merit further 
inquiry, begin the process of understanding how volatility may impact well-being across 
the population.  Taken together, the three essays that comprise the dissertation provide an 
updated, comprehensive inquiry into the occurrence and potential consequences of 
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volatility.  Future work on volatility can directly explore the responsiveness of public 
programs to volatile earnings.  This includes trend analysis utilizing a full variance 
decomposition of income sources.  In an intergenerational context, volatility along 
different points of the age distribution also warrants further examination.  Finally, essay 
4’s study of volatility within a model of intergenerational mobility can be expanded by 
using data sets beyond the PSID, including the National Longitudinal Surveys as well as 
administrative earnings records.  The results of this research will hopefully add to our 
collective understanding of labor market dynamics in the United States and the second 
moment of wages, particularly earnings and income volatility.  This improved 
understanding could raise new questions regarding the stabilizing role of the U.S. tax and 
transfer system, the provision of social insurance benefits, and well-being in the face of 
economic volatility.   
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Appendix List of Tables 
 
Appendix Table 1 Correlation between Parental Income and Parental Educational Attainment 
  
Mean Parental Income  
  
Parents Education 0.395*** 
 (0.004) 
Constant 10.718*** 
 (0.003) 
  
Observations 2,093 
R-squared 0.1446 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Parents Education is 0/1 variable indicating either parent attended 4 
or more years of college or university. 
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Appendix Table 2 Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and High School Dropout (Transitory Definition) 
DROPOUT 24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 39-41 39-41 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Parents Ed -0.047*** -0.051*** -0.034*** -0.030** -0.034*** -0.040** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) 
Transitory Volatility0-16 0.006 0.006 0.010 0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) 
Parents Ed * Transitory Vol0-16  0.007  -0.006  0.010 
  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.011) 
Black -0.041* -0.041* -0.059*** -0.059*** -0.037** -0.037** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
Other 0.090* 0.090* 0.109* 0.110* 0.138 0.137 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.063) (0.062) (0.130) (0.130) 
Female -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.029* -0.029* 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) 
No. of Siblings 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.020** 0.020** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) 
       
Constant 3.507** 3.509** 4.902*** 4.889*** 6.381 6.529 
 (1.726) (1.722) (1.324) (1.335) (5.206) (5.273) 
       
Observations 2,202 2,202 1,531 1,531 596 596 
R-squared 0.0705 0.0705 0.0763 0.0764 0.0929 0.0933 
Joint F Test  0.670  0.474  1.139 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for education and age not shown.  F-statistics 
tests joint significance of Transitory Volatility0-16 and Parents Ed * Transitory Vol0-16. 
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Appendix Table 3 Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and High School Dropout (Total Volatility Definition) 
DROPOUT 24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 39-41 39-41 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Parents Ed -0.045*** -0.013 -0.030*** -0.015 -0.016 0.011 
 (0.008) (0.013) (0.009) (0.014) (0.010) (0.019) 
Total Volatility0-16 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Parents Ed * Total Vol0-16  -0.001***  -0.001  -0.001* 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Black -0.031 -0.031 -0.042* -0.043** -0.033** -0.033** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.013) (0.014) 
Other 0.096** 0.092* 0.112* 0.112* 0.138 0.135 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.062) (0.062) (0.124) (0.122) 
Female -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.027* -0.025* 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) 
No. of Siblings 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
       
Constant 1.442 1.402 2.698 2.659 -0.152 1.037 
 (1.653) (1.617) (1.729) (1.715) (4.621) (4.603) 
       
Observations 2,300 2,300 1,606 1,606 640 640 
R-squared 0.0694 0.0720 0.0747 0.0756 0.1180 0.1225 
Joint F Test  5.910  3.244  2.331 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for education and age not shown.  F-statistics 
tests joint significance of Total Volatility0-16 and Parents Ed * Total Vol0-16. 
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Appendix Table 4 Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and Post Secondary Education (Transitory Definition) 
POST SECONDARY  24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 39-41 39-41 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Parents Ed 0.335*** 0.353*** 0.324*** 0.348*** 0.383*** 0.436*** 
 (0.020) (0.026) (0.025) (0.031) (0.036) (0.044) 
Transitory Volatility0-16 0.004 0.003 0.016 0.013 0.028 0.029 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.026) (0.024) 
Parents Ed * Transitory Vol0-16  -0.031  -0.042  -0.093** 
  (0.029)  (0.037)  (0.046) 
Black 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.103 0.106 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.060) (0.060) (0.121) (0.123) 
Other -0.052 -0.050 0.051 0.054 -0.147 -0.136 
 (0.061) (0.060) (0.069) (0.069) (0.101) (0.100) 
Female 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.080*** 0.079*** 0.051 0.048 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.025) (0.039) (0.039) 
No. of Siblings -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.040*** -0.040*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) 
       
Constant -4.188*** -4.196*** -4.723** -4.808** 12.021 10.612 
 (1.468) (1.469) (2.042) (2.049) (14.081) (14.199) 
       
Observations 2,202 2,202 1,531 1,531 596 596 
R-squared 0.1672 0.1675 0.1640 0.1647 0.1850 0.1897 
Joint F Test  0.564  0.761  2.248 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for education and age not shown.  F-statistics 
tests joint significance of Transitory Volatility0-16 and Parents Ed * Transitory Vol0-16. 
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Appendix Table 5 Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and Post Secondary Education (Total Volatility Definition) 
POST SECONDARY 24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 39-41 39-41 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Parents Ed 0.331*** 0.303*** 0.321*** 0.299*** 0.366*** 0.359*** 
 (0.020) (0.031) (0.024) (0.036) (0.035) (0.052) 
Total Volatility0-16 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Parents Ed * Total Vol0-16  0.001  0.001  0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Black 0.008 0.008 0.015 0.016 0.053 0.053 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.059) (0.059) (0.115) (0.115) 
Other -0.055 -0.051 0.049 0.049 -0.131 -0.131 
 (0.059) (0.060) (0.068) (0.068) (0.099) (0.100) 
Female 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.048** 0.048** 0.024 0.023 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.024) (0.038) (0.038) 
No. of Siblings -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.051*** -0.050*** -0.040*** -0.040*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) 
       
Constant -0.601 -0.565 -0.817 -0.761 22.697 22.377 
 (1.686) (1.665) (2.471) (2.459) (14.455) (14.611) 
       
Observations 2,300 2,300 1,606 1,606 640 640 
R-squared 0.1639 0.1643 0.1598 0.1601 0.1835 0.1836 
Joint F Test  3.187  1.334  1.299 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for education and age not shown.  F-statistics 
tests joint significance of Total Volatility0-16 and Parents Ed * Total Vol0-16. 
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Appendix Table 6 Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and Self Reported Poor Health (Transitory Definition) 
POOR HEALTH  24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 39-41 39-41 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Parents Ed 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.005 -0.005 -0.007 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Transitory Volatility0-16 0.005 0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Parents Ed * Transitory Vol0-16  0.004  -0.004  0.003 
  (0.012)  (0.003)  (0.002) 
Black 0.006 0.006 -0.003* -0.003* -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Other 0.008 0.009 -0.004** -0.004** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
No. of Siblings 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Constant 0.286 0.282 -0.197 -0.204 -1.325 -1.285 
 (0.301) (0.299) (0.222) (0.229) (1.190) (1.169) 
       
Observations 1,828 1,828 1,453 1,453 532 532 
R-squared 0.0034 0.0036 0.0033 0.0037 0.0070 0.0074 
Joint F Test  0.849  1.101  0.881 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for education and age not shown.  F-statistics 
tests joint significance of Transitory Volatility0-16 and Parents Ed * Transitory Vol0-16. 
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Appendix Table 7 Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and Self Reported Poor Health (Total Volatility Definition) 
POOR HEALTH 24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 39-41 39-41 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Parents Ed 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.000 -0.005 -0.007 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) 
Total Volatility0-16 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Parents Ed * Total Vol0-16  -0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Black 0.006 0.006 -0.003* -0.002* -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Other 0.008 0.008 -0.004** -0.004** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
No. of Siblings 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Constant 0.258 0.248 -0.226 -0.220 -1.194 -1.280 
 (0.263) (0.264) (0.199) (0.200) (1.068) (1.128) 
       
Observations 1,839 1,839 1,528 1,528 571 571 
R-squared 0.0022 0.0025 0.0032 0.0034 0.0061 0.0064 
Joint F Test  0.659  0.814  0.855 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for education and age not shown.  F-statistics 
tests joint significance of Total Volatility0-16 and Parents Ed * Total Vol0-16. 
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Appendix Table 8 Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and Non Marital Child Bearing (Transitory Definition) 
OWB  24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 39-41 39-41 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Parents Ed -0.008 0.004 -0.020** -0.009 -0.003 0.009 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.009) (0.012) (0.004) (0.011) 
Transitory Volatility0-16 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.009 0.024 0.022 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.012) (0.024) (0.022) 
Parents Ed * Transitory Vol0-16  -0.023  -0.023  -0.026 
  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.030) 
Black 0.253*** 0.253*** 0.224*** 0.224*** 0.068 0.070 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.070) (0.070) (0.076) (0.076) 
Other 0.000 0.001 -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.014 -0.007 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) 
No. of Siblings -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
Constant 0.487 0.487 -0.988 -1.039 4.000 3.464 
 (1.570) (1.564) (0.866) (0.856) (3.660) (3.106) 
       
Observations 1,065 1,065 743 743 289 289 
R-squared 0.0987 0.0997 0.0978 0.0990 0.0665 0.0739 
Joint F Test  1.003  1.878  0.901 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for education and age not shown.  F-statistics 
tests joint significance of Transitory Volatility0-16 and Parents Ed * Transitory Vol0-16. 
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Appendix Table 9 Childhood Income Volatility Exposure and Non Marital Child Bearing (Total Volatility Definition) 
OWB 24-26 24-26 29-31 29-31 39-41 39-41 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Parents Ed -0.005 -0.010 -0.018** 0.009 -0.004 0.004 
 (0.011) (0.019) (0.009) (0.015) (0.006) (0.008) 
Total Volatility0-16 0.001* 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Parents Ed * Total Vol0-16  0.000  -0.001*  -0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Black 0.246*** 0.247*** 0.247*** 0.246*** 0.053 0.053 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.072) (0.072) (0.061) (0.061) 
Other -0.002 -0.002 -0.031*** -0.027*** -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
No. of Siblings -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Constant 0.349 0.354 -1.075 -1.114 2.809 2.754 
 (1.630) (1.625) (0.855) (0.858) (2.865) (2.861) 
       
Observations 1,117 1,117 780 780 314 314 
R-squared 0.1030 0.1030 0.1190 0.1218 0.0300 0.0316 
Joint F Test  1.783  2.280  0.899 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  Coefficients for education and age not shown.  F-statistics 
tests joint significance of Total Volatility0-16 and Parents Ed * Total Vol0-16.
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Appendix Current Population Survey Data  
In this appendix describing Current Population Survey (CPS) data, years refer to 
calendar years.  Individual earnings before 1977 are calculated using the sum of income 
from wages, self-employment income, and farm income.  For 1977 and beyond the CPS 
has its own composite definition of individual earnings that incorporates the same 
components I use before 1977.   
Data on AFDC/TANF cash assistance, social security payments, and social 
security disability payments are available in the CPS after 1974; the monetary value of 
food stamps, earned income tax credits, and housing subsidies do not become available in 
the CPS until 1979.  This means that the income category for “Means Tested Transfers 
and Credits” excludes these variables before 1979.  When I decompose “Other Income” 
into its respective subcategories, note that the CPS combines two distinct variables, (1) 
alimony and (2) child support, to create “Alimony and Child Support” between 1975 and 
1986.  After 1986 alimony and child support are separate variables that are combined to 
create a uniform measure across the panel.  The income categories “Unemployment (UI), 
Worker’s Compensation (WC), and Veteran’s benefits” and “Rent, Interest, and 
Dividends” are structured similarly, so that each of the three distinct subcategories are 
combined after 1986 to create one variable for use across the panel.   As with “Alimony 
and Child Support”, these last two categories’ components were combined in the CPS 
prior to 1987.  I account for federal taxes using taxsim throughout the panel.  In years 
before 1977, state tax rates are unavailable and therefore not accounted for in the 
analysis.  Federal and state taxes are accounted for after 1976.      
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Appendix  A Basic Framework of Intergenerational Mobility 
The empirical analysis of income volatility’s intergenerational consequences is 
informed by the seminal Becker and Tomes (1979) model of intergenerational mobility, 
in an adaptation influenced heavily by Solon (1999, 2004).  This adaptation adds an 
approximation for income shocks to the model, formalizing the role of persistent 
transitory shocks to income (Lillard and Willis 1978; Hyslop 2001; Mazumder 2005).  I 
describe the basic features of the intergenerational model, below.  Parental income in 
time t-1 determines the quality of the offspring in time t, where this is measured by the 
child’s future or lifetime income, yi,t: 
(1) yi,t = φ�yi,t−1�.   
In a multi-period setting for a family i, the function 𝜑 is nondecreasing in income, y, and 
describes the intertemporal relationship between the incomes of parents in period t-1 and 
adult offspring in period t (Durlauf 2009).   In more detail (Solon 1999), the Becker and 
Tomes (1979) model allows for parents to allocate income between Ct−1, consumption 
for themselves, and It−1, human capital investment in their children.  From equation 1, 
parental income, yt−1, is defined as 
(2) yt−1 = Ct−1+ It−1 
Education investments are a salient example of variables included in human capital 
investment (It−1) but human capital investment also includes quality neighborhoods, 
stimulating learning environments outside of formal schooling, and childcare (Blau 
1999).  In addition to parental investment in human capital, lifetime adult income, yt, is 
also influenced by endogenous factors Et: 
(3) yt = (1 + r)It−1 + Et. 
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These Et determinants of lifetime income are a combination of innate and environmental 
factors, including reputation, family connections, ability, race, culture, and goals.  Et 
represents the set of elements beyond parental investment determining the child’s lifetime 
income or quality, and r is the rate of return to human capital.  Et is decomposed so that 
(4) Et =  et + ut. 
This decomposition accounts for the child’s given endowment of income capacity, et, 
and the presence of luck, ut.  Et can admit negative and positive terms that influence the 
child’s lifetime income or quality, and this is likely both endogenous and potentially 
inheritable.  The size of this omitted component is debatable.  Altonji and Dunn (2000) 
find that typical intergenerational associations overstate the role of parental 
characteristics and neglect the role of similarities in labor supply preferences across 
generations.  Yet, Mason (2007) concludes family preferences explain a small share of 
the racial gap in intergenerational mobility relative to social class.  Parents consider their 
optimizing choices of 𝐶𝑡−1 and 𝐼𝑡−1 as part of a family that spans an unknown number of 
generations into the future, and the well-being of children and future generations enters 
the utility function positively.   The parents are still self interested, but current 
consumption comes at the cost of future consumption, as well as investments in future 
generations.  Parents’ taste for consumption versus child investment varies by α, the 
preference parameter reflecting the tradeoff between parental current period interests and 
altruism in the Cobb-Douglass utility function: 
(5) max𝐶𝑡−1, 𝑦𝑡 𝑈 = (1 − 𝛼)𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑡−1 +  𝛼𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑡. 
α is bounded between 0 and 1, and the model assumes that Et are known to the parents.   
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 With a knowledge of 𝐸𝑡′𝑠 components, the resulting equation for the child’s lifetime 
income, yt, after substituting the optimal amount of investment, It−1, is 
(6) yt = α(1 + 𝑟)yt−1 + αEt. 
Setting β = α(1+r) yields a simplified expression where, assuming stationary of y such 
that the variance of y is equivalent across generations, child income is at least partially 
determined by parental income: 
(7) yt = βyt−1 + αEt. 
Here, β reflects the correlation between lifetime income of parents and children, or 
between parents’ income and lifetime child quality.  Equations 3, 4, and 6 demonstrate 
how factors outside of parental income and investment potentially influence the 
transmission of intergenerational income and earnings relationships.  Substituting the 
decomposition of Et (4) into (7) shows children’s lifetime income (quality) is influenced 
by parental investment and income, parental preferences, ability of the child, and luck: 
(8) yt = βyt−1 + αet + αut. 
 
 
  
 158 
 
References 
Essay 2 References 
Andrews, Donald W.K. 1993. “Tests for Parameter Instability and Structural Change 
with Unknown Change Point.” Econometrica 61(4): 821–856. 
Auerbach, Alan J., and Daniel Feenberg. 2000. “The Significance of Federal Taxes as 
Automatic Stabilizers.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(3): 37-56. 
Autor, David H., Lawrence F. Katz, and Melissa S. Kearney. 2008. “Trends in U.S. Wage 
Inequality: Re-Assessing the Revisionists.” Review of Economics and Statistics 
90(2): 300–323. 
Bai, Jushan. 1997. “Estimation of a Change Point in Multiple Regression Models.” 
Review of Economics and Statistics 79(4): 551–563. 
Baltagi, Badi. 2008. Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: 
pgs. 210-213. 
Blank, Rebecca. 2002. “Evaluating Welfare Reform in the U.S.” Journal of Economic 
Literature 40(4): 1105-1166.   
Blundell, Richard, Alan Duncan, and Costas Meghir. 1998. “Estimating Labor Supply 
Responses Using Tax Reforms.” Econometrica 66(4): 827–861. 
Blundell, Richard, and Thomas MaCurdy. 1999. “Labor Supply: A Review of alternative  
Approaches.” In Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3A, Orley Ashenfelter 
and David Card, editors, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1559–1695. 
Blundell, Richard, Luigi Pistaferri, and Ian Preston. 2008. “Consumption Inequality and 
Partial Insurance.” American Economic Review 98(5): 1887-1921.  
 
 159 
 
 
Bollinger, Christopher, and Barry Hirsch. 2006. “Match Bias from Earnings Imputation 
in the Current Population Survey: The Case of Imperfect Matching.” Journal of 
Labor Economics 24(3): 483–520. 
Bollinger, Christopher, and James P. Ziliak. 2008. “Changes in the distribution of income 
among single mother families: Murphy Brown meets inequality.” University of 
Kentucky Center for Poverty Research Working Paper Series DP 2008-08. 
Burkhauser, Richard, J.S. Butler, Shuaizhang Feng, and Andrew J. Houtenville. 2004. 
“Long term trends in earnings inequality: what the CPS can tell us.” Economics 
Letters 82(2): 295-299. 
Burkhauser, Richard, Shuaizhang Feng, and Stephen Jenkins. 2007. “Using the P90/P10 
Index to Measure US Inequality Trends with Current Population Survey Data: A 
View from Inside the Census Bureau Vaults.” IZA Discussion Paper 2839. 
Cameron, Stephen, and Joseph Tracy. 1998. “Earnings Variability in the United States: 
An Examination Using Matched-CPS Data,” Mimeo. 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/economists/tracy/earnings_variability.pdf 
Dahl, Molly, Thomas DeLeire, and Jonathan Schwabish. 2008. “Year-to-Year Variability 
in Worker Earnings and in Household Incomes: Estimates from Administrative 
Data.” http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~tdeleire/  
Deaton, Angus. 1985. “Panel Data from Time Series of Cross Sections.” Journal of  
Econometrics 30(1-2): 109–126. 
 
 
 160 
 
Dynan, Karen E., Douglas W. Elmendorf, and Daniel E. Sichel. 2008. “The Evolution of 
Household Income Volatility.” 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/02_useconomics_elmend
orf/02_useconomics_elmendorf.pdf  
Dynarski, Susan and Jonathan Gruber. 1997. “Can Families Smooth Variable Earnings?”  
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, 229–284. 
Gittleman, Maury, and Mary Joyce. 1996. “Earnings Mobility and Long-Run Inequality: 
An Analysis Using Matched CPS Data.” Industrial Relations 35(2): 180-196. 
Gottschalk, Peter and Robert Moffitt. 1994. “The Growth of Earnings Instability in the 
U.S. Labor Market.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, 217–254. 
Gottschalk, Peter, and Robert Moffitt. 2009. “The Rising Instability of U.S. Earnings.” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 23(4): 3-24.  
Gundersen, Craig, and James P. Ziliak. 2003. “The Role of Food Stamps in Consumption  
Stabilization,” Journal of Human Resources 38(Supplement): 1051–1079. 
Haider, Steven. 2001. “Earnings Instability and Earnings Inequality of Males in the 
United States: 1967–1991.” Journal of Labor Economics 19(4): 799–836. 
Hansen, Bruce. 2001. “The New Econometrics of Structural Change: Dating Breaks in 
U.S. Labor Productivity.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(4): 117–128. 
Hacker, Jacob S., and Elisabeth Jacobs. 2008. “The Rising Instability of American 
Family Incomes, 1969-2004: Evidence from the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics.” EPI Briefing Paper 213, Economic Policy Institute. 
 161 
 
Hotz, V. Joseph, and John Karl Scholz. 2003. “The Earned Income Tax Credit.” In 
Means-Tested Transfer Programs in the United States, Robert Moffitt, ed., The 
University of Chicago Press and NBER, 141-197. 
Jensen, Shane T., and Stephen H. Shore. 2008. “Changes in the Distribution of Income  
Volatility.” http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/0808/0808.1090v1.pdf. 
Katz, Lawrence F., and David H. Autor. 1999. “Changes in the Wage Structure and 
Earnings Inequality,” in Handbook of Labor Economics, Orley C. Ashenfelter and 
David Card, eds., Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Keys, Ben. 2008. “Trends in Income and Consumption Volatility, 1970–2000.” In 
Income Volatility and Food Assistance in the United States, D. Jolliffe and J. P. 
Ziliak, eds., Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute. 
Kniesner, Thomas J., and James P. Ziliak. 2002a. “Tax Reform and Automatic 
Stabilization.” American Economic Review 92(3): 590-612.  
Kniesner, Thomas J., and James P. Ziliak. 2002b. “Explicit Versus Implicit Income 
Insurance.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 25(1): 5-20. 
Larrimore, Jeff, Richard V. Burkhauser, Shuaizhang Feng, and Laura Zayatz. “Consistent 
cell means for topcoded incomes in the public use march CPS (1976-2007).” 
Journal of Economic and Social Measurement 33(2008): 89-128.  
Lemieux, Thomas. 2006. “Increasing Residual Wage Inequality: Composition effects, 
Noisy Data, or Rising Demand for Skill?” American Economic Review 96(3): 
461–498. 
Lemieux, Thomas. 2008. “The Changing Nature of Wage Inequality.” Journal of 
Population Economics 21(1): 21–48. 
 162 
 
Meyer, Bruce D., and Dan T. Rosenbaum. 2001. “Welfare, the Earned Income Tax 
Credit, and the Labor Supply of Single Mothers.” The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 116(3): 1063-1114.   
Piketty, Thomas, and Emmanuel Saez. 2003. “Income Inequality in the United States, 
1913–1998.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(1): 1–39. 
Quandt, Richard. 1960. “Tests of the Hypothesis that a Linear Regression Obeys Two 
Separate Regimes.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 55: 324–330. 
Shin, Donggyun, and Gary Solon. 2008. “Trends in Men’s Earnings Volatility: What 
Doesthe Panel Study of Income Dynamics Show?” NBER Working Papers, 
14075. 
Solon, Gary, Robert Barsky, and Jonathan Parker. 1994. “Measuring the Cyclicality of 
Real Wages: How Important is Composition Bias?” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 109(1): 1–25. 
Winship, Scott. 2009. “The Very Small Risk Shift: Trends in Family Income Changes.”  
Unpublished dissertation, Harvard University. 
http://www.scottwinship.com/dissertation.html  
Ziliak, James P., Beth Wilson, and Joe Stone. 1999. “Spatial Dynamics and 
Heterogeneity in the Cyclicality of Real Wages.” Review of Economics and 
Statistics 81(2): 227–236. 
Ziliak, James P. 2008. “Filling the Poverty Gap: Then and Now.” In Frontiers of Family  
Economics Vol. 1, Peter Rupert, ed., Emerald Publishing Group, 39-114.  
 
 
 163 
 
Essay 3 References 
Autor, David, Lawrence F. Katz, and Melissa S. Kearney. 2008. “Trends in U.S. Wage 
Inequality: Revising the Revisionists.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 
90(2): 300-323. 
Becker, Gary, and Nigel Tomes.  1986.  “Human Capital and the Rise and Fall of 
Families.” Journal of Labor Economics 4(3-2): S1-S39. 
Black, Dan, Natalia Kolesnikova, and Lowell Taylor. 2009. “Earnings Functions when 
Wages and Prices vary by Location.” Journal of Labor Economics 27(1): 21–47. 
Blundell, Richard, and Luigi Pistaferri. 2003. “Income Volatility and Household 
Consumption: The Impact of Food Assistance Programs.” The Journal of Human 
Resources 38: 1032-1050. 
Blundell, Richard, Alan Duncan, and Costas Meghir. 1998. “Estimating Labor Supply 
Responses Using Tax Reforms.” Econometrica 66(4): 827–861. 
Bollinger, Christopher, James P. Ziliak, and Kenneth R. Troske. 2009. “Down from the 
Mountain: Skill Upgrading and Wages in Appalachia.” Working paper. 
http://gatton.uky.edu/Faculty/ziliak/BZT_All_090909.pdf 
Cameron, Stephen, and Joseph Tracy.  1998. “Earnings Variability in the United States: 
An Examination Using Matched-CPS Data.” Working paper:  
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/economists/tracy/earnings_variability.pdf  
Celik, Sule, Chinhui Juhn, Kristin McCue, and Jesse Thompson. 2009. “Understanding 
Earnings Instability: How Important are Employment Fluctuations and Job 
Changes?” Census CES Working Paper 09-02. 
 164 
 
Dahl, Molly, Thomas DeLeire, and Jonathan Schwabish. 2008. “Year-to-Year Variability 
in Worker Earnings and in Household Incomes: Estimates from Administrative 
Data.” http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~tdeleire/ 
Davidson, Russell, and James G. MacKinnon. 2004. Econometric Theory and Methods 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Deaton, Angus. 1985. “Panel Data from Time Series of Cross Sections.” Journal of  
Econometrics 30(1-2): 109–126. 
Dynan, Karen E., Douglas W. Elmendorf, and Daniel E. Sichel. 2008. “The Evolution of  
Household Income Volatility.” 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/02_useconomics_elmend
orf/02_useconomics_elmendorf.pdf 
Eliason, Marcus.  2004.  “Lost jobs, broken marriages.” ISER Working Papers #2004-21. 
Eliason, Marcus, and Donald Storrie.  2007.  “Does Job Loss Shorten Life?”  The Journal 
of Human Resources 44(2):277-302. 
Freeman, Richard. 1986. “Demand for Education.” In Handbook of Labor Economics, 
Orley C. Ashenfelter and David Card, eds., Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Giuliano, Paola, and Antonio Spilimbergo. 2009. “Growing up in a Recession: Beliefs 
and the Macroeconomy.” NBER Working Paper Series No. 15321.   
Gottschalk, Peter and Robert Moffitt. 1994. “The Growth of Earnings Instability in the 
U.S. Labor Market.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1): 217–254. 
Gottschalk, Peter, and Robert Moffitt. 2009. “The Rising Instability of U.S. Earnings.” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 23(4): 3-24.  
 
 165 
 
Gronau, Reuben. 1974. “Wage Comparison – A Selectivity Bias.” The Journal of 
Political Economy 82(6):119-43. 
Hacker, Jacob S., and Elisabeth Jacobs. 2008. “The Rising Instability of American 
Family Incomes, 1969-2004: Evidence from the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics.” EPI Briefing Paper 213, Economic Policy Institute. 
Haskins, Ron. 2001. “Effects of Welfare Reform on Family Income and Poverty.” In The 
New World of Welfare, R. Blank and R. Haskins, eds., Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press.  
Heckman, James. 1979. “Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error.” Econometrica 
47(1): 153-161. 
Huff Stevens, Ann. 1997. “Persistent Effects of Job Displacement: The Importance of 
Multiple Job Losses.” Journal of Labor Economics 15(1):165-188. 
Mayer, Susan E.  1997.  “Income, Psychological Well-Being, and Parenting Practices.” In 
What Money Can’t Buy: Family Income and Children’s Life Chances.  Harvard 
University Press: Cambridge, MA.   
Oreopolous, Philip, Marianne Page, and Ann Huff Stevens. 2005. “The Intergenerational 
Effects of Worker Displacement.” NBER Working Paper 11587. 
Gundersen, Craig, and James P. Ziliak. 2003. “The Role of Food Stamps in Consumption  
Stabilization,” Journal of Human Resources 38(Supplement): 1051–1079. 
Katz, Lawrence F., and David H. Autor. 1999. “Changes in the Wage Structure and 
Earnings Inequality,” in Handbook of Labor Economics, Orley C. Ashenfelter and 
David Card, eds., Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
 166 
 
Keys, Ben. 2008. “Trends in Income and Consumption Volatility, 1970–2000.” In 
Income Volatility and Food Assistance in the United States, D. Jolliffe and J. P. 
Ziliak, eds., Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute. 
Hankins, Scott, and Mark Hoekstra.  2010.  “Lucky in Life, Unlucky in Love? The Effect 
of Random Income Shocks on Marriage and Divorce.”  Forthcoming in Journal of 
Human Resources.  http://www.uky.edu/~swhank2/research/lottery_divorce.pdf 
Hubbard, R. Glenn, and Anthony P. O’Brien. “Macroeconomics.” 2nd Edition.  Prentice 
Hall: Upper Saddle River, NJ.   
Lemieux, Thomas. 2008. “The Changing Nature of Wage Inequality.” Journal of 
Population Economics 21(1): 21–48. 
Loury, Glenn C. 1981. “Intergenerational Transfers and the Distribution of Earnings.” In 
Econometrica 49(4): 843-867. 
Mazumder, Bhashkar. 2005. “Fortunate Sons: New Estimates of Intergenerational 
Mobility in the United States Using Social Security Earnings Data.” Review of 
Economics and Statistics 87(2): 235-255. 
Polachek, Solomon W. 2007. “Earnings Over the Lifecycle: The Mincer Earnings 
Function and Its Applications.” Working Paper.   
Ruhm, Christopher. 2003. “Healthy Living in Hard Times.” IZA discussion paper No. 
711.  
Shin, Donggyun, and Gary Solon. 2010. “Trends in Men’s Earnings Volatility: What 
Does the Panel Study of Income Dynamics Show? Working paper.  
 167 
 
Shore, Steven. 2010.  “The Intergenerational Transmission of Income Volatility: Is 
Riskiness Inherited?” Working paper. 
http://www.econ.jhu.edu/People/Shore/Research/shore2011.pdf 
Smith, James P., and Finis Welch. “Inequality: Race Differences in the Distribution of 
Earnings.” International Economic Review 20(2): 515-526. 
University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research.  2010. “United States dataset of 
state-level information.”  http://www.ukcpr.org/ 
Violante, Giovanni L. 2002 “Technological Acceleration, Skill Transferability, and The 
Rise in Residual Inequality.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(1): 297-
338. 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey.  2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data.  
 Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Wilson, William J. 1996. “When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor.” 
Alfred A. Knopf: New York. 
Ziliak, James P. 2008. “Filling the Poverty Gap: Then and  Now.” In Frontiers of Family  
Economics Vol. 1, Peter Rupert, ed., Emerald Publishing Group, 39-114.  
Ziliak, James P., Bradley Hardy, and Christopher Bollinger. 2011. “Earnings and Income 
Volatility in American: Evidence from Matched CPS.  Working paper.   
  
 168 
 
Essay 4 References 
Altonji, Joseph, and Thomas Dunn. 2000. “An Intergenerational Model of Wages, Hours, 
and Earnings.” Journal of Human Resources 35(2): 221-258.   
Becker, Gary, and Nigel Tomes. 1979. “An Equilibrium Theory of the Distribution of 
Income and Intergenerational Mobility.” Journal of Political Economy 87(6): 
1153-1189.   
Becker, Gary, and Nigel Tomes.  1986.  “Human Capital and the Rise and Fall of 
Families.” Journal of Labor Economics 4(3-2): S1-S39. 
Becker, Gary. 1991.  A Treatise on the Family. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
MA.  
Black, Sandra E., Paul J. Devereux, and Kjell G. Salvanes. “Why the Apple Doesn't Fall 
Far: Understanding Intergenerational Transmission of Human Capital.” The 
American Economic Review 95(1): 437-449. 
Blau, David. 1999. “The Effect of Income on Child Development.” The Review of 
Economics and Statistics 81(2): 261-276. 
Blundell, Richard, Luigi Pistaferri, and Ian Preston. 2008. “Consumption Inequality and 
Partial Insurance.” American Economic Review 98(5): 1887-1921.  
Brenner, Jan.  2010.  “Life-cycle variations in the association between current and 
lifetime earnings: Evidence for German natives and guest workers.” Labour 
Economics 17(2010): 392-406 
Brooks-Gunn, Jeanne, Greg J. Duncan, Pamela Kato Klebanov, and Naomi Sealand. 
1993.  “Do Neighborhoods Influence Child and Adolescent Development?” The 
American Journal of Sociology 99(2): 353-395. 
 169 
 
Cancian, Maria, and Deborah Reed. 2001. “Changes in Family Structure: Implications for 
Poverty and Related Policy.” in Understanding Poverty, S. Danziger and R. 
Haveman, eds. Russell Sage Foundation: New York: 69-96. 
Charles, Kerwin, and Melvin Stephens Jr. 2002. “Job Displacement, Disability, and 
Divorce.” NBER working paper series.  
Charles, Kerwin, and Eric Hurst. 2003. “The Correlation of Wealth Across Generations.” 
Journal of Political Economy 111(6): 1155-1182.  
Conger, Rand, Glen H. Elder, Jr., Frederick O. Lorenz, Katherine J. Conger, Ronald L. 
Simons, Les B. Whitbeck, Shirley Huck, and Janet N. Melby. 1990.  “Linking 
Economic Hardship to Marital Quality and Instability.” Journal of Marriage and 
Family 52(3): 643-656. 
Cunha, Flavio, James J. Heckman, Lance Lochner, and Dimitriy V. Masterov.  2005. 
“Interpreting the Evidence on Life Cycle Skill Formation.” Prepared for 
Handbook of the Economics of Education.  E. Hanushek and F. Welch, eds., 
North Holland.  
Currie, Janet, Mark Stabile, Phongsack Manivong, and Leslie L. Roos. 2010.  “Child 
Health and Young Adult Outcomes.” Journal of Human Resources 45(3): 517-
548.  
Dahl, Gordon, and Lance Lochner. 2005.  “The Impact of Family Income on Child 
Achievement.” Institute for Research on Poverty DP1305-05. 
Dahl, Molly, Thomas DeLeire, and Jonathan Schwabish. 2008. “Year-to-Year Variability 
in Worker Earnings and in Household Incomes: Estimates from Administrative 
Data.” http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~tdeleire/  
 170 
 
Duncan, Greg. 1988.  “The Volatility of Family Income Over the Life Course.” In Life-
Span Development and Behavior, Vol. 9, P. Baltes, D. Featherman, and R. 
Lerner, eds., Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: London: 317-358.  
Duncan, Greg J., Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, and Pamela Kato Klebanov.  1994.  “Economic 
Deprivation and Early Childhood Development.” Child Development 65(2): 296-
318.  
Duncan, Greg, and Jeanne Brooks-Gunn. 2000. “Family Poverty, Welfare Reform, and 
Child Development.” Child Development 71(1): 188-196. 
Duncan, Greg J., Ariel Kalil, and Kathleen Ziol-Guest. 2008. “The Economic Costs of 
Early Childhood Poverty.” Partnership for America’s Economic Success, Issue 
Paper #4.  
Durlauf, Steven N. 2009. “Notes on Poverty Traps and Appalachia.” Working paper 
prepared for Appalachia and the Legacy of the War on Poverty: A Research 
Agenda, hosted by the University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research. 
Dynan, Karen E., Douglas W. Elmendorf, and Daniel E. Sichel. 2008. “The Evolution of  
Household Income Volatility.” 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/02_useconomics_elmend
orf/02_useconomics_elmendorf.pdf  
Eliason, Marcus.  2004.  “Lost jobs, broken marriages.” ISER Working Papers #2004-21. 
Eliason, Marcus, and Donald Storrie.  2007.  “Does Job Loss Shorten Life?”  The Journal 
of Human Resources 44(2):277-302. 
 171 
 
Fitzgerald, John, Peter Gottschalk, and Robert Moffitt. 1998. “An Analysis of Sample 
Attrition in Panel Data: The Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics.” The 
Journal of Human Resources 33(2): 251-299.  
Freeman, Richard. 1986. “Demand for Education.” In Handbook of Labor Economics, 
Orley C. Ashenfelter and David Card, eds., Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Gottschalk, Peter and Robert Moffitt. 1994. “The Growth of Earnings Instability in the 
U.S. Labor Market.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1): 217–254. 
Gottschalk, Peter, and Robert Moffitt. 2009. “The Rising Instability of U.S. Earnings.” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 23(4): 3-24.  
Gouskova, Elena, Ngina Chiteji, and Frank Stafford. 2010. “Estimating the 
intergenerational persistence of lifetime earnings with life course matching: 
Evidence from the PSID.” Labour Economics 17(3): 592-597.  
Gouskova, Elena, Patricia Andreski, and Robert F. Schoeni. 2010. “Comparing Estimates 
of Family Income in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the March Current 
Population Survey, 1968-2007.” PSID Survey Research Center: Technical series 
paper #10-01.   http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/Publications/Papers/tsp/2010-
01_comparing_estimates_of_fam.pdf  
Grawe, Nathan D. 2006.  “Lifecycle bias in estimates of intergenerational earnings 
persistence.” Labour Economics 13(2006): 551-570.   
Gundersen, Craig, and James P. Ziliak. 2003. “The Role of Food Stamps in Consumption  
Stabilization,” Journal of Human Resources 38(Supplement): 1051–1079. 
 
 172 
 
Gundersen, Craig, and James P. Ziliak  2008. “The Age Gradient in Food Stamp Program 
Participation: Does Income Volatility Matter?”  In Income Volatility and Food 
Assistance in the United States, D. Jolliffe and J. P. Ziliak, eds., Kalamazoo, MI: 
W.E. Upjohn Institute. 
Guryan, Jonathan. 2004. “Desegregation and Black Dropout Rates,” American Economic 
Review 94(4): 919-943. 
Haider, Steven. 2001. “Earnings Instability and Earnings Inequality of Males in the 
United States: 1967–1991.” Journal of Labor Economics 19(4): 799–836. 
Haider, Steven, and Gary Solon. 2006.  “Life-Cycle Variation in the Association between 
Current and Lifetime Earnings.” The American Economic Review 96(4): 1308-
1320. 
Hauser, Robert M., Solon J. Simmons, and Devah I. Pager. 2000. “High School Dropout, 
Race-Ethnicity, and Social Background from the 1970’s to the 1990’s.”  CDE 
Working Paper No. 2000-12.  http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/cde/cdewp/2000-12.pdf 
Hankins, Scott, and Mark Hoekstra.  2010.  “Lucky in Life, Unlucky in Love? The Effect 
of Random Income Shocks on Marriage and Divorce.”  Forthcoming in Journal of 
Human Resources.  http://www.uky.edu/~swhank2/research/lottery_divorce.pdf 
Huff Stevens, Ann. 1997. “Persistent Effects of Job Displacement: The Importance of 
Multiple Job Losses.” Journal of Labor Economics 15(1):165-188. 
Hyslop, Dean R. 2001. “Rising U.S. Earnings Inequality and Family Labor Supply: 
The Covariance Structure of Intrafamily Earnings.” The American Economic 
Review 91(4): 755-777.  
 173 
 
Institute for Social Research.  2006. “An Overview of the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics.” http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/Guide/Overview.html. 
Johnson, G.E., and P.R.G. Layard. 1986. “The Natural Rate of Unemployment: 
Explanation and Policy.” In Handbook of Labor Economics, Orley C. Ashenfelter 
and David Card, eds., Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Kane, Thomas J., and David T. Ellwood.  2000. “Who is Getting a College Education? 
Family Background and the Growing Gaps in Enrollment.” in Securing the 
Future, S. Danziger and J. Waldfogel, eds., New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Keys, Ben. 2008. “Trends in Income and Consumption Volatility, 1970–2000.” In 
Income Volatility and Food Assistance in the United States, D. Jolliffe and J. P. 
Ziliak, eds., Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute. 
Lee, Chul-In, and Gary Solon. 2007.  “Trends in Intergenerational Income Mobility.”  
NBER Working Paper 12007.   
Lillard, Lee A., and Robert J. Willis. 1978.  “Dynamic Aspects of Earnings Mobility.” 
Econometrica 46(5): 985-1012.  
Lillard, Lee A., and Robert J. Willis. 1994. “Intergenerational Educational Mobility: The 
Effects of Family and State in Malaysia.” In The Journal of Human Resources 
29(4): 1126-1166. 
Lochner, Lance. 2005. “Education, Work, and Crime: A Human Capital Approach.” In 
International Economic Review 45(3): 811-843. 
Loury, Glenn C. 1981. “Intergenerational Transfers and the Distribution of Earnings.” In 
Econometrica 49(4): 843-867. 
 174 
 
Ludwig, Jens, and Douglas L. Miller. 2007. “Does Head Start Improve Children’s Life 
Chances? Evidence From A Regression Discontinuity Design.” In The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 122(1): 159-208. 
Magnuson, Katherine, and Elizabeth Votruba-Drzal.  2009.  “Enduring Influences of 
Childhood Poverty.” In Changing Poverty, Changing Policies:  153-178. 
Mason, Patrick. 2007. “Intergenerational Mobility and Interracial Inequality: The Return 
to Family Values.” Industrial Relations 46(1): 51-80.  
Mayer, Susan E.  1997.  “Income, Psychological Well-Being, and Parenting Practices.” In 
What Money Can’t Buy: Family Income and Children’s Life Chances.  Harvard 
University Press: Cambridge, MA.   
Mazumder, Bhashkar. 2005. “Fortunate Sons: New Estimates of Intergenerational 
Mobility in the United States Using Social Security Earnings Data.” Review of 
Economics and Statistics 87(2): 235-255. 
Meghir, Costas, and Marten Palme.  2005. “Education Reform, Ability, and Family 
Background.” The American Economic Review 95(1): 414-424.  
Moynihan, Daniel P. 1965. “The Negro Family: The Case for National Action.” Office of 
Policy Planning and Research, U.S. Department of Labor. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office. 
Nunley, John M., and Alan Seals. 2010. “The Effects of Household Income Volatility on 
Divorce.” The American Journal of Economics and Sociology 69(3): 984-1010.  
Okun, Arthur. 1975. “Equity and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff.” The Brookings 
Institution: Washington, D.C, 1975. 
 175 
 
Oreopolous, Philip, Marianne Page, and Ann Huff Stevens. 2005. “The Intergenerational 
Effects of Worker Displacement.” NBER Working Paper 11587. 
Rothstein, Jesse, and Nathan Wozny.  2010. “Permanent Income and the Black-White 
Test Score Gap.” Working paper.   
Ruhm, Christopher. 2003. “Healthy Living in Hard Times.” IZA discussion paper No. 
711.  
Shin, Donggyun, and Gary Solon. 2009. “Trends in Men’s Earnings Volatility: What 
Does the Panel Study of Income Dynamics Show?” Working paper: 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/inequality/Seminar/Papers/Solon09.pdf  
Shore, Steven. 2010.  “The Intergenerational Transmission of Income Volatility: Is 
Riskiness Inherited?” Working paper. 
http://www.econ.jhu.edu/People/Shore/Research/shore2011.pdf 
Solon, Gary. 1992.  “Intergenerational Income Mobility in the United States.” The 
American Economic Review 82(3):393-408. 
Solon, Gary. 1999. “Intergenerational Mobility in the Labor Market.” In Handbook of 
Labor Economics, Orley C. Ashenfelter and David Card, eds., Amsterdam: 
Elsevier. 
Solon, Gary. 2004. “A Model of Intergenerational Mobility Variation over Time and 
Place.” In Generational Income Mobility, Miles Corak, editor, Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Weiss, Yoram. 1986. “The Determination of Lifecycle Earnings: A Survey.” In 
Handbook of Labor Economics, Orley C. Ashenfelter and David Card, eds., 
Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
 176 
 
Willis, Robert J. 1986. “Wage Determinants: A Survey and Reinterpretation of Human 
Capital Earnings Functions.” In Handbook of Labor Economics, Orley C. 
Ashenfelter and David Card, eds., Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Woock, Christopher. 2009. “Earnings Losses of Injured Men: Reported and Unreported 
Injuries.” Industrial Relations 48(4): 610-628.  
Wooldridge, Jeffrey.  2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data.  
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. pgs. 608-13.  
Ziliak, James P., Bradley Hardy, and Christopher Bollinger. 2010.  “Earnings and Income  
Volatility in America: Evidence from Matched CPS.”  University of Kentucky 
Center for Poverty Research Discussion Paper Series, DP2010-05.  
http://www.ukcpr.org/Publications/DP2010-05.pdf 
Zimmerman, David J. 1992.  “Regression Toward Mediocrity in Economic Stature.” The  
American Economic Review 82(3):409-429. 
  
 177 
 
Vita  
 
Bradley L. Hardy 
 
Birthdate/Place: February 12, 1980, Little Rock, Arkansas 
 
 
Education 
 
 
Master of Public Policy, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., May 2004 
 
Bachelor of Arts, Magna Cum Laude, Economics, Morehouse College, Atlanta, G.A., 
May 2002 
 
 
Professional and Research Experience 
 
 
Graduate Research Fellow, University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research, August 
2007-Present 
 
Instructor, Economic and Business Statistics, University of Kentucky, Summer 2009 
 
Instructor, Introductory Macroeconomics, University of Kentucky, Summer 2008 
 
Teaching Assistant, Econometrics, AEA Summer Program and Minority Scholarship 
Program at Duke University, Summer 2007 
 
Research Assistant, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, August 2004-June 2006 
 
Research Assistant, Georgetown Public Policy Institute, August 2002-May 2003 
 
 
Academic Awards and Honors 
 
 
Southern Regional Education Board Doctoral Scholar, 2007-Present  
 
University of Kentucky Lyman T. Johnson Fellow, 2006-Present 
 
AEA Summer Program Participant and Minority Scholarship Recipient, 2002 & 2004   
 
Phi Beta Kappa - Delta of Georgia at Morehouse College, May 2002 
 
Top Ranking Senior Student in Economics, Morehouse College, May 2002 
 178 
 
Publications 
 
 
Ziliak, James P. (Research Assistance: Bradley Hardy, Charles Hokayem, and Tomnoy 
Islam). 2010. “Alternative Poverty Measures and the Geographic Distribution of Poverty 
in the United States,” Report Prepared for the Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Planning and Evaluation, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
 
Ziliak, James P., Charles Hokayem, and Bradley Hardy. 2008. “Child Care Subsidies and 
the Economic Well-Being of Recipient Families: A Survey and Implications for 
Kentucky,” Technical Report to Kentucky Youth Advocates and the Kentucky Cabinet 
for Health and Family Services 
http://www.ukcpr.org/Publications/ChildCareSubsidies.pdf 
 
Hardy, Bradley, James P. Ziliak, and Charles Hokayem. 2008. “The economic impact of 
child care subsidies for Kentucky,” University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research 
Occasional Policy Brief No. 3.  http://www.ukcpr.org/Publications/PolicyInsights3.pdf 
 
Hardy, Bradley, Richard Kogan, and Arloc Sherman, and. 2005.  “What Are The Effects 
of Cutting Domestic Appropriations Another Two Percent?,” Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities. http://www.cbpp.org/10-31-05bud.htm 
 
Parrott, Sharon, Arloc Sherman, and Bradley Hardy. 2005.  “House Budget Resolution 
Would Require Much Deeper Cuts In Key Low-Income Programs Than Senate Budget 
Plan: Depth and Breadth of Cuts a Key Issue in the Budget Resolution Conference,” 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.  http://www.cbpp.org/3-30-05bud.htm 
 
Parrott, Sharon, Jim Horney, Isaac Shapiro, Ruth Carlitz, Bradley Hardy, and David 
Kamin. 2005. “Where Would the Cuts Be Made Under the President’s Budget? An 
Analysis of Reductions in Education, Human Services, Environment, and Community 
Development Programs,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. http://www.cbpp.org/2-
22-05bud.htm 
 
 
Working Papers 
 
 
Hardy, Bradley L. 2011.  “Childhood Income Volatility and Adult Outcomes” 
 
Hardy, Bradley L. 2011. “A Cohort Analysis of Earnings Volatility”  
 
  
 179 
 
Ziliak, James P., Bradley Hardy, and Christopher Bollinger. 2011.  “Earnings Volatility 
in America: Evidence from Matched CPS.” (Conditional Acceptance at Labour 
Economics) 
 
Hardy, Bradley L. 2011. “Black Female Earnings and Income Volatility.” (Forthcoming 
at The Review of Black Political Economy)  
 
Hardy, Bradley 2009.  “Estimating the Effects of Immigration on Crime in Local Labor 
Markets” 
 
 
